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Abstract
This dissertation consists of an introduction and three essays on the determi-
nation of external imbalances and the real interest rate. In particular, the objec-
tive of the dissertation is to analyze the reasons behind the long-lasting current
account imbalances observed over the past decades in large open economies,
such as the current account deficit of the United States and the current account
surplus of China, as well as the concurrent long-term decline in the world real
interest rate.
In the first two essays, I focus on demographic change, social security and
fiscal policy as potential drivers of households’ consumption-saving decisions,
the current account and the world real interest rate. The analysis is based on
a dynamic general equilibrium model with an embedded life-cycle structure,
which allows me to study the role of life-cycle savings and intergenerational
transfers in the consumption-saving decisions, and in which fiscal policy is
non-Ricardian.
In the first essay I analyze how permanent differences in demographics,
social security and fiscal policy affect the external sector and the world real in-
terest rate in the long run, and compare the effects under fixed and variable
labour supply, which the literature on demographic change and external im-
balances often abstracts from. I find that, relatively high life expectancy and
low social security are associated with a positive net foreign asset position in
the two-country world. Because the impact of social security is quantitatively
large, a country with relatively low life expectancy may become a net creditor if
its social security is low enough. This result suggests that analyzing the effects
of social security could help us understand the observed low-frequency capital
flows from fast-growing emerging economies to industrialized countries. High
life expectancy is, in the model, associated with a low international real inter-
est rate, but endogenizing labour supply results in a higher real interest rate
for a given level of life expectancy. This indicates that the negative effect of
i
population ageing on the real interest rate might not be as strong as suggested
by several earlier studies.
The objective of the second essay is to analyze whether it is possible to repli-
cate the dynamics of China’s trade surplus vis-a-vis the United States over the
period 1980-2015, by taking into account the differences in demographic fac-
tors and social security between the countries. Productivity growth in China
has been approximately twice as rapid as in the United States during this pe-
riod, which, according to traditional neoclassical models, should imply high
investment and consumption rates, and result in a trade deficit. In my model,
China’s relatively rapid population ageing and low social security result in
high and increasing savings by Chinese households, so that even when China’s
high productivity growth is taken into account, the model produces a trade
surplus for China during the sample period.
In the third essay, I analyze the impact of the Chinese government’s mac-
roeconomic policies on the observed trade balance dynamics and the transmis-
sion of these policies to the United States in the 2000s. The analysis is based
on a life-cycle model, which includes features that describe the behavior of the
Chinese policymakers. In particular, I assume that private agents are excluded
from the international financial market, and that the public authorities can di-
rectly control the domestic real interest rate and the real exchange rate. I find
that macroeconomic policies, especially the undervaluation of China’s real ex-
change rate, and the growth in government expenditures and fiscal deficits run
by China and the United States, have had a positive impact on China’s trade
balance, and raised the international interest rate. However, the overall effect
of the policies depends qualitatively on the assumption of the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution.
Keywords: external imbalances, real interest rate, demographics, social security,
fiscal policy, capital controls, real exchange rate
JEL codes: E21, E22, E43, E62, F21, F32, F41, F42, G28
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1 Introduction
The world economic landscape has transformed greatly over the past few decades.
Especially notable is the growth of China, which has replaced Japan as the
world’s second largest economy (see figure 1.1), and become the world’s largest
exporter and second largest importer (see figure 1.2), overtaking most of the
major advanced economies in this respect.
A feature of the transformation of the international economic landscape is
the persistent imbalance of global trade. This is reflected in the persistent cur-
rent account imbalances run by several countries (see figure 1.3), which have
led to an increase in the total value of gross external asset holdings. Concur-
rently with this observed rise in resource exchange over time, i.e. intertemporal
trade, the past decades have witnessed a steady decline in the world real in-
terest rate (proxied by the US real interest rate, see figure 1.4). Because the
world real interest rate is the price of future consumption in terms of current
consumption, i.e. the intertemporal terms of trade, it is natural to conjecture
that the current account imbalances and the decline in the real interest rate are,
at least to some extent, driven by the same factors.
Policymakers have become increasingly concerned over the practical effects
of these phenomena. Increased overseas borrowing and financial interlinkages
have raised concerns about an increased risk of contagion of financial crises,
and fears of so-called sudden stops, i.e. situations in which foreign capital is
suddenly withdrawn, in countries that are external net borrowers. The decline
of the interest rate has made it more difficult for monetary policymakers to
stimulate the economy in economic downturns, and given rise to wealth re-
distributions across nations due to extensive external borrowing and lending.
Furthermore, China’s active role in international trade and its persistent trade
surplus have raised questions regarding to what extent the Chinese govern-
ment affects the trade surplus with its macroeconomic policies, and whether
these policies create an unfair trade advantage in a beggar-thy-neighbor man-
1
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ner.
Figure 1.1: The share of the 10 largest economies of the world GDP in 1990 and
2017, current US dollars. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
2018.
Figure 1.2: The share of the five largest economies of world merchandise ex-
ports (upper) and of world merchandise imports (lower) in 1983 and 2017.
Source: World Trade Statistical Review 2018.
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Figure 1.3: Current account as a share of GDP. Source: IMF, World Economic
Outlook 2018.
Figure 1.4: Annual interest rate on all US government securities and bonds
net of CPI inflation between 1985-2015. Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook
2016.
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These global economic trends have also challenged traditional economic
theory and policies based on it. A key challenge is to explain capital outflows
from fast-growing emerging economies. According to neoclassical economic
theory, countries with high productivity growth should experience high con-
sumption and investment rates, and therefore current account deficits. Yet cap-
ital outflows from several emerging economies have been observed. Another
major challenge is understanding the drivers of the long-term decline in the
world real interest rate, and how persistent the decline is, as it has significant
implications on the conduct of monetary policy.
Against this background, I analyze the long-run determinants of external
imbalances and the real interest rate. Due to the persistent nature of these phe-
nomena, I analyze factors that influence the external relations between coun-
tries over the long run, focusing in particular on factors that are i) due to house-
holds’ consumption-saving decisions over the life-cycle, and ii) due to different
government policies, including fiscal policy, social security, exchange rate pol-
icy, and interest rate policy. As figures 1.5 and 1.6 show, there are large and
persistent differences between countries in household saving rates as well as
in demographic characteristics, which, according to previous literature, have
a significant effect on households’ consumption-saving choices. Furthermore,
there have been large differences and long-term changes in government poli-
cies, including fiscal policy stances (see figure 1.7), between industrialized and
developing countries around the world.
The analysis is done using dynamic general equilibrium models with an
embedded life-cycle structure, and the main objective is to test the ability of
the theoretical macroeconomic models to explain and replicate the observed
dynamics in the external sector and the real interest rate in recent decades.
4
Figure 1.5: Household savings in China, the European Union and the United
States. Source: OECD Data.
Figure 1.6: Estimates (until 2015) and projections (from 2015 onwards) of the
old-age dependency ratio. Source: UN World Population prospects 2017.
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Figure 1.7: General government total expenditures and gross debt. Source:
IMF World Economic Outlook 2018.
1.1 Theoretical framework and methodology
The analysis is based on the microfounded macroeconomic general equilib-
rium theory in a dynamic setting, which I apply to study the determination
of the external balance and the real interest rate. I construct a dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium model consisting of households, a representative firm, and a
government, with an embedded life-cycle structure, which allows me to con-
sider life-cycle saving behavior and demographic changes. In the last essay,
the model is further extended to take into account features that describe the
behavior of Chinese policymakers which include capital controls and control
over the real exchange rate. Because the analysis is focused on the drivers of
external imbalances between large economies, I use a two-country framework
in which both economies are large enough to affect the international real inter-
est rate. This allows the analysis of the simultaneous determination of the real
interest rate and the external balance, and the transmission of economic shocks
between countries.
Intertemporal trade naturally arises in the two-country framework when
differences between the countries (e.g. different time preference rates or pro-
ductivity), induce different optimal time-paths of consumption, savings and
investment, so that resources are exchanged between the countries over time.
In my analysis, the time preference rate between the countries differs because
6
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of differences in their demographic factors and life-cycle characteristics. In ad-
dition, households’ time-path of consumption and savings is affected by the
presence of social security, the level of which differs between the countries,
and by other fiscal policies, including fiscal deficits run by the governments,
which affect the time-paths of taxation. The key element in the quantitative
analysis is that different policies have different effects on different generations
and between countries, as they depend on the life-expectancy and fertility rate
of the generations.
1.1.1 Life-cycle theory
The analysis of the effects of demographic change and social security on house-
holds’ savings and the external imbalances relies on the life-cycle hypothesis
of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954). According to that hypothesis, households
have different consumption-saving profiles over the life-cycle, which implies
that aggregate household savings, and therefore the external balance, depend
on the demographic structures of the economies. This motivates the choice of
departing from the representative agent framework and considering one with
heterogenous agents.
To capture life-cycle saving behavior, I use the life-cycle model of Gertler
(1999). Its foundations are the two-stage OLG models of Samuelson (1958) and
Diamond (1965), and the Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985) models with agents
with finite horizons.
The two-stage OLG models assume that, at each point in time, individu-
als of two different generations are alive and maximize their utility over the
two periods of their lifetime. Using these models it is thus possible to an-
alyze life-cycle savings and intergenerational transfers (social security). The
other building block, the Blanchard (1985)/Yaari (1965) framework, introduces
a representative household that faces a constant probability of surviving and
therefore a finite expected lifetime, which makes the household discount the
future more than in the infinite horizon case.
The Gertler (1999) framework combines the Samuelson (1958)/Diamond
(1965) and the Blanchard (1985)/Yaari (1965) models so that one can analyze
life-cycle behavior in the presence of uncertainty about lifetime. As in the Di-
amond (1965) framework, households live through two different stages in life:
a stage in which they are young, or workers, and a stage in which they are old,
or retirees. Unlike the Diamond (1965) model, households spend a stochastic
number of periods in each stage, which is governed by an exogenous survival
probability. All workers face the same probability of retiring, and all retirees
7
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the same probability of dying. These probabilities can be chosen so as to have
realistic average life expectancy, working time, and time spent in retirement
faced by the individual agents. At each point in time, different generations are
alive. The young in the economy consist of working age population born at
different points in time, and the old of retirees, who have been born and re-
tired at different points in time. This feature of the model allows for a realistic,
time-varying old age dependency ratio, and therefore the model is well suited
to analyzing the effects of population ageing, as observed in most advanced
and emerging economies.
In the model, the uncertainty about retirement time causes a risk to work-
ers’ wage income, which would lead to unrealistically high household sav-
ings. This risk is eliminated by using Epstein-Zin preferences, which allow me
to separate income risk aversion and elasticity of intertemporal subsitution, so
that one can assume that the agents are risk neutral with respect to income risk.
In addition, retirees face a risk because of the uncertainty of the time of death,
which means that they face the risk of leaving accidental bequests. This risk
is eliminated in the model by assuming a perfect annuities market following
Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985), which provides perfect insurance against
this risk.
Because the young and the old households have different expected life-
times, their discount factors differ. As the optimal consumption-saving de-
cisions of the households depend on their discount factors, the aggregate effect
of policies and shocks depends on the share of each age group in the economy,
i.e. the demographic composition. Moreover, because the discount factors are
endogenous and depend on demographic factors, differences in demographics
between economies result in different discount rates between economies, and
therefore different dynamic effects across the countries induced by different
policies.
I use this framework not only to analyze the effects of time-varying de-
mographic factors, but also of different policies - social security, interest rate
policy, exchange rate policy and fiscal policy - under different demographic
structures. This is currently a main concern given that, according to the latest
demographic forecast by the United Nations, the old age dependency ratio (the
number of population aged 65+ to population aged 20-64, for every 100) in the
United States is projected to rise from 24.6 in 2015 to 55.0 by 2100, and in China
from 14.5 to 64.1.
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1.1.2 Social security, fiscal policy, and external imbalances
A key objective of my thesis is to analyze the drivers behind Chinese house-
holds’ high savings. Given Chinese households’ relatively low life expectancy,
high household savings are puzzling since, in light of the life-cycle theory,
low life expectancy should be associated with low savings. Therefore, fea-
tures other than life-cycle behavior must drive household savings in China.
Accordingly, I analyze the effects of intergenerational transfers on life-cycle
savings behavior: in particular, I explore the role of low social security in old
age, as it has been suggested by earlier literature (e.g. Blanchard et al. (1989))
that intergenerational transfers (a pay-as-you-go social security system) from
households with low propensity to consume (the young) to households with
high propensity to consume (the old) are likely to lower private savings in a
life-cycle setting. The Gertler (1999) life-cycle model makes it possible to study
transfers of wealth across generations, taking into account the demographic
transition, which implies that the number of people who are contributing to
social security changes over time.
In addition to social security, I analyze the effects of government expendi-
ture and budget deficits on households’ consumption-saving decisions and the
current account. As shown in figure 1.7, government expenditures are higher
in developed economies, but over recent decades, they have grown in emerg-
ing economies as well, implying a larger tax burden on private agents. Fur-
thermore, fiscal deficits and government debt have grown both in developed
economies and in emerging countries, including China, over past decades.
The overlapping generations (OLG) model breaks the Ricardian equiva-
lence, so that the timing of taxes matters. Unlike in the representative agent
framework, government deficits induce income redistribution from future gen-
erations to current ones, and therefore fiscal deficits affect the equilibrium of
the economy and the current account balance.1 In a similar manner, in the life-
cycle economy, higher taxes in the future, which are needed to offset current
tax cuts, are discounted by the agents at a higher (endogenous) rate than the
risk-free rate used by the government to discount its future expenditures and
revenues. Hence, taxes occuring in the future are not fully capitalized by the
households and private savings do not fully offset public dissaving, so that a
budget deficit has a non-zero net effect on aggregate savings and the current
account.
In the first essay I analyze the effects of government expenditures and tax
policy on the steady state of the life-cycle economy, assuming that the demo-
1See e.g. discussion by Obstfeld et al. (1996) in section 3, or by Blanchard et al. (1989).
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graphic structures between the economies are identical. As the effects of the
timing of taxes depend on whether the taxes are distortionary or lump sum,
because labor income taxes affect households’ labor supply decisions, I com-
pare the effects of fiscal policy under lump sum and distortionary taxes.
In the third essay, I analyze the effects of fiscal policy on the dynamics of
the trade balance of China and the United States in the 2000s. Because of dif-
ferent discount factors between generations and across countries, the implica-
tions of fiscal policies are different between economies at different stages of
demographic transition. The dynamic simulations of the effects of fiscal policy
capture this effect, as the demographic variables are allowed to vary over time.
1.1.3 Intratemporal and intertemporal terms of trade
The first two essays of the thesis focus on factors that endogenously affect the
current account and the real interest rate, i.e. the intertemporal terms of trade.
In the last essay, I also analyze the case in which the government of one country
is able to set the level of the domestic interest rate directly. This is motivated by
the observation that, as China imposes capital controls on its domestic agents,
it has been able to set a domestic interest rate which has differed from the in-
ternational interest rate. As a result, over the Chinese transition period, the
Chinese real interest rate has been lower than the international real interest
rate. According to the Mundell-Fleming trilemma, a country can not simul-
taneously have free capital mobility, a fixed foreign exchange rate, and inde-
pendent monetary policy, because under fixed exchange rates and free capital
mobility, an interest rate spread would lead to capital flows until the uncov-
ered interest parity (UIP) would hold. By preventing capital flows, China can
prevent sales and purchases of assets denominated in its currency, and set an
interest rate that differs from the international interest rate.
In particular, in the last essay I assume that China can fully prevent capital
mobility and control its domestic interest rate, and analyze the quantitative
effects of interest rate spreads as observed in the 2000s. The interest rate policy
affects the economy both directly and indirectly: as the government can access
the world financial market and lend or borrow at a different interest rate than
the one faced by domestic private agents, as a result, Ricardian equivalence
breaks down.2
In addition to analyzing the effects of intertemporal terms of trade manip-
ulation, I analyze the effect of intratemporal terms of trade, i.e. the relative
2See discussion in section 4.B
10
1.2 SUMMARY OF THE ESSAYS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
price of imports and exports. As pointed out in several studies, including the
IMF External Sector Reports 2013-2018, China’s real exchange rate was under-
valued for a prolonged period in the 2000s. In the model, I assume that the
consumers consume domestic and foreign goods, which are imperfect sub-
stitutes, and one of the countries is able to directly affect the real exchange
rate (the price of the foreign goods at home and the price of domestic goods
abroad). This manipulation affects the consumption share of different goods
in the households’ consumption basket, but also the price of the consumption
basket today in comparison to the price of the consumption basket tomorrow.
This gives rise to two opposing effects: a negative wealth effect that lowers
household savings, and a positive substitution effect, due to which households
raise savings in order to substitute consumption into the future. In the third
essay, I analyze whether the impact of exogenous undervaluation in Chinese
real exchange rate has quantitatively significant effects on its external sector.
Distorting the time paths of terms of trade, both intertemporal and in-
tratemporal, has different effects on the consumption-saving behavior of the
different generations. Hence the effects of terms of trade manipulation de-
pends on the demographic structures of the economies, which is one of the
topics discussed in the third essay.
1.2 Summary of the essays and directions for future
research
This section summarizes the main findings of the essays which constitute the
main part of the dissertation, and discusses directions for future research.
1.2.1 Long-term factors behind external imbalances and the real
interest rate
In the first essay, I analyze the long-term determinants of the international real
interest rate and external imbalances, focusing on the effects of demographic
change, social security, and fiscal policy. Because the external imbalances and
the decline of the real interest rate, as well as the demographic transition and
social security and fiscal policy stances, have been very persistent, in this essay
I focus on steady state effects. As opposed to previous literature on demo-
graphics and external imbalances, I take into account the labor supply chan-
nel by allowing for endogenous labor supply by both the old and the young
11
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households. In addition, I present and compare the results under lump sum
and distortionary taxation.
In line with earlier literature, I find that a relatively high life expectancy pre-
dicts a positive net foreign asset position in the steady state, as it reinforces the
saving-for-retirement motive. I therefore find that population ageing is posi-
tively associated with aggregrate savings and negatively with the real interest
rate. Labor supply responses mitigate the effects of population ageing on ag-
gregate saving, and the effect on the world real interest rate, implying that the
link between population ageing and the world interest rate might not be as
strong as suggested by previous literature.
In addition, I find that high social security is associated with a negative net
foreign asset position. The impact of social security is quantitatively large, and
in the model, even a country with a relatively young population may become a
net creditor in the steady state if its social security expenditures are sufficiently
low. Furthermore, financing social security expenditures with budget deficits
reinforces their negative effects on private savings and the external asset posi-
tion.
The steady state analysis supports the hypothesis that social security and
fiscal policy can be important drivers behind the observed external imbalances
between emerging and advanced economies, as both social security expendi-
tures and fiscal deficits have typically been low in emerging economies in com-
parison to advanced countries.
1.2.2 External imbalances between China and the US: a dy-
namic analysis with a life-cycle model
In the second essay, I use a life-cycle model to analyze the dynamics of the
trade balance between China and the United States between 1980 and 2015.
The objective of the essay is to analyze the quantitative effects of China’s rel-
atively rapid population ageing and low social security expenditures on its
households’ savings, and to evaluate whether these factors can explain China’s
persistent trade surplus vis-a-vis the United States, which earlier literature has
struggled to explain due to the high productivity growth observed in China
over the past decades. Labor supply is assumed to be endogenous, and taxes
consist of distortionary labor income taxes.
The key result is that the effects of demographic change and social secu-
rity on China’s external imbalances are strong. Because of China’s relatively
rapid population ageing and relatively low social security expenditures, its ag-
12
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gregate savings are so high that the trade balance is positive for the majority
of the sample period even after taking into account the observed fast produc-
tivity growth and its positive impact on investment. The essay complements
the recent strand of literature, which explains the capital outflows from China
and other emerging economies by focusing on the role of financial markets, by
providing an alternative explanation for the high household saving rate and
current account surplus, which relies on life-cycle saving behavior.
1.2.3 China’s macroeconomic policies and spillover effects
In the third essay, I analyze the effects of the Chinese central government’s
macroeconomic policies on its external sector, and the transmission of these
policies to the United States via the world real interest rate. The essay is mo-
tivated by the observations that, during the 2000s, i) the Chinese real interest
rate has differed from the international interest rate, ii) the real exchange rate
has been undervalued for an extended period, and iii) the Chinese govern-
ment expenditures and fiscal deficits have grown, as have the fiscal deficits in
the United States.
For this purpose, I develop a model embedded with features that describe
the behavior of the Chinese policymakers. These features include capital con-
trols, which prevent the private sector from accessing the international finan-
cial market, and the existence of a consolidated central bank-government, which
is assumed to be able to access the international financial market and to directly
control the domestic interest rate and the real exchange rate. As demographic
factors are known to affect the external sector and the transmission of macroe-
conomic policies, and as the demographic structures between China and the
United States differ considerably, the analysis is based on the life-cycle frame-
work, which allows the demographic dynamics to be taken into account.
My results support the view that the Chinese government’s macroeconomic
policies have had a positive effect on its trade balance in the 2000s. Of the three
policies analyzed, the undervaluation of the exchange rate improves the trade
balance the most. Also, the increase in government expenditures in China, as
well as the fiscal deficits run by China and the United States, have had a posi-
tive effect on China’s trade balance and a negative effect on the trade balance of
the United States. However, I also find that the effects of the exchange rate pol-
icy on the external balance are qualitatively sensitive to the assumption about
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, as this parameter determines whether
the real exchange rate undervaluation results in an increase or decrease in pri-
vate savings.
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1.2.4 Directions for future research
The thesis opens several opportunities for future research.
While analyzing the life-cycle savings profiles of the households, one could
allow the individuals to care about future generations and leave bequests. Given
that, in many countries, household financial wealth is held to an increasing ex-
tent by the elderly, this can be an important aspect to consider when analyz-
ing life-cycle saving behavior. Furthermore, it would be possible to introduce
an endogenous retirement choice in the spirit of Feldstein (1974) and Munnell
(1974).
As regards the assumptions on factor mobility, by allowing for labor mobil-
ity between countries, the framework could be used to analyze the migration
incentives caused by demographic change and its economic consequences.
In order to better match the dynamics of external imbalances between emerg-
ing and industrialized economies, one could allow for different preferences,
different labor shares of production, or different capital depreciation rates, as
both the labor shares and the types of capital differ significantly between the
emerging and the industrialized world.
Finally, given that earlier literature (e.g. Fujiwara and Teranishi (2008))
shows that the effects of monetary policy depend on the demographic compo-
sition of an economy, it would be of interest to analyze the effects of monetary
policy shocks in countries that feature different demographic structures, such
as China and the United States. Furthermore, because the life-cycle structure
causes the households to discount future financial flows at a higher rate than
the government does, it would be of interest to analyze whether the life-cycle
framework could provide a solution to the forward guidance puzzle, i.e. the
observation that, in the standard representative agent New Keynesian model,
announcements about the future path of interest rates trigger responses in eco-
nomic activity that are too large compared to what is observed in the data.
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2 Long-term factors behind
external imbalances and the
real interest rate
.
2.1 Introduction
A large number of the world’s economies are characterized by persistent cur-
rent account imbalances and have therefore accumulated either a large positive
net foreign assets position or debt (current accounts of selected economies are
shown in figure 2.1). Between 1980 and 2015, 74 of 191 countries experienced
a period of at least 20 consecutive years of either current account surpluses or
deficits. At the same time, the world real interest rate, proxied by the real inter-
est rate on US government bonds in figure 2.1, has been falling for over three
decades.
The drivers of the external imbalances and the fall of the real interest rate
have become a key economic question in an environment characterized by in-
tegrated financial markets, high cross holdings of foreign assets, and low in-
terest rates. One explanation for the low-frequency capital flows and falling
real interest rate is the demographic transition, i.e. falling population growth
rate, caused by falling fertility rates and increasing life expectancy in differ-
ent parts of the world. Recent literature suggests that, by increasing the time
spent in retirement and lowering the support ratio, the demographic transition
causes excess savings in ageing economies, which results in capital outflows
and pushes down the real interest rate. For example, Ferrero (2010) argues that
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Figure 2.1: Left panel: Current account balances for China, Germany, India,
Japan and the United States between 1980-2017 (source: IMF, World Economic
Outlook). Right panel: Annual interest rate on all US government securities
and bonds (source: IMF, International Financial Statistics) net of CPI inflation
between 1980-2015 (source: IMF, World Economic Outlook).
the relatively rapid increase in life expectancy in the G6 countries in compari-
son with the US can explain a fraction of the dynamics of capital flows between
these countries, and Carvalho et al. (2016) argue that demographic changes are
a likely explanation for the observed long fall of the real interest rate.
Given the sizeable demographic changes that have taken place in the world’s
largest and most populous economies (see Appendix A), it seems likely that the
demographic transition has had a significant impact on global asset demand,
external imbalances and the real interest rate. However, previous literature on
the effects of demographics on external imbalances abstracts to a large extent
from the effects of ageing through the labor supply channel, nor does it con-
sider the effects of social security on households’ saving. Given that observed
labor force participation and employment rates as well as the level of social se-
curity income differ across regions, especially between emerging and industri-
alized countries, it seems reasonable to assume that the labor supply channel
and social security may have an significant effect on the external imbalances
between economies.
The main aim of this paper is to analyze the importance of demographic
change, social security and fiscal policy in determining external imbalances
and the real interest rate in the long run, and to analyze how the effect of popu-
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Figure 2.2: Left panel: Public pension spending (% of GDP) for the US and
China between 2000-2012 (sources: OECD Data on Social Protection and Asian
Development Bank: Social Protection Index Database). Right panel: Life ex-
pectancy at birth in the US and China between 1970-2015 (source: World Bank
Development Indicators).
lation ageing depends on the level of social security. Furthermore, it aims to an-
alyze how the endogeneity of labor supply and distortionary taxation change
the implications of social security and population ageing on the external im-
balances. To analyze these questions, I build a dynamic general equilibrium
model with the life-cycle structure proposed by Gertler (1999) featuring en-
dogenous labor supply with distortionary taxation and social security. Social
security is defined as a pay-as-you-go system consisting of lump-sum trans-
fers to the old, and the model consists of two large economies. The model is
calibrated to match an average of China and the United States (US) between
1980-2015.1The analysis focuses on the steady state.
The results show that relatively low social security predicts a negative trade
balance and a positive stock of foreign assets in the steady state. Because of low
pensions, households accumulate more financial wealth for retirement, which
increases the capital stock and pushes down the real interest rate. The effect
of social security on the external imbalances is quantitatively significant: for
the US, the observed difference in pension expenditures (shown in figure 2.2)
would predict an average foreign debt of 60 % of GDP between 1980-2015. The
model predicts that even if the life expectancy in a country is low, it can be-
come a net external creditor if its social security is low enough. Second, the
model predicts that the demographic transition leads to a fall in the real inter-
est rate. However, introducing endogenous labor supply to the model raises
1In Appendix 2.D I show the results for the model calibrated to match the US and other OECD
countries.
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the real interest rate and mutes the steady state effects of population ageing
on it. The reason is that agents can prepare for low pensions and higher ex-
pected time spent in retirement by increasing their labor supply, and therefore
population ageing does not raise household savings to the same extent as with
fixed labor supply. The model predicts the country with an older population to
have a positive net foreign asset position. For the US, the average differences
in life expectancy predict a positive net foreign asset of 20 % of GDP against
China. Finally, relatively low levels of government debt and expenditures are
also associated with a positive net foreign asset position.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on the
life-cycle framework, external imbalances and the real interest rate. Section 3
sets out the model. Section 4 analyzes the effects of social security, population
ageing and fiscal policy on external imbalances under different model spec-
ifications: with exogenous labor supply, with endogenous labor supply and
lump sum taxes, and endogenous labor supply and distortionary taxes. Sec-
tion 5 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
An extensive literature on international capital flows and the external balance
uses life-cycle and overlapping generations models to explain external bal-
ances and the interest rate. They provide a fruitful framework for analyzing
the effects of demography, social security and fiscal policy in determining the
current account.
This paper builds on the life-cycle model by Gertler (1999). The Gertler
model is based on the Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985) frameworks, which
introduce uncertainty of life-time to the macroeconomic models, and on the
two-stage overlapping generations model (OLG) by Diamond (1965), in which
individuals of two different generations are assumed to be alive at each point
in time, and maximize their utility over the two periods of their lifetime. The
Gertler (1999) model combines these frameworks by assuming that time spent
in both of the stages is finite and determined by an exogenous survival prob-
ability. Due to the life-cycle structure, the young households have a motive to
save for retirement, and the model facilitates the analysis of demographic fac-
tors, social security and fiscal policy. I extend the Gertler (1999) model into a
two-country world and provide an extensive analysis of social security, labor
supply, taxation and fiscal policy on the external sector in the steady state of
the model.
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Gertler’s model has been applied to study the effects of population age-
ing by Kilponen et al. (2006), Fujiwara and Teranishi (2008), Ferrero (2010) and
Carvalho et al. (2016). Kilponen et al. (2006) analyze the effects of social se-
curity and population ageing in a small open economy (Finland), taking the
international interest rate as given. Carvalho et al. (2016) analyze the effects
of population ageing, and also social security, in a closed economy with the
Gertler framework, and assume fixed labor supply. Fujiwara and Teranishi
(2008) explore the effects of structural shocks on workers and retirees in the
Gertler framework in a closed economy setting, abstracting from social secu-
rity and assuming lump sum taxes. Ferrero (2010) is, to my knowledge, the
only other application of the Gertler framework to study the effects of demo-
graphics in a two-country economy, but labor supply is taken as given and the
model does not feature social security or distortionary taxation.2
This paper is also related to a recent paper by Eugeni (2015), who ana-
lyzes the impact of social security on the external imbalances in a two-country,
two-stage OLG framework that maintains the structure of the Diamond (1965)
model. Eugeni shows that the country with lower social security has a positive
stock of net foreign assets and a negative trade balance in the long run in a dy-
namically efficient steady state, when the countries are equal in other aspects.
In comparison to this paper, in Eugeni (2015) the agents only live one period
while young and one while old, and therefore she does not study the effects
of demographic changes. In addition, her model abstracts from labor market
responses and the effects of fiscal policy.
The life-cycle and overlapping generations models provide a theoretical
framework for addressing the questions of how population aging, social secu-
rity and fiscal policy affect the external balance and real interest rate. The large
differences observed in labor supply, social security, and fiscal policy, across
countries, as well as the challenges that this literature encounters in explaining
the drivers of external balances between industrialized and developing coun-
tries in particular, motivates the inclusion of labor supply and social security
in the analysis and further investigation of the long-term determination of the
external imbalances.
2For studies of demographic changes and external balances in multi-country, multiperiod over-
lapping generations models, see Backus et al. (2014), Domeij and Floden (2006) and Saarenheimo
(2005).
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2.3 The model
The model is a symmetric two-country model which captures the effects of de-
mographic change through a life-cycle structure as in Gertler (1999). The pop-
ulation in a country at time t consists of two groups of individuals: workers,
whose total number is Nwt , and retirees, whose number equals N
r
t . All agents
enter the economy as workers at the age of 20, remain workers with probability
ωt,t+1 and retire with probability 1−ωt,t+1. Every period (1−ωt,t+1 + nt,t+1)Nwt
new workers are born. Thus the number of workers grows each period at rate
nt,t+1 and the law of motion for aggregate labor force is
Nwt+1 = (1−ωt,t+1 + nt,t+1)Nwt +ωt,t+1Nwt = (1+ nt,t+1)Nwt . (2.1)
At time t, the probability of a retiree to survive to the next period is γt,t+1.
The law of motion for the number of retirees is
Nrt+1 = (1−ωt,t+1)Nwt + γt,t+1Nrt . (2.2)
The ratio of the number of retirees to the number of workers, dependency
ratio, is given by ψt = Nrt /N
w
t and can be solved to evolve according to
(1+ nt,t+1)ψt+1 = (1−ωt,t+1) + γt,t+1ψt. (2.3)
2.3.1 Households
The preferences of households are given by a CES nonexpected utility function
of the form
Vzt =
{[
(Czt )
v (1− lzt )1−v
]ρ
+ βzt,t+1
[
Et (Vt+1 | z)µ
] ρ
µ
} 1
ρ
, z = {w , r} (2.4)
where Czt is consumption and l
z
t the fraction of total time allocated to work
at time t of a person type z (retiree if z = r and worker if z = w). βzt is the sub-
jective discount factor, and Et (Vt+1 | z) is the expectation of the value function
for the next period of the person of type z. The Epstein-Zin preferences allow
the separation of income risk aversion from aversion to intertemporal substi-
tution. Parameter ρ captures intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which is
given by σ = 1/ (1− ρ). Parameter µ captures attitudes towards income risk.
Risk neutrality (i.e. µ = 1) is assumed, because the only source of income risk
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is the exogenous probability of retirement and thus the effect of income risk
aversion is mitigated.
2.3.1.1 Retirees
Retirees’ expectation of the value function is Et (Vt+1 | r) = Vrt+1 and because
the retiree takes into account the survival probability γt,t+1, the effective dis-
count factor is βrt,t+1 = βγt,t+1. A retiree born in period j and retired in period
i chooses consumption-saving allocation and leisure to maximize
V jrt (i) =
{[(
Cjrt (i)
)v
(1− lrt )1−v
]ρ
+ βγt,t+1
(
V jrt+1(i)
)ρ} 1ρ
(2.5)
subject to
Ajrt+1 (i) =
RtA
jr
t (i)
γt−1,t
+Wtξl
jr
t (1− τt) + Sjrt (i)− Cjrt (i) . (2.6)
Retirees consume out of their non-human wealth Art , labor income Wtξl
jr
t
net of taxes τt and lump sum social security transfer S
jr
t (i). The productivity of
a unit of labor provided by retirees is only ξ times that of a worker (ξ ∈ (0 , 1)),
which leads to a lower labor supply by retirees in the equilibrium.3 Retirees
participate in a perfect annuities market that provides insurance against the
uncertainty of the time of death so that each retiree receives a gross return on
wealth of RW,t/γt−1,t. RW,t is the world interest rate that clears the interna-
tional capital market. The pension scheme is a public pay-as-you-go (PAYG)
pension system in which social security income is financed with transfers from
the taxpayers to the retirees.
The first order condition with respect to leisure is
l jrt (i) = 1−
Cjrt (i)ς
Wtξ(1− τt) , (2.7)
where ς = 1−vv . The consumption Euler equation for a retiree is
3Evidence from the EU countries suggests that the working decision is relevant for retired pop-
ulation, as 16% of old-age pensioners keep working. The majority do so for financial reasons (see
Appendix B: Employed old-age pensioners in the EU-28).
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Cjrt+1(i) = C
jr
t (i)
[(
Wt(1− τt)
Wt+1(1− τt+1)
)ρ(1−v)
βRt+1
]σ
. (2.8)
The retiree’s marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is etpit and de-
cision rule for consumption is given by
Cjrt (i) = etpit
(
RW,tA
jr
t (i)
γt
+ H jrt (i) + P
jr
t (i)
)
, (2.9)
where H jrt (i) is the present discounted value of a retiree’s lifetime human
wealth and Pjrt (i) is the present discounted value of a retiree’s lifetime pension
benefits, given by
H jrt (i) = Wt(1− τt)ξl jrt (i) +
H jrt+1(i)
Rt+1/γt+1
and
Prt = S
r
t +
Prt+1
Rt+1/γt,t+1
. (2.10)
The marginal propensity to consume evolves according to the nonlinear
difference equation
etpit = 1− etpit
et+1pit+1
γt,t+1
(
Wt(1− τt)
Wt+1(1− τt+1)
)ρσ(1−v)
βσ(Rt+1)ρσ. (2.11)
2.3.1.2 Workers
Workers’ expected value function is Et (Vt+1 | w) = ωt,t+1Vwt+1 +(1−ωt,t+1)Vrt+1
and the effective discount factor is βwt,t+1 = β. A worker born in period j
chooses consumption-saving allocation and leisure to maximize
V jwt ={[(
Cjwt
)v (
1− l jwt
)1−v]ρ
+ β
[
ωt,t+1V
jw
t+1 + (1−ωt,t+1)V jrt+1
]ρ} 1ρ
(2.12)
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subject to
Ajwt+1 = RW,tA
jw
t +Wtl
jw
t (1− τt)− Cjwt − T jwt . (2.13)
Like retirees, workers consume out of nonhuman wealth and wage income
net of taxes less a lump sum tax paid by each worker. The proportional income
tax (τt) is paid both by the workers and the retirees. Workers and retirees in
both countries consume a single (numeraire) good that can be traded interna-
tionally.
The first order condition with respect to labor is
lwjt = 1−
Cwjt ς
Wt(1− τt) . (2.14)
The consumption Euler equation for workers is
Cjwt
[(
Wt(1− τt)
Wt+1(1− τt+1)
)ρ(1−v)
βRW,t+1Ωt+1
]σ
= ωt,t+1C
jw
t+1 + (1−ωt,t+1)e
σ
1−σ
t+1 χC
jr
t+1 (2.15)
where χ = ξ−(1−v) and Ωt is an adjustment term that weights the gross
return, i.e. an additional discount factor in the workers value function, given
by Ωt ≡ ωt−1,t + (1−ωt−1,t)e
1
1−σ
t χ.
The worker’s marginal propensity to consume out of wealth, pit, evolves
according to
pit = 1− pit
pit+1
(
Wt(1− τt)
Wt+1(1− τt+1)
)ρσ(1−v)
βσ(RW,t+1Ωt+1)σ−1. (2.16)
The worker’s decision rule for consumption is
Cjwt = pit(RW,tA
jw
t + H
jw
t + P
jw
t ) (2.17)
where H jwt is the present discounted value of a worker’s human wealth
net of taxation and Pjrt is the present discounted value of a worker’s pension
benefits once retired. They are given by
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Hwjt =Wtl
jw
t (1− τt)− Twt +
ωt+1H
jw
t+1
Ωt+1Rt+1
+
(1−ωt+1)χε
1− 1ρ
t+1 H
r
t+1
Ωt+1Rt+1
and
Pwjt =
ωt+1P
jw
t+1
Ωt+1Rt+1
+
(1−ωt+1)χε
1− 1ρ
t+1 P
r
t+1
Ωt+1Rt+1
.
The effective discount rate of the workers is thereforeΩt+1Rt+1/ωt+1, where
Ωt is an additional discount factor which captures the fact that because the
workers expect life to be finite, they value the future less than the present and
therefore Ωt+1 > 1 as discussed in Gertler (1999).
1.2 Aggregation
Because marginal propensities to consume, both for retirees and workers, do
not depend on individual characteristics, aggregate consumption can then be
expressed as
Ct = pitAtRW,t(etλt + 1− λt) + pit(Hwt + Pwt ) + etpit(Hrt + Prt ) (2.18)
where λt is the share of assets held by retirees such that λt =
Art
At . The dis-
tribution of aggregate assets between retirees and workers evolves according
to
λt+1 = ωt,t+1
(
RW,tλt
At(1− etpit)
At+1
+
W(1− τt)Lrtξ + Srt − etpit(Hrt + Prt )
At+1
)
+ (1−ωt,t+1). (2.19)
Aggregate labor supply by workers is
Lwt = N
w
t −
ς
Wt(1− τt)C
w
t (2.20)
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and that of retirees
Lrt = N
r
t +
ς
Wt(1− τt)C
r
t . (2.21)
The present discounted value of retirees’ aggregate human wealth is
Hrt = ξL
r
tWt(1− τt) + γt,t+1
ψt
ψt+1
Hrt+1
(1+ nt,t+1)Rt+1
(2.22)
where ψt is the old age dependency ratio, i.e. ψt =
Nrt
Nwt
, and nt,t+1 is the
growth rate of the number of workers between periods t and t + 1. The dis-
count rate of the present value of total human wealth for current retirees is
augmented by the growth rate of the retired labor force
(
ψt
ψt+1
)
. Similarly, the
present discounted value of workers’ aggregate human wealth is
Hwt = L
w
t Wt(1− τt)− twt Yt
+ωt,t+1
Hwt+1
(1+ nt,t+1)RW,t+1Ωt+1
+ (1−ωt,t+1)
Hrt+1e
1
1−σ
t+1 χ
ψt+1(1+ nt,t+1)RW,t+1Ωt+1
. (2.23)
Present discounted value of retirees’ aggregate pension benefits at time t is
Prt = St + γt,t+1
ψt
ψt+1
Prt+1
Rt+1
(2.24)
and the present discounted value of social security for workers
Pwt = ωt,t+1
Pwt+1
(1+ nt,t+1)RW,t+1Ωt+1
+ (1−ωt,t+1)
Prt+1e
1
1−σ
t+1 χ
ψt+1(1+ nt,t+1)RW,t+1Ωt+1
. (2.25)
2.3.2 Firms
The goods market is competitive and the representative firm produces the con-
sumption good with constant returns to scale under Cobb-Douglas production
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technology. Aggregate output is given by Yt = (XtLt)
α K1−αt , where Xt is the
level of exogenous labor augmenting productivity at time t, Lt is the aggregate
effective labor force, Kt is physical capital, and α ∈ (0 , 1) is the labor share. The
firm chooses labor, capital and investment to maximize the present discounted
value of profits given by
V (It−1 , Kt) =
[
(XtLt)
α K1−αt −WtLt − It +
V (It , Kt+1)
Rt+1
]
(2.26)
subject to the law of motion of capital accumulation
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +
[
1− φ
2
(
It
It−1
− µt
)2]
It. (2.27)
The aggregate effective labor force consists of the effective labor input by
the two agent types such that Lt = Lwt + ξL
r
t . Capital depreciates at rate
δ ∈ (0 , 1) and quadratic adjustment cost makes investing new capital costly.
The size of the adjustment cost is determined by φ > 0. The term µt ensures
that investment adjustment costs equal zero along the balanced growth path.
Productivity Xt grows at rate xt, which follows an AR(1) process given by
xt = (1− θ)xss + θxt−1 + uxt .
2.3.3 Government
The government consumes Gt in each period and pays retirees a total amount
of Pt of social security benefits. The expenditures are financed with tax rev-
enues Tt and by issuing debt Bt+1. Government spending, social security and
fiscal policy are assumed to be an exogenously determined fraction of output:
Gt = g¯tYt, Pt = p¯tYt and Bt = b¯tYt−1, and the government adjusts taxes to
satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint. The government’s per period bud-
get constraint is Bt+1 = RW,tBt + Gt + Pt − Tt and the intertemporal budget
constraint is
RW,tBt =
∞
∑
v=0
Tt+v
∏vz=1 RW,t+z
−
∞
∑
v=0
Gt+v
∏vz=1 RW,t+z
−
∞
∑
v=0
Pt+v
∏vz=1 RW,t+z
. (2.28)
The government’s per period discount rate equals the world interest rate
RW,t and is lower than the households’ per period discount rates. With elastic
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labor supply, total tax revenue is
Tt = τtWtLt + Nwt T
w
t . (2.29)
Labor tax τt is endogenously adjusted according to the fiscal policy rule.
The rule ties the tax rate to the level of government debt as in Leeper (1991) so
that the tax rate follows
τt = τt−1 + θ
[
bt − b¯t
]
. (2.30)
In the steady state, government debt is an exogenously given fraction b¯ of
the output and taxes are adjusted to satisfy the governments budget constraint.
2.3.4 A competitive world equilibrium and the external sector
A competitive world equilibrium is a sequence of quantities and prices such
that in each country (i) households maximize utility subject to their budget
constraints, (ii) firms maximize profits subject to their technology constraints,
(iii) the government chooses a path for taxes and debt, compatible with in-
tertemporal solvency, to finance an exogenous level of total spending, and (iv)
all markets clear.
In each economy, households’ aggregate nonhuman wealth equals the ag-
gregate capital stock, government bonds and net foreign assets Ft,
At = Kt + Bt + Ft. (2.31)
Net foreign asset position evolves according to
Ft+1 = RW,tFt + NXt (2.32)
and the trade balance NXt is determined by the aggregate resource constraint
NXt = Yt − (Ct + It + Gt) . (2.33)
The current account, the change in the net foreign asset position, consists of
net interest payments on foreign assets and the trade balance
CAt = (RW,t − 1) Ft + NXt. (2.34)
Return RW,t is equalized across the two countries and in equilibrium, foreign
asset positions in the two countries sum up to 0, i.e. Ft + F∗t = 0. The law of
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one price is assumed to hold.
I allow population and productivity to grow in the steady state and there-
fore the model needs to be stationarized. In the steady-state, quantity variables
grow at the constant rate (1+ x) (1+ n) ' 1+ x+ n. The stationarized model
is solved for variables in efficiency units, for example, ct = Ct/ (XtNwt ) where
Xt is the level of productivity and Nwt the growth rate of population. The equa-
tions characterizing the steady state are presented in Appendix 2.G.
2.4 Asymmetries and determination of the external
balance
This section analyzes the effects of social security and life expectancy on the
steady state trade balance, net foreign asset position and the real interest rate
under three model specification: with fixed labor supply and lump sum taxes,
with variable labor supply and lump sum taxes only (τwt = τ
w = 0) and vari-
able labor supply and distortionary taxes only (Twt = T
w = 0).4 In addition,
the section discusses the role of government debt and expenditures in driving
external imbalances.
The model is calibrated such that the steady state values of the key demo-
graphic parameters, labor market variables, great ratios and the world interest
rate match the average between China and the Unites States between 1980 and
2015.5 Table 2.1 shows the targeted moments and parameter values.
Following Ferrero (2010) and Carvalho et al. (2016), the discount factor, β,
is set at 0.98, the labor share of income, α, at 2/3, and the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution, σ, at 0.5. The depreciation rate is 20 %. Consumption share
of periodic utility, v, is 0.8 as in Kilponen et al. (2006). The productivity of one
unit of labor supplied by a retiree relative to a worker, ξ, is 0.58.
The average of total factor productivity of China and the United States be-
tween 1980-2012 is used as proxy for growth in labor augmenting productivity.
The annual growth rate of the working age population, nwt,t+1 = n
w, matches
the average annual population growth rate 1980-2015 of approximately 2 %
between China and the US.
The probability of remaining a worker, ωt,t+1 = ω , is calibrated to match
the average effective age of retirement of 64 years in China and the United
4Labor supply is fixed when v = 1 and ξ = 0.
5See Appendix G for data sources.
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Parameter / exogenous variable Value
β discount factor 0.98
α labor share 23
δ discount rate 0.2
σ elasticity of intertemporal substitution 0.5
ξ productivity of a unit of labor, retiree to worker 0.58
v elasticity of period utility with respect to consumption 0.8
x growth rate of technology 0.014
nw population growth rate, population aged 20-64 years 0.02
γ probability to survive (if retired) 0.9
ω probability to stay in the labor force 0.9773
b government debt, % of gdp 0.3
g government spending, % of gdp 0.15
s social security spending, % of gdp 0.04
Table 2.1: Calibration for the open economy. Source: α, σ and δ are from Ferrero
(2010). The rest of the parameters are chosen to match data for US and China
1980-2015.
States between 1980-2014.6 Retirement age is calculated as the average retire-
ment age between the two genders weighted by their share in the labor force.
The probability of surviving, γt,t+1 = γ, is calibrated to match the average
life expectancy at birth of 74 years between the countries, given the retirement
age. Government net debt b is set at 30% of GDP. GDP share of government
spending is set at 15 % following the average between China and the US in
1980-2015. The level of social security spending matches the average public
pension spending of 4 % of GDP between the countries in 1980-2013.7The rel-
ative size of the countries, X
China
t N
w,China
t
XUSt N
w,US
t
, is 1.4, matching the average ratio of
the economies’ productivity levels X
China
t
XUSt
times the average ratio of population
sizes, N
w,China
t
Nw,USt
, between 1980-2015.
The countries’ stationarized net foreign assets evolve according to
ft = Rt ft−1(1+ xt−1,t + nt−1,t) + nxt (2.35)
6For China, data is from 1987-2010.
7Data on Chinese public pension expenditures is available only for 2004-2013. Therefore it is
assumed that China’s pension expenditures have remained at the average observed level between
these years prior to 2004 as well. Values for 2006-2007 and 2011-2012 have been linearly interpo-
lated.
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Therefore in the steady state, the net foreign asset position is given by
f =
nx(1+ x+ n)
(1+ x+ n− R) . (2.36)
When the economy is dynamically efficient, i.e. R ≥ 1 + x + n, unless the
trade is balanced, one economy must run a positive trade balance while main-
taining a negative foreign asset position, and vice versa for the other. When the
world interest rate exceeds the growth rate of the economy, the creditor coun-
try can finance its imports with the interest payment it receives on its foreign
claims. In an inefficient world, a country can have a negative trade balance in
addition to a negative foreign asset position in the steady state.
The stationarized current account in the steady state is given by
ca = (R− 1) f
1+ x+ n
+ nx . (2.37)
The sign of the current account in the steady state is therefore determined
by the relative sizes of the trade balance and the net interest payment on foreign
assets.
Another feature of the open economy steady state is that because both coun-
tries are using the same production technology, the stock of capital as a share
of efficient labor force is given by
K
XL
=
[
(1− α)
R− 1+ δ
] 1
α
(2.38)
which is equalized across the countries. Therefore, output in efficiency
units is equalized as well.
2.4.1 Social security
This section analyzes the steady-state effect of differences in social security
spending on the external imbalances. Social security spending is increased
from 2 to 7 % of GDP in country 2 and kept at 6 % in country 1, which matches
the observed differences between China and the US. Between 1980 and 2015,
average public pension spending was 6 % of GDP in the US and in China, 2 %
between 2005-2015.8
8Data for Chinese public pension spending is available only from 2005 onwards.
32
2.4 ASYMMETRIES AND DETERMINATION OF THE EXTERNAL BALANCE
Figure 2.3: Social security. Steady state values for 0.02 ≤ s2 ≤ 0.07 and s1 =
0.06 with fixed labor supply. The vertical line shows the steady state when
s1 = s2 and the countries are identical. The point where s2 = 0.02 corresponds
to the observed public pension expenditure-to-GDP ratio in China.
Figure 2.3 shows that the country with lower social security spending has
a positive net foreign asset position and runs a trade deficit in the steady state
(country 2 (China) left of the vertical line; at the vertical line, s1 = s2).9 As social
security is lower, households insure consumption during retirement by accu-
mulating assets and therefore financial wealth, and aggregate consumption is
higher. High aggregate consumption is driven by consumption of the working-
age population, since the effect on retirees’ consumption is small. Lump sum
social security payments constitute a transfer of wealth from the workers to the
retirees, and as the old have a higher marginal propensity to consume, high so-
cial security increases consumption among retirees as in country 1. However,
the intergenerational transfer of wealth increases taxes and, through a nega-
tive income effect, lowers consumption among the working-age population.
Given the large share of working-age population, the aggregate effect on con-
sumption is negative. As consumption is higher in the country with low social
security, it runs a negative trade balance in the steady state. The imports are
financed by interest payments on the country’s net foreign assets.
The higher the share of social security spending in country 2, the lower the
9The prediction of the model - that a country with lower social security has a negative trade
balance in a dynamically efficient steady-state - is in line with the results of Eugeni (2015).
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incentive to save for retirement and therefore the smaller the amount of world
financial wealth. This lowers the capital stock and investments, and raises the
real interest rate. A low interest rate benefits the country with an external debt.
Less needs to be exported in order to pay back the foreign debt. The bilateral
trade balance is therefore smaller when the difference in the countries’ social
security expenditures is smaller.
When variable labor supply is assumed (figure 2.4), households can also ad-
just to different levels of social security by adjusting their labor supply, work-
ing both during active working life and retirement. This reduces the need to
accumulate financial wealth before retirement, as working is also possible in
old age, and the households can also maintain higher levels of consumption
while working by increasing labor supply. Figure 2.4 shows that with variable
labor supply, the interest rate is lower for all levels of social security. The figure
also shows that the interest rate is more sensitive to the level of social security
when labor supply is fixed, and therefore the impact of social security on the
trade balance is also larger. The seemingly large effect of endogenous labor
supply on the trade balance is driven by the high real interest rate. By adjust-
ing the value of the discount factor β, it can be seen that the β-adjusted effect
of introducing variable labor supply on the trade balance is small.
Figure 2.5 shows the effects of social security with lump sum and distor-
tionary taxes. Distortionary taxes lower the labor supply of both workers and
retirees, and propensities to consume are lower and financial wealth higher.
Therefore with distortionary taxes, the world financial wealth is lower and the
interest rate higher for all levels of social security. Again, the β-adjusted effect
of introducing variable labor supply on the trade balance is small.
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Figure 2.4: Social security: fixed vs. variable labor supply. Steady state val-
ues for 0.02 ≤ s2 ≤ 0.07 and s1 = 0.06 with fixed (thick lines) and variable
labor supply (thin lines). The vertical line shows the steady state when s1 = s2
and the countries are identical. The point where s2 = 0.02 corresponds to the
observed public pension expenditure-to-GDP ratio in China.
Figure 2.5: Social security: lump sum vs. distortionary taxes. Steady state
values for 0.02 ≤ s2 ≤ 0.07 and s1 = 0.06 with lump sum taxes (thin lines) and
labor income taxes (thick lines). The vertical line shows the steady state when
s1 = s2 and the countries are identical. The point where s2 = 0.02 corresponds
to the observed public pension expenditure-to-GDP ratio in China.
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Figure 2.6: Population ageing. Steady state values for 0.86 ≤ γ2 ≤ 0.91 and
γ1 = 0.9 with fixed labor supply for US (blue line) and China (red dotted line)
. The vertical line shows the steady state when γ1 = γ2.
2.4.2 Life expectancy
This section analyses the effects of life expectancy on external imbalances, shown
in figure 2.6. Life expectancy varies in country 2 (’China’), while staying con-
stant in country 1 (’US’). The point at which the countries are identical is indi-
cated by the vertical line. When γ2 < 0.9 (γ2 > 0.9 ), life expectancy in country
2 is lower (higher) than in country 1. The average life expectancy between the
countries between 1980-2015, 74 years, corresponds to γ = 0.9. The average
life expectancy in China in the same period was 72 years, corresponding to
γ2 = 0.87.
Figure 2.6 shows that the country where life expectancy is higher maintains
a negative trade balance and a positive net foreign asset position in the steady
state. As can be seen from equations (2.11) and (3.11), a larger γ leads to lower
marginal propensities to consume as agents need to spread their consumption
over a longer lifetime.10 Because households need to save for a longer retire-
ment period, its financial wealth and capital stock are higher. For the country
with lower life expectancy, the world interest rate is below its autarky rate, and
therefore it is willing to borrow from abroad.
Even though the country with higher life expectancy is constantly running
a negative trade balance, as the economy is dynamically efficient, the coun-
10See Ferrero (2010) for an analytical proof.
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Figure 2.7: Population ageing: fixed vs. variable labor supply. Steady state
values for 0.86 ≤ γ2 ≤ 0.91 and γ1 = 0.9 for US (blue line) and China (red
dotted line) with fixed labor supply (thick lines) and variable labor supply (thin
lines). The vertical line shows the steady state when γ1 = γ2.
try earns a high enough interest rate on its foreign assets to be able to hold
a positive net foreign asset position. Its negative trade balance also reflects
its relatively high aggregate consumption. Even though marginal propensities
to consume are higher in the country with a younger population, aggregate
consumption in the country with higher life expectancy is higher for three rea-
sons: its residents are wealthier, a higher share of nonhuman wealth is held by
retirees, and the dependency ratio is higher.
With variable labor supply (see figure 2.7), the steady state interest rate is
higher for all levels of life expectancy. This is higher due to lower financial
wealth. A change in life expectancy in country 2 increases its financial wealth,
but also leads to higher labor supply, especially from the retirees. Therefore the
fall in the real interest rate is muted. Again, the difference in the level of interest
rate drives the large differences in trade balance. With β-adjusted calibration,
the effect of labor supply on the trade balance is small. With distortionary
taxes (see figure 2.8), labor supply among both retirees and workers is lower
for all levels of life expectancy and the level of financial wealth is higher, which
lowers the interest rate. With lower labor supply and interest rates, marginal
propensities to consume are lower and the differences in consumption share
of output between the countries smaller. Therefore the external imbalances
remain smaller with distortionary taxation.
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Figure 2.8: Population ageing: lump sum vs. distortionary taxation. Steady
state values for 0.86 ≤ γ2 ≤ 0.91 and γ1 = 0.9 for US (blue line) and China
(red dotted line) with lump sum taxes (thin lines) and distortionary taxes (thick
lines). The vertical line shows the steady state when γ1 = γ2.
The steady state effects of life expectancy depend on the level of pensions.
Figure 2.9 shows the steady-state implications of life expectancy for different
levels of pension expenditures (country 1: 0, 2 and 4 % of GDP; country 2:
4 % of GDP (constant)). As before, life expectancy varies along the x-axis (
0.85 ≤ γ1 ≤ 0.95, γ2 = 0.9). Even though low life-expectancy lowers the
country’s financial wealth and predicts a negative net foreign asset position
if pension spending is identical in both countries (s1 = s2 = 4%; the yellow
dotted line), if a country’s pension expenditures are small enough relative to
the other country, it can nevertheless have a positive net foreign asset position.
In addition, with higher social security expenditures, population aging has a
stronger impact on the country’s external imbalances and the real interest rate.
The higher the social security, the larger the tax burden on the working-age
population, which lowers the labor supply, encourages savings and pushes
down the interest rate. Finally, the impact of the level of social security is grea-
ter when life expectancy is low. Because aggregate social security expenditures
are by assumption a constant fraction of the GDP, high life expectancy and
therefore a high dependency ratio lowers the size of the lump sum transfer per
retiree. Therefore, as the world economy grows older, the importance of social
security in determining the external balance is mitigated.
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Figure 2.9: Effect of social security on the steady state impact of population
aging. Life expectancy varies in country 1 such that 0.85 ≤ γ1 ≤ 0.95. In
country 2, γ2 = 0.9. At the vertical line, γ1 = γ2. Social security expenditures
in country 1 are 0 % of GDP (blue line), 4 % of GDP (red dotted line) or 8 % of
GDP (yellow dotted line). Social security expenditures in country 2 are 4 % of
GDP.
2.4.3 Government debt
Figure 2.10 shows how a difference in the level of government debt affects the
external balance and how the steady state changes when the level of govern-
ment debt in country 1 changes from 0 to 60 % of GDP while it stays at 30 % of
GDP in country 2.
The non-Ricardian effects of government debt in the model are caused by
the life-cycle structure and the tax distortions. Due to the life-cycle structure,
the expected lifetime of workers is finite and therefore their discount rate ex-
ceeds the discount rate of the government. Because the workers less than fully
capitalize the higher future tax flows related to higher government debt, gov-
ernment debt increases consumption and lowers savings, which brings down
the capital stock and pushes up the interest rate. However, the permanently
higher debt level leads to higher taxes in the current period as well, as inter-
est expenses on the public debt are higher. This lowers labor supply and the
value of human wealth, lowering consumption and savings. In the aggregate,
households are less wealthy in the more indebted country and the country’s
aggregate consumption is lower. Therefore the country runs a positive trade
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Figure 2.10: Government debt. Steady states for 0 ≤ b1 ≤ 0.6 and b2 = 0.3
with variable labor supply and distortionary taxes for country 1 (red line) and
country 2 (blue line). At the leftmost vertical line, the countries are identical.
balance and, as its capital supply is lower, holds a negative amount of foreign
assets in the steady state.
The level of government debt also has an impact on the steady-state effects
of social security. In section 2.4.1 we saw that a country with relatively low
social security is a net debtor in a dynamically efficient steady state. However,
the result depends on how the social expenditures are financed, since a rela-
tively high level of government debt alone has the opposite influence, as seen
above.
Figure 2.11 plots the real interest rates and external balances for different
levels of government debt (20-70 % of GDP) and social security (0, 2 or 4 %
of GDP) in country 1. The level of government debt and social security ex-
penditures are constant in country 2 (30% and 4% of GDP respectively). With
high government debt in country 1, the effect of social security on the trade
balance is greater. Therefore the importance of social security in determining
the external balance is greater if it is financed with government debt.
2.4.4 Government expenditures
Finally, figure 2.12 shows the steady state effect of government expenditures
on the external balance. Government consumption in country 1 (’US’) varies
between 10 and 20 % of GDP, and stays at 15 % of GDP in country 2 (’China’).
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Figure 2.11: Effect of social security on the impact of government debt. Gov-
ernment debt varies in both countries such that 0.2 ≤ b1 ≤ 0.7. In country 2,
b2 = 0.65. Social security expenditures in country 1 are 0 % of GDP (blue line),
4 % of GDP (red dotted line) or 8 % of GDP (yellow dotted line). Social security
expenditures in country 2 are 8 % of GDP.
Between 1980-2015, the average government expenditures between China and
US were 15 % of GDP.
The country with lower government consumption has a positive foreign as-
set position and runs a trade deficit, provided that the economy is dynamically
efficient. Tax rate is higher in the country with higher government expenditure,
which crowds out private consumption and savings and lowers employment.
In the country with less government expenditures consumption as well as em-
ployment are higher. Higher private consumption in the steady state leads this
country to run a negative trade balance and hold a positive amount of foreign
assets in the steady state. The higher the government expenditures in country
1, the more private consumption is crowded out. With the higher real inter-
est rate, capital intensity is lower in both countries. The crowding-out effect
is stronger in country 1. As capital intensity is lower, the marginal product of
labor falls and output is lower in both countries.
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Figure 2.12: Government spending. Steady states for 0.1 ≤ g1 ≤ 0.2 and
g2 = 0.15 with variable labor supply and distortionary taxesfor country 1 (red
line) and country 2 (blue line). At the vertical line, g1 = g2.
2.5 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the long-term effects of demographic factors, social secu-
rity and fiscal policy on external imbalances and real interest rate, and explores
how these effects are influnced by endogeneity of labor supply and distor-
tionary taxation. The model is based on the Gertler (1999) framework applied
to a two-country economy as in Ferrero (2010), extended by social security,
variable labor supply and distortionary taxes on labor.
According to my analysis, differences in the level of social security expen-
ditures have a significant impact on external imbalances. The model predicts
that countries with low social security expenditures run a negative trade bal-
ance and hold a positive stock of foreign assets in a dynamically efficient steady
state. The reason is that high social security income during retirement lowers
households’ savings, leading to low financial wealth and pushing up the world
interest rate. Therefore a country with relatively low social security becomes
a net external creditor in the long run. For the US, the observed difference
in pension expenditures in comparison to China predicts an average foreign
debt of 60 % of GDP between 1980-2015. Like earlier literature, the model also
predicts a positive net foreign asset position for the relatively aged economy.
However, if the aged economy has a high level of social security, it can never-
theless become a net debtor in the long run. High government debt and gov-
42
REFERENCES
ernment expenditures predict a negative stock of foreign assets in the steady
state. Therefore high social security, financed by ahigh level of public debt,
predicts a weak external balance for a country.
Endogenizing labor supply mutes the effects of the long-term factors on
key steady-state variables, including the real interest rate and capital stock. For
example, an increase in life-expectancy leads to a smaller increase in aggregate
financial wealth than with fixed labor supply, as the negative wealth effect is
partly offset by an increase in labor supply. Therefore the negative effect of
population ageing on the real interest rate is smaller. This is especially true
with lump sum taxes, since the tax distortions caused by labor income taxes
discourage the labor supply responses.
The results suggest that the implications of population ageing on external
imbalances may change significantly if differences in social security expendi-
tures and labor supply responses are taken into account. For example, social
security differentials can be an important factor in explaining the somewhat
puzzling observed capital flows from fast-growing emerging economies to the
industrialized world, such as from China to the US. Even though the higher
life expectancy in the US would by itself predict it to be a net creditor to China
in the long run, the fact that China’s public social security expenditures and
reported government debt have been lower than that of the US between 1980-
2015 could lead to the opposite conclusion.
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Appendix
2.A Demographic transition
Figure 2.13: Life expectancy at birth and total fertility rate (TFR) in 10 largest
economies measured by GDP. Data source: United Nation World Population
Prospects 2015 Revision. GDP ranking: World Bank.
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2.B Employed old-age pensioners in the EU-28
Figure 2.14: The graph shows employed old-age pensioners in the EU-28. A
person is counted as employed if (s)he works while receiving an old-age pen-
sion, even for a few hours a week. Most old-age pensioners (62.8 %) work for
financial reasons. In northern Europe non-financial reasons, such as job satis-
faction, are more important, but in southern Europe, financial reasons matter
more. Source: Eurostat, Labor Force Survey Statistics (LFS) 2012.
2.C Steady state in a closed economy
This section analyzes the steady-state effects of demographic factors, fiscal pol-
icy and social security in a closed economy under three different model speci-
fications: with variable labor supply and distortionary taxes only (Twt = T
w =
0), with variable labor supply and lump sum taxes only (τwt = τ
w = 0), and
with fixed labor supply and lump sum taxes (as in Ferrero (2010))11. When dis-
tortionary taxes are ruled out, lump sum taxes adjust endogenously to satisfy
the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. The purpose of this section
is to analyze the effects of endogenous labor supply and distortionary taxa-
tion on the steady state, and how the steady-state responses to demographic
11See Technical appendix of Ferrero (2010) for the corresponding steady-state equations.
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factors, fiscal policy and social security differ under different model specifica-
tions. Here the model is calibrated to match the OECD countries in 2016.
2.C.1 The baseline calibration
Table 2.3 presents the steady-state values of the model under the different
model specifications. The model is calibrated as in Ferrero (2010) (table 2.2)12,
and the same calibration is used for all model specifications. The additional
parameters in the models with variable labor supply, consumption share in pe-
riodic utility v and retiree productivity ξ, are chosen so as to match the employ-
ment rates of those aged 15-64 and those aged over 65 in the OECD countries
in 2014.
Parameter Value Source
β discount factor 0.98 Ferrero (2010)
α labor share 23 Ferrero (2010)
δ discount rate 0.1 Ferrero (2010)
σ elasticity of intertemporal substitution 0.5 Ferrero (2010)
ξ productivity of a unit of labor, retiree / worker 0.58 Chosen to match employment rate
in OECD countries
v elasticity of period utility with respect to consumption 0.66 Chosen to match employment rate
in OECD countries
x growth rate of technology 0.015 Ferrero (2010)
n population growth rate 0.002 Ferrero (2010)
γ probability to survive (if retired) 0.93 Ferrero (2010)
ω probability to stay in the labor force 0.9778 Ferrero (2010)
b government debt, % of gdp 0.6 Ferrero (2010)
g government spending, % of gdp 0.2 Ferrero (2010)
s social security spending, % of gdp 0 -
Table 2.2: Calibration for closed economy. Source: all parameters are from Ferrero
(2010) except v and ξ, which are chosen so as to match the employment rate of popula-
tion aged 15-64 and 65- in OECD countries in 2016.
12This is the calibration for the final steady-state for United States in Ferrero (2010).
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Variable labor supply Fixed labor
supply
labor income taxes lump sum taxes lump sum taxes
R real interest rate 1.046 1.059 1.016
epi marginal propensity to consume, retirees 0.098 0.103 0.087
pi marginal propensity to consume, workers 0.056 0.061 0.046
Ω adjustment term 1.058 1.055 1.058
e ratio of marginal propensities to consume 1.729 1.695 1.906
K
XL capital / XL 3.513 3.090 4.844
I
XL investment / XL 0.404 0.356 0.567
A
XL assets / XL 4.420 3.960 5.860
t tax rate 0.326 0.225 0.200
λ retirees’ share of all financial wealth 0.240 0.270 0.206
H
XL workers’ human wealth / XL 7.638 6.740 10.202
Hr
XL retirees’ human wealth / XL 0.753 0.929 -
Lw
L workers’ labor supply / all labor supply 0.892 0.896 -
L
Nw labor supply / working age population 0.732 0.825 -
C
XL consumption / XL 0.805 0.803 0.787
Y/XL output / XL 1.512 1.448 1.692
Net saving/XL net saving / XL 0.048 0.039 0.082
w wage / XL 1.008 0.966 -
K
Y capital / GDP 2.324 2.134 2.863
I
Y investment / GDP 0.267 0.246 0.335
A
Y assets / GDP 2.924 2.734 3.463
H
Y workers’ human wealth / GDP 5.053 4.653 6.029
Hr
Y retirees’ human wealth / GDP 0.498 0.041 -
C
Y consumption / GDP 0.533 0.555 0.465
Net saving/Y net saving / GDP 0.035 0.032 0.049
Table 2.3: Steady state values of the model at baseline calibration (table 2.2)
with (1) variable labor supply and labor income taxes only, (2) with variable
labor supply and lump sum taxes only, and (3) with fixed labor supply and
lump sum taxes only.
A comparison of the steady states at the above calibration shows that in
the models with endogenous labor supply (first and second column), inter-
est rate is higher and capital stock lower than in the model with fixed labor
supply (third column). With fixed labor supply, agents have no labor income
during retirement and thus have a motive to save for retirement during work-
ing time. With variable labor supply, agents can work during retirement and
thus the motive to save during working life is lower. Also, during their work-
ing life, agents increase their labor supply, because higher savings and lower
consumption in period t would increase the marginal utility of labor if labor
supply were kept fixed.13 The lower aggregate demand for assets increases
the interest rate. This reduces the capital stock , and output falls. Both house-
13In each period, agents choose labor supply to equate the marginal utility of leisure to wage’s
consumption value, i.e., wuc = u1−l . As an increase in life expectancy requires the agents to
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hold types have higher marginal propensities to consume, and thus aggregate
consumption is higher than if labor supply were fixed.
By comparing the models with distortionary and lump sum taxation (first
and second column), it can be seen that labor income tax distorts workers’ la-
bor supply decision. From equations (2.7) and (2.14) one can see that agents’ la-
bor supply decision depends negatively on the tax rate. Therefore households
save more for their retirement, and the value of non-human assets, capital, and
investment are higher in the steady state than with variable labor supply and
lump sum taxation. With a lower real interest rate, agents’ marginal propensity
to consume and aggregate consumption are lower. The steady-state values of
most variables are observed to be closer to the values of the model with fixed
labor supply when distortionary taxes are introduced.
2.C.2 Steady-state effects of exogenous changes
The model specification affects the sensitivity of the steady-state values to changes
in demographic factors, fiscal policy and social security, which is analyzed in
chapters C.2.1 - C.2.3. The results suggest that even though most models with
different assumptions on labor supply and taxation produce qualitatively sim-
ilar predictions of the effects of the factors on the steady state, with variable
labor supply the effects are smaller and their relative magnitude differs. Most
importantly, the large impact that population aging has on the interest rate in
the model with fixed labor supply is muted.
2.C.2.1 Demographic changes
This subsection analyzes the steady-state effects of population growth rate (n ),
retirement age (ω) and life expectancy (γ), in closed economy under different
model specifications. Endogeneity of labor supply affects the implications of
population growth, but the effect is small. The implications of retirement age
change qualitatively. Introducing variable labor supply significantly affects the
implications of population aging.
spread their wealth over a longer lifetime, marginal propensity to consume and consumption fall.
The marginal utility of consumption increases, and with endogenous labor supply, agents adjust
by increasing their labor supply. Therefore, with higher wage income, agents do not need to re-
duce consumption as drastically in face of an increased lifetime as they would need to, were labor
supply fixed. The higher is the consumption share of periodic utility v, the more the agents work.
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Population growth (n) Figure 2.15 shows the steady state of the model
for population growth rates between 0.2 % (the baseline calibration) and 2 %.
In the steady state, the population growth rate is determined by the growth rate
of the labor force n as the dependency ratio, given by ψ = 1−ω1+n−γ , is stationary.
Under all specifications, high population growth leads to higher real in-
terest rate and lower capital stock. Population growth affects the steady state
slightly more when labor supply is fixed. High population growth decreases
the economy’s dependency ratio and therefore lowers the share of nonhuman
wealth held by retirees. As a younger population has lower marginal propen-
sity to consume out of wealth, high population growth leads to lower con-
sumption. A higher share of agents with less accumulated financial wealth
means that capital (in efficiency units) falls, which pushes up the real interest
rate.
Retirement age (ω) Figure 2.16 shows the steady state effects of varying ω
from 0.975 to 0.978, corresponding to varying the retirement age from 60 to 65
years. An increase in the retirement age, captured by the probability of staying
in the labor force ω, increases the horizon of the working-age population and
when probability of surviving, γ, is kept constant, it also implies an increase in
the life expectancy of the agents.
When labor supply is endogenous, an increase in the probability to stay in
the labor force is associated with wealthier households, lower real interest rate
and higher consumption. The longer life horizon increases net savings and
labor supply in the economy, and real interest rate is lower. The steady-state
effects of retirement age with fixed labourlabor supply are the opposite.
Life expectancy (γ) Figure 2.17 shows the steady-state effects of varying
γ from 0.8 to 0.96, which corresponds to a life expectancy between 75 and 85
years (when ω is held constant). The level of life expectancy affects workers’
and retirees’ horizons and changes the economy’s demographical composition.
Households’ financial wealth and capital stock are higher when life ex-
pectancy is high, regardless of whether labor supply is endogenous and in-
dependent of taxation. With fixed labor supply, the fall in marginal propensity
to consume leads to lower aggregate consumption. Contrarily, with variable
labor supply, an increase in retirees’ consumption causes the aggregate con-
sumption to increase.
The steady-state effects of life expectancy are smaller in magnitude with
variable labor supply than with fixed. With variable labor supply, agents can
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Figure 2.15: Closed economy steady states for population growth levels between 0.2
% (the baseline calibration) and 2 % with variable labor supply and distortionary taxes
(black dotted line), variable labor supply and lump sum taxes (blue dotted line) and
fixed labor supply (green line). Quantity variables are expressed in efficiency units (X
= level of productivity, L = aggregate labor supply).
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Figure 2.16: Closed economy steady states for 0.975 ≤ ω ≤ 0.978 with variable la-
bor supply and distortionary taxes (black dotted line), variable labor supply and lump
sum taxes (blue dotted line) and fixed labor supply (green line). The vertical line in-
dicates the baseline calibration where ω ≤ 0.9778. Quantity variables are expressed in
efficiency units (X = level of productivity, L = aggregate labor supply).
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Figure 2.17: Closed economy steady states for 0.8 ≤ γ ≤ 0.96 with variable labor
supply and distortionary taxes (black dotted line), variable labor supply and lump sum
taxes (blue dotted line) and fixed labor supply (green line). The vertical line indicates
the baseline calibration where γ = 0.93. Quantity variables are expressed in efficiency
units (X = level of productivity, L = aggregate labor supply).
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adjust to longer lifetimes by working more, and the observed employment
rate of the entire population, especially that of retirees, increases with life ex-
pectancy. The motive to save for retirement is smaller, which is reflected in the
more modest increase in aggregate household wealth.
2.C.2.2 Fiscal policy
This subsection compares the effects of fiscal policy under different model
specifications. Overall, introducing variable labor supply mutes the steady-
state effects of fiscal policy and does not change the qualitatively implications
documented by Gertler (1999). Labor supply depends negatively on the size
of government debt, but the reaction of labor supply to government spending
depends on taxation.
Government debt The steady-state effects of government debt are pre-
sented in figure 2.18. Government debt varies from 0 to 100 % of GDP. Gov-
ernment expenditures are kept at 20 % of GDP and there are no social security
expenditures.
The steady-state effects of changing the size of the government budget deficit
are similar under different model specifications. Government debt crowds out
capital and investment, which pushes up the real interest rate. As can be seen
from the steady-state version of the government budget constraint (see Ap-
pendix G, equation (2.53)), a higher level of government debt requires a higher
steady state tax rate, because the interest payments on the government debt
increase. In each period, households need to save more in order to be able to
pay the higher taxes in the future. This leads to an increase in households’ fi-
nancial wealth and to higher aggregate consumption as a share of GDP. With
lower capital intensity, real output falls.
With variable labor supply, the steady state is less sensitive to the level of
government debt because of the labor supply channel. As government debt
increases, increasing the tax rate, labor supply falls. The fall in employment
needs to be offset by higher asset accumulation, and the decline in net savings
is smaller than with fixed labor supply. As a result, capital intensity falls less,
and the increase in real interest rate is smaller.
The choice of taxation in the model mostly affects the levels of the vari-
ables. However, with distortionary taxation, workers’ labor supply falls more
sharply with government debt, due to the tax distortion. This further mutes
the increase in the real interest rate.
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Figure 2.18: Closed economy steady states for 0 ≤ b ≤ 1 with variable labor supply
and distortionary taxes (black dotted line), variable labor supply and lump sum taxes
(blue dotted line) and fixed labor supply (green line). The vertical line indicates the
baseline calibration where b = 0.6. Quantity variables are expressed in efficiency units
(X = level of productivity, L = aggregate labor supply).
55
LONG-TERM FACTORS BEHIND EXTERNAL IMBALANCES AND THE REAL
INTEREST RATE
Government spending The effect of varying government expenditures
from 20 to 25 % of GDP are shown in figure 2.19.
With all model specifications, an increase in government expenditures crowds
out private consumption. The increase in taxes implied by the higher govern-
ment expenditures creates a negative wealth effect on consumption. House-
holds also accumulate less assets which leads to a fall in the capital stock. This
increases the real interest rate.
With distortionary taxes, labor supply is lower with high government con-
sumption, whereas with lump sum taxes, labor supply is higher with higher
government consumption. As with government debt, the labor supply chan-
nel mutes the effect of government expenditures on the steady state.
2.C.2.3 Social security
The steady-state effects of varying the level of social security from 0 to 10 % of
GDP with variable labor supply are shown in figure 2.20.14 Here the govern-
ment is assumed to run a constant debt/GDP ratio of 60 %, but it should be
noted that the effects of social security are sensitive to how they are financed.
Lump sum social security payments to the retirees constitute a transfer of
wealth from the young to the old. As the old have a higher marginal propensity
to consume, this raises aggregate consumption as a share of GDP. However,
as real output falls, consumption in efficiency units falls. As social security
income complements the other sources of income in retirement, the incentive
to save for retirement is weaker and net saving and household wealth fall.
This lowers the capital stock and investment and raises the real interest rate.
As the capital stock falls, the marginal product of labor and employment fall.
High social security negatively affects retirees’ labor supply in particular, and
workers provide a larger share of total labor.
When the debt-to-GDP ratio is constant, the higher social security, in the
form of a pay-as-you-go system of the model, places a burden on tax payers.
With distortionary taxation, the higher tax rate causes labor supply to fall more.
This decreases the marginal product of capital, capital as a share of GDP falls
less , and therefore the overall effect on the interest rate is muted.
14The effects of social security with fixed labor supply in a closed economy are discussed by
Gertler (1999)
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Figure 2.19: Closed economy steady states for 0.2 ≤ g ≤ 0.25 with variable labor
supply and distortionary taxes (black dotted line), variable labor supply and lump sum
taxes (blue dotted line) and fixed labor supply (green line). At the baseline calibration,
g = 0.2. Quantity variables are expressed in efficiency units (X = level of productivity,
L = aggregate labor supply).
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Figure 2.20: Closed economy steady states for 0 ≤ s ≤ 0.1 with variable labor supply
and distortionary taxes and variable labor supply and lump sum taxes. The vertical line
indicates the baseline calibration where s = 0.08. Quantity variables are expressed in
efficiency units (X = level of productivity, L = aggregate labor supply).
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2.D Open economy results for OECD-US
Figure 2.21: Open economy steady states for 0.91 ≤ γ1 ≤ 0.96 and γ2 = 0.9378 with variable
labor supply and distortionary taxes (red line and blue dotted line). The red dotted line shows
the steady state when γ1 = γ2. At the rightmost vertical line, the countries are identical. At the
leftmost vertical line, γ1 = 0.925, which corresponds to the observed life expectancy in the US.
59
LONG-TERM FACTORS BEHIND EXTERNAL IMBALANCES AND THE REAL
INTEREST RATE
Figure 2.22: Open economy steady states for 0.2 ≤ b1 ≤ 0.9 and b2 = 0.65 with variable
labor supply and distortionary taxes (red line and blue dotted line). The red dotted line shows
the steady state when b1 = b2. At the leftmost vertical line, the countries are identical. At the
rightmost vertical line, b1 = 0.78, which corresponds to the observed debt-to-GDP ratio in the US.
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Figure 2.23: Open economy steady states for 0.16 ≤ g1 ≤ 0.24 and g2 = 0.198 with variable
labor supply and distortionary taxes (red line and blue dotted line). The red dotted line shows
the steady state when g1 = g2. At the vertical line, the countries are identical. At left g1 = 0.16
corresponds to the observed government expenditure-to-GDP ratio in the US.
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Figure 2.24: Open economy steady states for 0.07 ≤ s1 ≤ 0.08 and g2 = 0.08 with variable
labor supply and distortionary taxes (red line and blue dotted line). The red dotted line shows
the steady state when s1 = s2. At the vertical line, the countries are identical. At left, s1 = 0.07
corresponds to the observed public pension expenditure-to-GDP ratio in the US.
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2.E Sensitivity of results to parameter values
Productivity of retirees ξ: An increase in the relative productivity of the
retirees leads to higher labor supply by retirees15, lower wages per efficient
unit of labor and lower labor supply by workers. The increase in productiv-
ity increases the payoff of a unit of labor (see eq. 2.7) and triggers a positive
substitution effect on labor supply. As retirees’ labor supply increases, their
consumption increases due to a positive wealth effect on consumption. An in-
crease in consumption is associated with a fall in savings, an increase in the
real interest rates and a lower capital-to-GDP ratio.
The higher the productivity of retirees with respect to workers, the more an
increase in γ is accompanied by an increase in retirees’ labor supply and the
lower is the increase in savings and the fall in the real interest rate.
Consumption elasticity of periodic utility v: A large consumption elas-
ticity of periodic utility leads to higher marginal propensities to consume, higher
consumption as a share of GDP, and higher employment for both workers and
retirees, as well as lower asset-, and capital-to-GDP ratios. Wages are lower
and retirees hold a slightly higher share of total assets.
The effects of population aging are sensitive to consumption elasticity of
periodic utility. For low values of elasticity, an increase in γ has nonmonotonic
steady-state effects. For high values of elasticity, changes are always mono-
tonic. For example, if consumption share in utility and life expectancy are low,
an increase in life expectancy increases the level of nonhuman wealth in the
steady-state and lowers the real interest rate. However, if the increase in life ex-
pectancy is large enough, the opposite happens. In other words, when leisure
share in periodic utility is high enough, at high enough level of life expectancy,
level of financial wealth decreases and interest rate rises.
Elasticity of intertemporal subsitution σ: A high σ leads to lower lev-
els of consumption and marginal propensities to consume, and higher assets-,
capital- and investment-to-GDP ratios. Interest rate is lower with higher EIS.
The relation of the workers’ and retirees’ marginal propensities to consume
depends in a non-monotonic way on the value of σ due to the fact that workers’
marginal propensity to consume is nonmonotonic in σ. It is highest at low
values of σ.
15For given parameter values, retirees only supply positive amounts of labor when their produc-
tivity is high enough.
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2.F Data
Table 2.4: Demographic and labor force data
OECD OECD
with-
out
US
US China Data source
Average effective age of retirement
(all genders, weighted by female labor
share), 2009-2014
64 64 65.3 67.8 OECD: Statistics on average effective
age of retirement
Female labor share, average 2009-2014 44.7 44.7 46.0 43.9 World Bank World Development
Indicators.
Life expectancy at birth, average
2009-2014
80.08 80.13 78.68 75.30 World Bank World Development
Indicators.
Average annual population growth
rate 2010-2015
0.62 0.57 0.77 0.52 United Nations World Population
Prospects: The 2015 Revision
Employment / population,
ages 15-64 yrs, 2014
65.8 64.9 68.1 75.1
(2010)
OECD (2016), Labour statistics
Employment / population,
ages 65 yrs + , 2014
13.4 11.7 17.7 20.9
(2010)
OECD (2016), Labour statistics
Labor force participation rate,
ages 15-64 yrs, 2014
71.2 73.1 72.7 77.4 OECD (2016), Labour statistics
Labor force participation rate,
ages 65 yrs +, 2014
13.8 11.9 18.6 21.1
(2010)
OECD (2016), Labour statistics
Table 2.5: Great ratios
OECD OECD
with-
out
US
US China Data source
Government spending, % of GDP (g),
average 2009-2014
19.8 19.9 15.9 13.3 World Bank, World Development Indicators
General government net debt, % of
GDP (b), average 2010-2015
65.3 58.9 77.6 - International Monetary Fund, World
Economic Outlook Database, October 2015
Public pension spending, % of GDP,
average 2009-2011
0.08 0.08 0.07 0.02 OECD Data on Social Protection (19.4.2016);
China: Asian Development Bank, Social
Protection Index Database (25.4.2016)
Private consumption, % of GDP (c/y),
average 2009-2014
55.5 55.1 68.5 36.4 World Bank, World Development Indicators:
World Bank national accounts data, and
OECD National Accounts data files.
Total investment, % of GDP (i/y),
average 2010-2015
21.4 21.4 19.3 46.3 World Bank, World Development Indicators
World real interest rate (r), proxied by
US annual government bond rate in
2015 net of CPI inflation
2.14 % - - IMF, International Financial Statistics and
World Economic Outlook Database (CPI
inflation, avegare consumer prices), 7/2016
The average of a GDP-weighted
average of OECD countries’ TFP
growth 2001-2011
0.001 Penn World Table 8.1, data retrieved
20.4.2016,
GDP: OECD Data
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2.G Steady-state equations
The following equations are stationarized and timing convention is such that
the stock variables (At, Kt, bt and Ft) are predetermined. Thus, for instance,
equation (3.20) is written as Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 +
[
1− φ2
(
It
It−1 − µt
)2]
It and
then stationarized, resulting in expression (2.44).
1. Retiree’s mpcw:
epi = 1− γ
(
1
1+ x
)ρσ(1−v)
βσRσ−1 (2.39)
2. Worker’s mpcw:
pi = 1− βσ
(
1
1+ x
)ρσ(1−v)
(ΩR)σ−1 (2.40)
3. Adjustment term (where χ = ξ−(1−v)):
Ω = ω+ (1−ω)e 11−σ χ (2.41)
4. Production:
y =
(
L
Nw
)α ( k
1+ x+ n
)1−α
(2.42)
5. Capital:
k =
[
(1− α)
R− 1+ δ
] 1
α
(
L
Nw
)
(1+ x+ n) (2.43)
7. Investment:
i = k
(x+ n+ δ)
(1+ x+ n)
(2.44)
8. Workers’ consumption:
cw = pi(
(1− λ)aR
1+ x+ n
+ hw + pw) (2.45)
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9. Total consumption:
c = pi
a
1+ x+ n
R(eλ+ 1− λ) + pi(hw + pw) + epi(hr + pr) (2.46)
10. Distribution of wealth between generations:
λ =
[
ψ+ω(
L−Lw
L αy(1− τ) + sry− epi(hr + pr)
a(1+ n− γ) )
]
(2.47)
∗ (1+ n− γ)(
1− ωγ(βRW )σ(
1
1+x )
ρσ(1−v)
(1+x+n)
)
11. Total assets:
a = k+ by+ f (2.48)
12. Workers’ human wealth:
hw =
[
Lw
L
αy(1− τ)− twy+ (1−ω) h
r(1+ x)e
1
1−σ χ
ψRΩ
](
1−ω (1+ x)
RΩ
)−1
(2.49)
13. Retirees’ human wealth:
hr =
[(
1− L
w
t
Lt
)
αy(1− τ)
] (
1− (1+ x)
RW/γ
)−1
(2.50)
14. Retirees’ social security wealth:
pr = sy
(
1− (1+ x)
RW/γ
)−1
(2.51)
15. Workers’ social security wealth:
pw =
(1−ω)e 11−σ χpr(1+ x)
ψRΩ
∗ 1
1−ω(1+ x)/RΩ (2.52)
16. Labor tax rate:
τ =
[R−(1+x+n)]b
1+x+n + g+ s− tw
α
(2.53)
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17. Aggregate resource constraint:
(1− g)y = c+ i+ nx (2.54)
18. Workers’ labor supply:
Lw
L
= N
w
L − ςαy(1−τ) cw (2.55)
19. Total labor supply, % of efficient population:
L
Nw(1+ ψξ)
=
(
1+ ς
αy(1−τ) (c
r + cw)
)−1
(2.56)
20. Net foreign assets:
f
(
1+ x+ n− R
1+ x+ n
)
= nx (2.57)
21. Global asset market clearing condition:
ft +
F∗t
XtNwt
= ft + f ∗t
X∗t Nw∗t
XtNwt
= 0 (2.58)
22. Wage in effiency units (detrended by level of technology Xt only; wt = WtXt ):
w = αy
Nw
L
. (2.59)
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68
3 External imbalances
between China and the
United States:
a dynamic analysis with a
life-cycle model
.
3.1 Introduction
China and the United States, the world’s largest economies, have both experi-
enced large and persistent external imbalances over the past decades. China’s
current account has been consistently positive since 1994, and by 2015 it had
accumulated a stock of net foreign assets which amounted to 15 % of its GDP
(red lines in figure 3.1). The United States (henceforth, the US) has, in contrast,
run a nearly consistent current account deficit since 1982, and accumulated a
net foreign debt equal to 40 % of GDP by 2015 (blue lines in figure 3.1). The ex-
ternal imbalances also show up on the countries’ bilateral trade balance: since
the mid-80s, US imports from China have exceeded its exports to the coun-
try, and the US bilateral trade deficit has increased at an accelerating rate until
recent years.1
1Trade balances are pictured in Appendix A (figure 3.20). United States’ multilateral trade
balance has been negative since 1976. China’s multilateral trade balance has been positive since
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Figure 3.1: Left panel: Current account balance. Right panel: Net international
investment position and cumulative current account balance. Source: IMF Bal-
ance of Payment Statistics and author’s calculations.
This paper suggests that demographic developments and differences in the
level of social security between China and the US have had a great impact on
households’ consumption and saving decisions and, therefore, on the observed
external imbalances. During the period from 1980 to 2015, China experienced
a rapid increase in life expectancy, which converged towards that of the US,
but at the same time, its old-age social security expenditures were significantly
lower. When analyzed with a two-country life-cycle model, these develop-
ments have caused the Chinese population to prepare for the lengthening of
the retirement period by increasing their savings, which has resulted in an im-
provement in China’s current account balance and contributed to the build-up
of its foreign asset position. The impact of this channel appears quantitatively
large, and the model predicts a positive trade balance for China for the majority
of the simulation period.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a complementary ex-
planation for the persistent external imbalances between China and the US.
Early research on external imbalances focuses on the industrialized world and
struggles to explain the capital flows from fast-growing emerging economies
to industrialized countries, because neoclassical theory predicts that capital
flows into countries with rapid productivity growth (see e.g. the discussion
on the “capital allocation puzzle” in Gourinchas and Rey (2014)). A more re-
1990 apart from a brief plunge in 1993.
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cent strand of the literature, to which this paper is closely related, focuses on
identifying drivers behind the external imbalances between emerging and in-
dustrialized economies, including Caballero et al. (2008), Mendoza et al. (2009),
Song et al. (2011) and Coeurdacier et al. (2015). This strand of literature em-
phasizes the importance of financial markets in driving the capital outflows
from the emerging world, suggesting for instance that the flight of capital from
the emerging markets is due to their underdevelopment and their inability to
supply safe assets. However, apart from Coeurdacier et al. (2015), this strand
puts less emphasis on explaining the observed high household savings and low
propensities to consume, which are the key elements driving the capital flows
in this paper. Coeurdacier et al. (2015) suggest that tighter credit constraints in
fast-growing emerging economies can lead to higher household savings, and
provide an explanation for the current account surpluses. The role of house-
hold savings and the current account has also been studied by Eugeni (2015),
who suggests that the low level of social security may play an important role
in driving the capital outflows from the emerging world.
In this paper, I use a two-country life-cycle model á laGertler (1999) to quan-
tify the importance of social security and demographic transition, as well as
productivity growth and government expenditures, in shaping the dynamics
of the bilateral trade balance and the net foreign asset position between the
US and China between 1980 and 2015. The model is close to Ferrero’s (2010),
which is a two-country model featuring a Gertler life-cycle structure, and is
extended to include a pay-as-you-go social security system, endogenous labor
supply and distortionary taxation. The model is calibrated for China and the
United States, and demographic change, productivity growth, social security
and government expenditures are taken into account as exogenous variables
in simulating the transition paths.
The results suggest that demographic transition and the level of social se-
curity expenditures have a quantitatively significant impact on households’
consumption and saving decisions and, therefore, on the current account, trade
balance and net foreign asset positions between China and the US. In the model,
population aging leads to high savings as households prepare for the long
retirement period by accumulating financial wealth, and because the demo-
graphic transition has been faster in China, the impact on its current account
is positive. The relatively low social security expenditures in China relative
to the US (approximately 2 % of output in China and 6 % of output in the
US between 1980 and 2015) have a quantitatively large impact on the house-
hold savings, and when both social security and demographic transition are
accounted for, the model predicts a trade surplus for China for the majority of
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the simulation period. Furthermore, even after controlling for high productiv-
ity growth, which has a strong negative impact on the trade balance, the model
still predicts a positive net foreign asset position and trade balance for China
for most years in the simulation period.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related
literature. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 presents the results of the
static and dynamic analysis. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Related literature
The paper is related to two strands of research: the literature which uses life-
cycle and OLG models to analyze questions related to population aging, social
security and external imbalances, and, more generally, to the recent literature
on the external imbalances between emerging and industrialized economies.
In this paper, I use the life-cycle model by Gertler (1999), which allows me
to model an economy with realistic average lengths of life, working time and
time spent in retirement, and is therefore well suited to studying the economic
implications of the demographic transition and social security. In comparison
to large-scale multi-period OLG models, the advantage of the Gertler frame-
work is its parsimony, which allows to obtain tractable analytical solutions for
aggregate consumption and labor supply and to track the mechanisms behind
the aggregate savings and current account dynamics.
The Gertler (1999) model has previously been used by Kilponen et al. (2006),
Fujiwara and Teranishi (2008), Ferrero (2010) and Carvalho et al. (2016), among
others. Kilponen et al. (2006) analyze the implications of population aging
and social security in a small open economy (Finland), and relax Gertler’s as-
sumption of a stationary demographic structure. As opposed to Kilponen et al.
(2006), I focus on external imbalances between two large economies, and the
relative importance of aging and social security in comparison to total factor
productivity (henceforth, TFP) growth and fiscal policy. Fujiwara and Teran-
ishi (2008) analyze the welfare implications of monetary and fiscal policy on
different age groups in a closed economy. In comparison, my focus is on the
external sector and therefore the analysis is performed in a two-country frame-
work. As I focus on the low-frequency dynamics of the trade balance, I also
abstract from nominal frictions. Carvalho et al. (2016) analyze the impact of
population aging on the real interest rate in a closed economy, considering also
the role of social security. In contrast, my focus is on the external sector, and
furthermore, my model features endogenous labor supply together with dis-
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tortionary taxes, so that the quantitative findings are robust to the effects of so-
cial security through the labor supply channel. Ferrero (2010) is, to my knowl-
edge, the only paper applying the Gertler (1999) model to a two-country world
to analyze the dynamics of the external balance and the real interest rate. Fer-
rero (2010) analyzes the effects of demographics, fiscal policy and productivity
on the external balance between the US and six other industrialized countries.
The above-mentioned difficulty of explaining capital flows between emerging
and industrialized countries is present in Ferrero (2010). In fact, even though
productivity differentials, together with demographic developments, can ex-
plain the majority of the dynamics of the bilateral trade balance between the
analyzed industrialized countries during the simulation period (1970-2005),
Ferrero’s predictions for China are counterfactual. In this paper I extend the
Ferrero (2010) model by introducing a pay-as-you-go social security system to-
gether with variable labor supply and distortionary labor taxes and restrict the
analysis to China and the United States.
Saarenheimo (2005), Domeij and Floden (2006) and Attanasio et al. (2016)
use multi-period OLG models to analyze questions related to external imbal-
ances, population aging and social security in multi-country settings. Saaren-
heimo (2005) studies the effects of population aging on global variables, includ-
ing the real interest rate, asset prices and external imbalances in a 73-cohort
OLG model with five countries, including China, over the period 2000-2050.
In addition to the different approach to modeling the life-cycle and the multi-
country setting, labor supply is exogenous in the paper, and it focuses on pro-
jecting the future rather than explaining the observed dynamics. The model
predicts a current account deficit for China for the entire simulation period be-
cause of high projected TFP growth, which has proven counterfactual in the
first decades of the 2000s. Domeij and Floden (2006) use an OLG model to ana-
lyze the effects of demographic transition on the international capital flows in
a model economy consisting of 18 OECD countries and the rest of the world,
also assuming fixed labor supply. Attanasio et al. (2016) study the role of de-
mographics in shaping the factor prices and capital movements in a 4-region
setting, one of the countries being China, with a rich OLG structure. The period
of the analysis is between 2010 and 2100, and for the first decades of the mil-
lennium the model predicts a negative foreign asset position for China. In ad-
dition to using the Gertler (1999) life-cycle framework, this paper differs from
the above-mentioned papers as it focuses on the observed dynamics of exter-
nal imbalances in the past decades and on the bilateral relation between China
and the US instead of a multi-country world. In addition, I allow for endoge-
nous labor supply with distortionary taxation, which are not featured in the
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above-mentioned papers but which allows me to take into account the impact
of population aging through the labor supply channel, and ensures that popu-
lation aging does not result in counterfactual excessive savings by the young.
Two-country OLG models motivated by the Chinese experience include Eu-
geni (2015) and Coeurdacier et al. (2015). Eugeni (2015) analyzes the role of
social security in the formation of external imbalances and the fall of the real
interest rate. Eugeni (2015) finds that the absence of a social security system (a
pay-as-you-go pension system) leads to higher savings and capital exports in
a two-country OLG model in which only one of the two countries has a social
security system, suggesting that social security plays a role in explaining the
capital outflows from countries such as China. In contrast to Eugeni (2015), my
model also features a rich demographic structure so that I am able to analyze
the effects of social security together with demographic changes. In addition,
I analyze the dynamic effects of a richer set of exogenous variables including
TFP growth and fiscal policy, and take into account the impact of social secu-
rity through the labor supply channel. Coeurdacier et al. (2015) study external
imbalances with a 3-period OLG model, in which the external imbalances are
driven by the growth differentials between countries and the differences in the
credit constraints that the households in different economies are assumed to
face. In contrast to Coeurdacier et al. (2015), I abstract from financial frictions
to focus on the impact of demographics and social security arising in a friction-
less environment.
I˙mrohorog˘lu and Zhao (2018a) and I˙mrohorog˘lu and Zhao (2018b) study
Chinese savings in detail with dynastic models. The use of a dynastic model
somewhat changes the impact of demographic change on household savings
in contrast to a life-cycle model. In dynastic models, individuals derive util-
ity from the well-being of their ancestors and predecessors in addition to their
own well-being. This means that the young save to provide for the retired el-
derly, but also the old save to leave bequests to the young, and the effect of
demographic change on aggregate savings depends on which of the different
savings motives dominates. In I˙mrohorog˘lu and Zhao (2018a), population age-
ing results in higher savings by the old and therefore higher aggregate savings:
even though there are fewer young to care for, which lowers the savings of the
old, and fewer young to provide for the elderly, which lowers the savings of
the young, lowering fertility rates lead to a deterioration of the family pension
support system. Because of of this, the old are required to save more, resulting
in a positive net effect on aggregate savings. Furthermore, in I˙mrohorog˘lu and
Zhao (2018a), there are also precautionary savings due to health risks faced
by elderly people and labor income risks faced by the young. Precautionary
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savings by the old, caused by an increase in health costs, are found to be the
main explanation for the recent rise in savings in China. I˙mrohorog˘lu and
Zhao (2018a) study a closed economy, and analyzing the impact of precaution-
ary saving and family support system on the current account would require a
comparison of the relative importance of these factors in the counterpart coun-
tries.
I˙mrohorog˘lu and Zhao (2018b) also study the effects of social security re-
forms in China on saving, capital and output. Social security is found to be
negatively associated with household saving also in the dynastic model as in
the life-cycle model in this paper. Social security reforms are also studied by
Song et al. (2015), who conduct a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the
welfare effects of different pension reforms in China during its projected eco-
nomic and demographic transition in the 21st century. The analysis takes into
account features of the Chinese economy such as rural-urban migration and
heterogeneous education in different age groups, which I have assumed away
for simplicity. To capture the heterogeneity in population, Song et al. (2015)
use a rich multi-period OLG structure as opposed to a Gertler type stochastic
two-period structure. In Song et al. (2015), the economic transformation and
resulting wage growth, which give rise to the welfare redistribution, are due
to firm heterogeneity and the financial frictions as in Song et al. (2011), and
the impact of demographics and social security on private savings is not dis-
cussed. As opposed to Song et al. (2015), I make no model-based assumptions
of future economic transition or wage growth, but only analyze the relative ef-
fects on savings implied by demographic transition and social security in the
two countries.
Finally, several recent papers, including Caballero et al. (2008), Mendoza
et al. (2009) and Song et al. (2011), analyze the role of financial markets in
the development of external imbalances between emerging and industrialized
countries. Caballero et al. (2008) develop a model which rationalizes the inter-
national capital flows as a global equilibrium outcome driven by differences in
the abilities of different regions to supply financial assets. Mendoza et al. (2009)
argue that when countries with less developed financial markets, which result
in low enforceability of financial contracts, integrate into the international fi-
nancial system, capital flows towards more developed financial markets occur.
Song et al. (2011) propose a model for the Chinese economy in which the firms
are heterogeneous in productivity and in their ability to access financial mar-
kets. The capital outflows occur because the productive firms have limited
access to financial markets, and therefore the domestic financial markets are
unable to provide sufficient investment opportunities to the households de-
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spite high productivity growth. In this paper, I assume no frictions in financial
markets in order to focus on the potential explanatory power of the life-cycle
aspects and social security systems.
3.3 The model
The model is a symmetric two-country model with a life-cycle structure as in
Gertler (1999).2 The population in each country at time t consists of two groups
of individuals: workers, whose total number is Nwt , and retirees, whose num-
ber equals Nrt . All agents enter the economy as workers at the age of 20, and
remain workers with probability ωt,t+1 or retire with probability 1−ωt,t+1. Re-
tirees face the probability γt,t+1 of surviving to the next period. These param-
eters are calibrated to match the observed average lengths of life, time spent at
work and time spent in retirement.
3.3.1 Households
The preferences of households are given by a CES nonexpected utility function
of the form
Vzt =
{[
(Czt )
v (1− lzt )1−v
]ρ
+ βzt,t+1
[
Et (Vt+1 | z)µ
] ρ
µ
} 1
ρ
, z = {w , r} , (3.1)
where Czt is consumption and l
z
t the fraction of time allocated to work at time t
by a person of type z (retiree if z = r and worker if z = w). Each individual has
one unit of time per period to use for either work or leisure. Parameter βzt is
the subjective discount factor, and Et (Vt+1 | z) is the expectation of the value
function in the next period of the person of type z. The Epstein-Zin preferences
allow the separation of income risk aversion from aversion to intertemporal
substitution. Parameter ρ captures the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
which is given by σ = 1/ (1− ρ). Parameter µ captures attitudes towards
income risk. Risk neutrality (i.e. µ = 1) is assumed to yield consumption deci-
sions that are linear in wealth, which facilitates the aggregation of the model.
The only source of income risk is the exogenous probability to retire and thus
the effect of income risk aversion is reasonable.
2Appendix B describes the life-cycle structure.
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3.3.1.1 Retirees
A retiree’s expectation of the value function is Et (Vt+1 | r) = Vrt+1, and because
(s)he takes into account the probability of dying before the next period, the
effective discount factor in retirees’ case is βrt,t+1 = βγt,t+1. A retiree, born
in period j and retired in period i, chooses consumption-saving allocation and
leisure to maximize
V jrt (i) =
{[(
Cjrt (i)
)v
(1− lrt )1−v
]ρ
+ βγt,t+1
(
V jrt+1(i)
)ρ} 1ρ
, (3.2)
subject to
Ajrt+1 (i) =
RtA
jr
t (i)
γt−1,t
+Wtξl
jr
t (1− τt) + Srt − Cjrt (i) . (3.3)
Retirees consume out of their non-human wealth Art , labor income Wtξl
jr
t ,
net of distortionary labor income taxes τt, and lump sum social security trans-
fer Srt . The productivity of a unit of labor provided by retirees is ξ times that
of a worker (ξ ∈ (0 , 1)), which leads to a lower labor supply by retirees in the
equilibrium. Retirees participate in a perfect annuities market which provides
insurance against the uncertainty of the time of death, so that each retiree re-
ceives a gross return on wealth of Rt/γt−1,t. Rt is the real interest rate. The
pension scheme is a public PAYG (pay-as-you-go) pension system in which the
pension income is a transfer from the tax payers to the retirees.
The first order condition with respect to leisure is
l jrt (i) = 1−
Cjrt (i)ς
Wtξ(1− τt) , (3.4)
where ς = 1−vv . The retiree’s decision rule for consumption is given by
Cjrt (i) = etpit
(
RtA
jr
t (i)
γt−1,t
+ H jrt (i) + P
r
t
)
, (3.5)
where etpit is the marginal propensity to consume (mpc) out of wealth and
H jrt (i) and P
jr
t (i) are the present discounted values of a retiree’s lifetime human
wealth and pension benefits. The marginal propensity to consume evolves ac-
cording to the nonlinear difference equation
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etpit = 1− etpit
et+1pit+1
γt,t+1
(
Wt(1− τt)
Wt+1(1− τt+1)
)ρσ(1−v)
βσ(Rt+1)ρσ. (3.6)
3.3.1.2 Workers
A worker’s expectation of the value function in the next period is Et (Vt+1 | w) =
ωt,t+1Vwt+1 + (1−ωt,t+1)Vrt+1 and the effective discount factor is βwt,t+1 = β. A
worker born in period j chooses consumption-saving allocation and leisure to
maximize
V jwt =
{[(
Cjwt
)v (
1− l jwt
)1−v]ρ
+ β
[
ωt,t+1V
jw
t+1 + (1−ωt,t+1)V jrt+1
]ρ} 1ρ
(3.7)
subject to
Ajwt+1 = RtA
jw
t +Wtl
jw
t (1− τt)− Cjwt . (3.8)
As retirees, workers consume out of non-human wealth and wage income
net of labor income taxes. Workers and retirees in both countries consume a
single (numeraire) good which can be traded internationally.
The first order condition with respect to labor is
lwjt = 1−
Cwjt ς
Wt(1− τt) . (3.9)
The consumption Euler equation for workers is
Cjwt
[(
Wt(1− τt)
Wt+1(1− τt+1)
)ρ(1−v)
βRt+1Ωt+1
]σ
(3.10)
= ωt,t+1C
jw
t+1 + (1−ωt,t+1)e
σ
1−σ
t+1 χC
jr
t+1,
where χ = ξ−(1−v) and Ωt ≡ ωt−1,t + (1− ωt−1,t)e
1
1−σ
t χ is an additional dis-
count factor in the workers’ value function. The worker’s marginal propensity
to consume out of wealth, pit, evolves according to
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pit = 1− pit
pit+1
(
Wt(1− τt)
Wt+1(1− τt+1)
)ρσ(1−v)
βσ(Rt+1Ωt+1)σ−1. (3.11)
The worker’s decision rule for consumption is
Cjwt = pit(RtA
jw
t + H
jw
t + P
jw
t ), (3.12)
where H jwt is the present discounted value of a worker’s human wealth net of
taxation and Pjwt is the present discounted value of a worker’s pension benefits
once retired.
3.3.1.3 Aggregation
Because marginal propensities to consume, both for retirees and workers, do
not depend on individual characteristics, aggregate consumption can be ex-
pressed as
Ct = pitAtRt(etλt + 1− λt) + pit(Hwt + Pwt ) + etpit(Hrt + Prt ) (3.13)
where λt denotes the share of financial assets held by retirees such that
λt =
Art
At . The asset distribution evolves according to
λt+1 (3.14)
= ωt,t+1
(
Rtλt
At
At+1
(1− etpit) + W(1− τt)L
r
tξ + S
r
t − etpit(Hrt + Prt )
At+1
)
+ (1−ωt,t+1).
The present discounted value of retirees’ aggregate human wealth is
Hrt = ξL
r
tWt(1− τt) + γt,t+1
ψt
ψt+1
Hrt+1
(1+ nt,t+1)Rt+1
(3.15)
where ψt is the old age dependency ratio, i.e. ψt =
Nrt
Nwt
, and nt,t+1 is the
growth rate of the number of workers between periods t and t + 1. The dis-
count rate of the present value of total human wealth for current retirees is
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augmented by the growth rate of the retired labor force
(
ψt
ψt+1
)
. Similarly, the
present discounted value of workers’ aggregate human wealth is
Hwt = L
w
t Wt(1− τt) +ωt,t+1
Hwt+1
(1+ nt,t+1)Rt+1Ωt+1
(3.16)
+ (1−ωt,t+1)
Hrt+1e
1
1−σ
t+1 χ
ψt+1(1+ nt,t+1)Rt+1Ωt+1
.
Present discounted value of retirees’ aggregate pension benefits at time t is
Prt = St + γt,t+1
ψt
ψt+1
Prt+1
Rt+1
(3.17)
and the present discounted value of social security for workers is
Pwt = ωt,t+1
Pwt+1
(1+ nt,t+1)Rt+1Ωt+1
(3.18)
+ (1−ωt,t+1)
Prt+1e
1
1−σ
t+1 χ
ψt+1(1+ nt,t+1)Rt+1Ωt+1
.
3.3.2 Firms
The goods market is competitive and the representative firm produces con-
sumption goods with constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production tech-
nology. Aggregate output is given by Yt = (XtLt)
α K1−αt , where Xt is the level
of exogenous labor augmenting productivity at time t, Lt is the aggregate ef-
fective labor force, Kt is physical capital, and α ∈ (0 , 1) is the labor share. The
firm chooses labor, capital and investment to maximize the present discounted
value of profits given by
V (It−1 , Kt) =
[
(XtLt)
α K1−αt −WtLt − It +
V (It , Kt+1)
Rt+1
]
(3.19)
subject to the law of motion of capital accumulation
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +
[
1− φ
2
(
It
It−1
− µt
)2]
It. (3.20)
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The aggregate effective labor force consists of the effective labor input by
the two agent types such that Lt = Lwt + ξL
r
t . Capital depreciates at rate
δ ∈ (0 , 1) and quadratic adjustment cost makes investing new capital costly.
The size of the adjustment cost is determined by φ > 0. The term µt ensures
that along the balanced growth path, investment adjustment costs equal zero.
Productivity Xt grows at rate xt, which follows an AR(1) process given by
xt = (1− θ)xss + θxt−1 + uxt .
3.3.3 Government
Government consumes Gt in each period and pays retirees a total amount of
Pt of social security benefits. The expenditures are financed with tax revenues
Tt and by issuing one-period debt Bt+1. Government spending, social secu-
rity and fiscal policy are assumed to be exogenously determined fractions of
output: Gt = g¯tYt, Pt = p¯tYt and Bt = b¯tYt−1. The government’s per period
budget constraint is Bt+1 = RtBt + Gt + Pt − Tt and the intertemporal budget
constraint is
RtBt =
∞
∑
v=0
Tt+v
∏vz=1 Rt+z
−
∞
∑
v=0
Gt+v
∏vz=1 Rt+z
−
∞
∑
v=0
Pt+v
∏vz=1 Rt+z
. (3.21)
The government’s per period discount rate equals the world interest rate Rt
and is lower than the households’ per period discount rates. With elastic labor
supply, total tax revenue is
Tt = τtWtLt. (3.22)
Labor tax τt is adjusted according to the fiscal policy rule
τt = τt−1 + θ
[
bt − b¯t
]
(3.23)
as in Leeper (1991).
3.3.4 A competitive world equilibrium and the external sector
A competitive world equilibrium is a sequence of quantities and prices such
that in each country (i) households maximize utility subject to their budget
constraints, (ii) firms maximize profits subject to their technology constraints,
(iii) the government chooses a path for taxes and debt, compatible with in-
tertemporal solvency, to finance an exogenous level of total spending, and
(iv) all markets clear.
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In each economy, households’ aggregate non-human wealth equals the ag-
gregate capital stock, government bonds and net foreign assets Ft such that
At = Kt + Bt + Ft. (3.24)
Net foreign asset position evolves according to
Ft+1 = RtFt + NXt (3.25)
and the trade balance NXt is determined by the aggregate resource constraint
NXt = Yt − Ct − It − Gt. (3.26)
The current account CAt consists of the trade balance and net interest pay-
ments on foreign assets
CAt = NXt + (Rt − 1) Ft. (3.27)
Return Rt is equalized across the two countries and in equilibrium, foreign
asset positions in the two countries sum up to 0, i.e. Ft + F∗t = 0 so that the in-
ternationally traded asset is in zero net supply. The law of one price is assumed
to hold.
3.4 Quantitative analysis
In this section I analyze the drivers of the bilateral external imbalances between
US and China during 1980-2015. During this period, China and the US expe-
rienced persistent external imbalances both multilaterally and vis-a-vis each
other, and accumulated large foreign asset positions of opposite signs. The
period coincides with China’s transition process towards a market economy,
and the features which shaped the Chinese planned economy, especially in the
beginning of the period, are not explicitly modeled. China engaged actively
in international trade from the beginning of its transition process in 1978, so
that the share of exports and imports of GDP grew from approximately 10 % of
GDP in 1978 to over 40 % by 1993 (see figure 3.2), and by 2015, it had become
the world’s largest merchandise trader. Given China’s external trade openness
during the entire period, it is of interest to study the dynamics of the trade
balance since the early 1980s, and a more detailed analysis of the effects of the
political system is left for future research.
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In what follows, I introduce potential drivers of the external imbalances as
exogenous variables into the two-country life-cycle model presented in section
3, and simulate the transition dynamics of the model during 1980-2015. The po-
tential drivers include demographic changes, differences in pension systems,
fiscal policy and productivity growth differentials. The dynamic transition of
the model economy is simulated in two different ways, first with a standard de-
terministic simulation and then with a deterministic simulation with updates,
in which the paths of exogenous variables are updated in every period. In
this case, the agents revise their expectations according to the latest available
information. The method is also known as extended path and was originally
Figure 3.2: Merchandise trade (the sum of merchandise exports and imports) in
China as a share of GDP. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators.
proposed by Fair and Taylor (1983).
Section 3.4.1 discusses the evolution of the exogenous variables in US and
China between 1980 and 2015. Section 3.4.2 presents the calibration of the
model and a comparative static analysis. Section 3.4.3 presents the results of a
deterministic simulation and section 3.4.4 a deterministic simulation with up-
dates. Section 3.4.5 discusses the role of the labor supply in the model.
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3.4.1 The US and China from 1980 to 2015: demographics, so-
cial security, fiscal policy and technological progress
The change in the countries’ demographic structures is the largest long-term
trend included in the simulation. During the simulation period, both countries
experienced a fall in population growth rates and an increase in life expectancy,
which has led to an increase of the old-age dependency ratio (the ratio of pop-
ulation aged 65+ to population aged 20-64 years). This trend is projected to
continue for several more decades (see figures 3.3 and 3.4). However, both
the demographic structures and the pace of change have differed between the
countries. In 1980, there were almost twice as many elderly in China for every
working-age individual as in the US, but towards the end of the 20th century,
the difference in old age dependency ratios declined. This was mainly due to
the relatively rapid growth in life expectancy in China, which grew by 8 years
(from 67.3 to 75.4 years) between 1980 and 2015, in comparison to 6 years (from
72.9 to 78.9 years) in the US. The convergence of the old-age dependency ratios
was dampened because the Chinese population growth rate remained high in
relation to the US over the entire period, despite its rapid decline amplified by
the introduction of the one-child policy in 1979. In the simulations, the pop-
ulation growth rate and retirement and survival probabilities are adjusted so
that the average lengths of time spent as a worker and as a retiree, the popu-
lation growth rate and the old age dependency ratio match the average values
observed in the data.
Based on old United Nations population forecast revisions, the demographic
transition has not been fully anticipated. Estimation and forecasting method-
ology have evolved over time and new census data has become available, re-
sulting in changes in the forecasts. The forecasts of life expectancy at birth
both in China and the US have been revised upwards in nearly every revision
round (see figure 3.5), and the projections of population growth rates have been
revised upwards for the US and downwards for China several times each (see
figure 3.6). The time horizon of the demographic projections has also increased
over time. Until 1994, the projections were made until 2025, in the years be-
tween 1994 and 2008 until 2050, and since 2010 they have been made until
2100. In the simulation with updates, the paths of exogenous demographic
variables are adjusted in each period so that the demographic variables in the
model match the values of the most recent United Nations World Population
Prospect data.
Differences in the level of social security expenditures are also included in
the simulation as potential drivers of the external imbalances. In recent years,
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Figure 3.3: Left panel: Old age dependency ratio in the US and China (data
frequency: 5 years) between 1985-2015 and projections until 2100. Right
panel: Life expectancy at birth in the US and China in 1980-2015 and projec-
tions (medium variant) until 2050. Source: United Nations World Population
Prospects: The 2015 Revision.
Figure 3.4: Left panel: Total population in the US and China in 1980-2015 and
projections until 2050. Right panel: The annual population growth rate in the
given year and 5 preceding years 1985-2015 and projections until 2050. Source:
United Nations World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision.
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Figure 3.5: Left panel: Life expectancy at birth, US. Right panel: Life ex-
pectancy at birth, China. Source: United Nations World Population Prospects:
1980-2015 Revisions.
Figure 3.6: Left panel: Population growth rate, US. Right panel: Population
growth rate, China. Source: United Nations World Population Prospects: 1980-
2015 Revisions.
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Figure 3.7: Left panel: Public pension expenditures, % of GDP in the US and
China. Source: OECD Data on Social Protection and Asian Development
Bank: Social Protection Index Database (data 1); Naughton (2007) (data 2).
Right panel: General government final consumption expenditures. Source:
World Bank, World Development Indicators 2016.
public pension spending in China as a share of GDP has been only one-third
that of the US (2.1 % versus 6.6 %; see figure 3.7). The GDP share of public so-
cial security expenditures has not changed substantially in either of the coun-
tries during the time for which the data is available. China’s low GDP share of
pension spending is not explained by its younger population structure alone.
Had the pension spending been proportional to the old-age dependency ratio,
the social security expenditures in China would have needed to be 3.3-4.0 % of
GDP to match the US level (see figure 3.3). In addition, the coverage of the pen-
sion scheme, defined as the share of population aged 15-65 covered by manda-
tory pension schemes, is only approximately 27.7 % in China (2010), compared
to 71.4 % in the US (2005) (OECD, 2013). In the simulations I run, the pension
system is assumed to have full coverage, which is likely to yield conservative
results with regard to the impact of social security on households’ savings. As-
suming heterogeneity in the coverage rate would imply that in China, the vast
majority of the population would have no pension income at all. Despite sev-
eral differences between the Chinese and American public pension systems,
they can both be classified as pay-as-you-go based on the 3-pillar classification
of pension systems by Pallares-Miralles et al. (2012).3
3See Appendix C for a description of the old-age pension systems in China and the US and the
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Figure 3.8: Annual TFP growth in the US and China 1980-2012. Source: Penn
World Table.
The simulation also takes into account the differences in government ex-
penditures and their impact on the external imbalances. Government expen-
ditures have been higher in the US (on average 15.5 % of GDP) than in China
(on average 14.4% of GDP) for most of the simulation period, as shown in fig-
ure 3.7. Data for net government debt is not available for China, and therefore
government debt is assumed to evolve according to the same fiscal rule in both
countries, and the permanent level of government debt is assumed to be 20 %
of GDP in both countries.
Finally, productivity growth is included in the simulations as a potential
driver of the external imbalances. The counterfactual implications about trade
surplus and net foreign debt that several neoclassical models imply for China
in the earlier literature (including Ferrero, 2010) are driven by its high produc-
tivity growth during most of the simulation period. Figure 3.8 shows the TFP
growth rate for China and the US. On average, TFP grew by 1.9 % in China and
by 0.9 % in the US every year between 1980 and 2012.
3.4.2 Calibration and the steady state
To analyze the dynamics of the external imbalances between China and the
US between 1980 and 2015, the time-invariant model parameters are calibrated
to match the means of the GDP shares of the trade balance, consumption and
classification of the pension systems by Pallares-Miralles et al. (2012).
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investment, and the mean of the world real interest rate, during the simula-
tion period. The model’s time-varying exogenous variables, which include life
expectancy, population growth rate, pension expenditures, other government
expenditures, and TFP, are set to match the values directly observable in the
data.
Table 3.1 presents the values of time-invariant parameters, which are the
same in both simulations and for both countries. The labor share of output,
α, equals 2/3 and follows the convention in the literature (including Cooley
(1995), Gertler (1999), Fujiwara and Teranishi (2008) and Ferrero (2010)).4 The
discount factor, β, equals 0.994 so that the net real interest rate matches the
mean value of 3 % over the sample period in the data. Consumption share
in utility, v, and the relative productivity of retirees, ξ, are chosen to match
employment rates among population aged 15-64 and 65 and over. The value for
the consumption share in utility falls between the values used in related papers
including Gertler (1999) (ν = 0.4) and Kilponen et al. (2006) (ν = 0.8). There is
no consensus in the literature about the value of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, σ, the values ranging from 0.1 (Hall (1988)) to 2 (Gruber (2013)).
A recent meta-study by Havranek et al. (2015) reports that, in a sample of 169
studies, the mean estimate for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is
0.594 for the US and 0.530 for China; the value chosen here lies in this range.
Depreciation rate, δ, and the investment adjustment cost factor, φ, are chosen so
as to match the mean of the investment-to-output ratio over the sample period.
4According to the International Labour Organization (2015), the labor share of output declined
both in the US and in China over the past decades. Bai et al. (2006) estimate the labor share of
output to be 50-54 % in China. Analyzing the impact of different production technologies is out of
the scope of this paper.
89
EXTERNAL IMBALANCES BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES:
A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS WITH A LIFE-CYCLE MODEL
Parameter Value
α labor share of output 23
β discount factor 0.994
δ depreciation rate 0.2
φ investment adjustment cost factor 3
σ elasticity of intertemporal substitution 0.55
ξ productivity of a unit of labor, retiree to worker 0.5
v elasticity of period utility with respect to consumption 0.7
Table 3.1: Values of the time-invariant parameters in the simulation. The pa-
rameters are uniform across the countries.
Table 3.2 presents the values of exogenously determined variables related to
demographics, fiscal policy, pensions and TFP in the initial and final states. The
dynamics are solved with two different simulation methods (with and without
updates on the exogenous variables), and the table presents the values of ex-
ogenous variables for both simulations.
In the first simulation (I), the model is calibrated so that in the initial state,
the economies match the data in 1980, and converge to a new steady state in
which they match the data in 2015. In the initial and final states, productivity
and population growth rates (x and nw) are the same across the countries to
prevent one of the economies from outgrowing the other. The annual produc-
tivity growth rate is 1 % in both states and economies, which is the average of
the observed growth rates between the countries between 1980 and 2015. The
annual growth rate of working-age population decreases gradually from 2.15
% in 1980 to 0.5 % in 2015 and thereafter. The probability of staying in the labor
force, ω, is the same in the initial and final state, and it is slightly higher in the
US than in China (ωUS = 0.9777 and ωChina = 0.9769), corresponding to an (ef-
fective) age of retirement of 63 years in China and and 65 years in the US. Life
expectancy, captured by the survival probability γ, differs between the coun-
tries in both states. It corresponds to the observed values of 72.9 years (US)
and 67.3 years (China) in 1980 and 78.9 years (US) and 75.4 years (China) 2015,
respectively. Government spending and public pension spending are perma-
nently at different levels, matching the average in the data between 1980-2015.
Government debt in both countries is 20 % of GDP (recall that no data on Chi-
nese government net debt is available).
In the second simulation (II), the model is calibrated so that in the initial
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state, the economies match the 1980 data and converge to a new steady state.
However, the agents’ information set regarding the values of exogenous vari-
ables during the transition and at the terminal point, as well as the date when
the terminal point is reached, is updated in each period. In particular, the
agents’ information set regarding demographic variables consists of the most
recent UN population forecast, so that as each new UN population forecast
becomes available, the agents’ information set is updated. In the final step
of the simulation, the final steady state values match the predicted values for
2100 according to the 2015 UN forecast. The annual steady state growth rate of
working-age population decreases gradually from 2.15 % in 1980 to 0 % in the
final steady state, which is the average population growth rate projected for
the countries for 2100. Life expectancy increases from 72.9 years (US) and 67.3
years (China) in 1980 to 88.7 years (US) and 85.2 years (China) in 2100. Other
exogenous variables are as in the first simulation.
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Data Model
I II
Exogenous variable Initial state
1980
Final steady
state 2015
Initial state
1980
Final steady
state
x1, x2 technology growth
rate
(US, China)
0.01
(mean between 1980
and 2015 China and
the US)
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
n1, n2 population growth
rate
(US, China)
1980: 0.0215 (mean
between China and
the US)
2050: 0.005 (projected
mean in 2015)
2100: 0.00 (projected
mean in 2015)
0.0215 0.005 0.0215 0.00
γ1 probability to
survive (if retired) /
life expectancy at
birth (US)
1980: 72.9 years
(estimate in 1980)
2015: 78.9 years
(estimate in 2015)
2100: 88.7 years in
2100 (projection in
2015)
0.8758 /
72.9
0.9289 /
78.9
0.8758 /
72.9
0.9580 /
88.7
γ2 probability to
survive (if retired) /
life expectancy at
birth (China)
1980: 67.3 years
(estimate in 1980)
2015: 75.4 years
(estimate in 2015)
2100: 85.2 years
(projection in 2015)
0.7506/
67.3
0.9174/
75.4
0.7506 /
67.3
0.9543 /
85.2
ω1 probability to stay in
the labor force /
effective retirement
age (US)
65 years 0.9777 /
65
0.9777 /
65
0.9777 /
65
0.9777 /
65
ω2 probability to stay in
the labor force /
effective retirement
age (China)
63 years 0.9769 /
63
0.9769 /
63
0.9769 /
63
0.9769 /
63
b1 government debt,
% of GDP (US)
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
b2 government debt,
% of GDP (China)
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
g1 government
spending,
% of GDP (US)
0.155 0.155 0.155 0.155 0.155
g2 government
spending,
% of GDP (China)
0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144
s1 social security
spending,
% of GDP (US)
0.066 0.060 0.070 0.060 0.060
s2 social security
spending,
% of GDP (China)
0.021 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.020
Table 3.2: Values of exogenous variables (technological growth rate, demo-
graphic variables, government debt and expenditures, and social security ex-
penditures) in the initial state (i.e. in 1980), the final state (i.e. in 2015 in the
deterministic simulation and in 2100 in the simulation with updates, which is
the last year of the United Nation’s population forecast) and over time (mean
in the period 1980-2015) in the data and the model. (I) Deterministic simulation
(II) Simulation with updates.
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Variable Value in the
model (I)
Value in the
model (II)
Value in
data
Data source
mean
min / max
st. dev.
mean
min / max
st. dev.
mean
min / max
st. dev.
R World real interest rate
1.03 1.02 1.03 Nominal interest rate: IMF,
International Financial Statistics. CPI
inflation: IMF, World Economic
Outlook 2015.
0.99/1.07 1.01/1.04 1.00/1.08
0.02 0.01 0.02
NX1
Y1
Bilateral trade balance /
output (US)
-0.01 -0.02 -0.01 Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA),
U.S. Department of Commerce,
author’s calculation. Period:
1999-2015.
-0.07/0.05 -0.05/0.01 -0.02/-0.01
0.03 0.01 0.00
NX2
Y2
Bilateral trade balance /
output (China)
0.00 0.02 0.06 Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA),
U.S. Department of Commerce,
author’s calculation. Period:
1999-2015.
-0.03/0.03 -0.01/0.03 0.03/0.09
0.02 0.01 0.02
NX1
Y1
Multilateral trade balance
/ output (US)
- - -0.03 World Bank, World Development
indicators.-0.06/-0.000.02
NX2
Y2
Multilateral trade balance
/ output (China)
- - 0.02 World Bank, World Development
indicators.0.020.03
F1
Y1
Net foreign assets /
output (US)
-0.16 -0.39 -0.38 IMF Balance of Payment Statistics
and World Economic Outlook-0.37/0.00 -0.83/-0.01 -1.72/1.570.09 0.26 0.79
F2
Y2
Net foreign assets /
output (China)
0.11 0.23 0.09 IMF Balance of Payment Statistics
and World Economic Outlook.
Period: 2003-2015.
-0.00/0.18 0.01/0.41 0.02/0.12
0.06 0.13 0.03
C1
Y1
Consumption /
output (US)
0.53 0.53 0.65 World Bank, World Development
indicators.0.50/0.57 0.51/0.56 0.60/0.690.02 0.01 0.02
C2
Y2
Consumption /
output (China)
0.50 0.48 0.44 World Bank, World Development
indicators.0.47/0.53 0.47/0.50 0.34/0.530.02 0.01 0.06
I1
Y1
Investment /
output (US)
0.33 0.34 0.22
IMF, World Economic Outlook 2015.0.30/0.34 0.31/0.35 0.18/0.25
0.01 0.01 0.02
I2
Y2
Investment /
output (China)
0.35 0.36 0.40
IMF, World Economic Outlook 2015.0.33/0.37 0.34/0.38 0.32/0.48
0.01 0.01 0.05
Table 3.3: Comparison of the key moments (mean, minimum and maximum
values and standard deviation) of variables in the data and in the model during
the simulation period (1980-2015). (I) Deterministic simulation (II) Simulation
with updates.
3.4.2.1 Steady state implications of the model
Throughout the simulation period, China has had a younger population and
lower level of social security expenditures than the US. This section presents
a comparative static analysis around the steady state to illustrate the effects of
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life expectancy and social security in the model.
Figure 3.9 shows the steady state effects of life expectancy. The economies
are assumed to be in a steady state in which the values of exogenous variables
match the average between the countries in the data in 2015, apart from γ, the
parameter which determines life expectancy, which is allowed to differ. In the
US, γ1 is fixed at 0.9319, which corresponds to a life expectancy of 79.5 years,
and in China, γ2 varies between 0.92 and 0.9319. At the dotted vertical line
the life expectancy in China matches the projected value in 2020 (γ2 = 0.9247
corresponding to a life expectancy of 76.5 years), when the difference in life
expectancies between the countries is 3 years.
The model predicts that the country with higher life expectancy (the aged
country) accumulates a positive net foreign asset position and satisfies its higher
consumption demand by importing goods from abroad, running a permanent
trade deficit. High life expectancy increases the households’ motive to save
for retirement, and therefore the households hold more financial wealth in the
aged country. Because the world interest rate is below the autarky rate of the
country in which life expectancy is lower (the young country), it is willing to
borrow from abroad, and so the household wealth of the aged country is in-
vested partly in foreign assets. Even though the aged country is running a
permanent trade deficit, it earns a high enough interest rate on its foreign as-
sets to be able to hold a permanent positive net foreign asset position. The
marginal propensities to consume (henceforth, mpc’s) are lower in the aged
country, but its consumption is high because its residents are wealthier and
a higher share of non-human wealth is held by retirees, whose mpc is higher
than the workers’.
The observed difference in life expectancies between China and the US in
2020, 3 years, implies a positive trade balance of 0.002 % of GDP and a negative
net foreign assets position of 4 % of GDP for China in the steady state. The
higher the life expectancy in China (the larger γ2), the smaller its trade surplus
and net foreign debt. Also, the higher the life expectancy in China, the lower
the world real interest rate, as an increase in life expectancy raises household
savings and the aggregate level of financial wealth in the world. The effect is
qualitatively similar to that documented by Ferrero (2010).
Figure 3.10 presents the comparative statics with public pension spending.
As before, the economies are assumed to be identical so that the values of ex-
ogenous variables correspond to the average of observed levels in 2015 apart
from social security, which is allowed to differ between the countries. Public
pensions spending in the US is set at 6 % of GDP, and varies between 2 and 6
% in China.
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§
Figure 3.9: Steady states for 0.92 ≤ γ2 ≤ 0.9319 and γ1 = 0.9319 (blue line
= US and red dotted line = China). At the leftmost vertical line, γ2 = 0.9247,
which corresponds to the projected life expectancy in China in 2020.
The model predicts that, in the steady state, the country with lower social
security expenditures holds a positive net foreign asset position and runs a
trade deficit. Because the retirees in that country have lower pension income,
the households accumulate more assets before retirement, which pushes down
the world real interest rate. The world interest rate is below the autarky rate
of the country with higher social security expenditures, which causes capital to
flow from the country with low social security (China) to the country with high
social security (US). Due to the lower pension expenditures, the country with
low pensions can also maintain a lower tax rate, which leads to higher labor
supply and level of human wealth, and because of its relatively high human
and financial wealth, its aggregate consumption is higher. High consumption
demand is partly satisfied with foreign imports, which are financed with inter-
est payments on the net foreign assets held by the country. The effect of social
security on external imbalances is quantitatively significant, and it seems likely
that social security can be an important factor in understanding the high level
of savings in China. The observed 4 % difference in the share of GDP that is
spent on public pensions implies a trade deficit of 1.5 % of GDP and a positive
net foreign assets position of 70 % of GDP for China in the steady state. The
higher the social security spending in China, the smaller is its net foreign asset
position and the larger its trade surplus in the steady state.
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Figure 3.10: Steady states for 0.02 ≤ s2 ≤ 0.06 and s1 = 0.06 (blue line = US
and red dotted line = China).
Other features that distinguish the economies are the relatively low effec-
tive retirement age and low level of government expenditure in China. Low
retirement age predicts a negative net foreign asset position for the US in the
steady state. Low government expenditures imply the opposite, namely a pos-
itive net foreign asset position in the steady state. In comparison to the effects
of life expectancy and social security, however, the effects of retirement age and
government expenditure on the steady state variables are relatively small.
3.4.3 Deterministic simulation
The steady state analysis suggests that the low level of social security expendi-
tures can help to explain China’s trade surplus vis-a-vis the US. Given that life
expectancy has increased more quickly in China than in the US, the steady state
analysis also suggests that China’s net foreign asset position has improved, im-
plying that its trade balance has been elevated during the period of the demo-
graphic transition.
In this subsection, we run a deterministic simulation to analyze the dy-
namic effects of the demographic transition, social security, government ex-
penditures and TFP fluctuations on the trade balance and net foreign asset po-
sition of the two countries. The economies are assumed to initially be in a state
in which the exogenous variables match the data in 1980, and then converge
to a new steady state, in which the the exogenous variables match the data in
2015. During the transition, the exogenous variables follow the path observed
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in the data.5 The approach we follow is sequential: first we introduce demo-
graphic transition, while keeping all other factors constant; then fiscal policy
shocks and differences in public social security spending; and finally, tempo-
rary fluctuations in TFP growth rates.
3.4.3.1 The dynamic effects of demographic transition
The growth rate of population aged 15 to 64 fell from 2.9 to 0.2 % in China, and
from 1.4 to 0.5 % in the US, between 1980 and 2015. Life expectancy increased
from 67.4 to 75.4 years in China, and from 74.3 to 78.9 years in the US over
the same period (United Nations (2015)). In the model, we are able to match
the population growth rates during the period 1980-2015 exactly (see the data
in figure 3.4), but need to assume a faster increase in life expectancy than in
the data to avoid numerical problems that would otherwise arise in the model
solution algorithm. In the initial and final states, population growth rate is
assumed to be the average of the observed growth rates (2.15 % in 1980 and 0.5
% 2015) between the countries.
The results of the dynamic simulation with demographic transition are shown
in figures 3.11 and 3.12. Consistent with the steady state results, higher retire-
ment age and life expectancy together imply a positive net foreign asset posi-
tion and negative trade balance for the US in the initial state. The size of the
net foreign asset position is approximately 63 % of GDP and the trade deficit is
1 % of GDP for the US. In the initial state, the US households hold more finan-
cial wealth than the Chinese households because of higher life expectancy, and
the US net foreign asset position is therefore positive. China holds a negative
foreign asset position and runs a trade surplus.
After the initial state, the economy faces transitory and permanent changes
to the demographic variables as described above. As life expectancy increases
permanently in both countries, the mpc’s of and consumption by both retirees
and workers initially fall, as the households increase their savings because of
the longer time they expect to spend in retirement. The mpc’s decline more in
China because the increase in Chinese households’ life expectancy is larger.
As savings increase, the real interest rate falls, and investment rises as the
economies start to adjust to a new steady state with higher capital stock. The
net effect of the demographic shock on the trade balance is positive in China,
because the increase in savings exceeds the rise in investment, and negative in
5The values of g1, g2, s1, s2, nw1, nw2, x1 and x2 match exactly the values in the data, plotted in
figures 3.4, 3.7 and 3.8. The life expectancy parameters, γ1 and γ2, converge faster than in the data
to obtain model convergence.
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Figure 3.11: Left panel: Effects of a perma-
nent demographic change on the trade balance.
Right panel: Effects of a permanent demographic change on the net for-
eign asset position.
Figure 3.12: Effects of demographic changes on the marginal propensities to
consume and the GDP shares of consumption, investment and saving.
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the US, where the effect on investments is larger. The reason is that the increase
in Chinese savings pushes the real interest rate below the autarky level of the
US interest rate, and therefore the change in investments exceeds the change
in domestic savings caused by the aging of its domestic population. As the US
trade balance weakens, and as the fall in the interest rate causes the returns on
its foreign assets to fall, its stock of foreign assets starts to decline, and China’s
stock of foreign assets begins to grow.
As the age structures between the countries become more similar, the exter-
nal imbalances gradually become smaller. As the capital stock approaches the
new steady state level, investments decline, with a positive impact on the trade
balance both in the US and in China. However, the trade surplus of China be-
comes smaller because of the simultaneous rise in the aggregate consumption
share. The rise in consumption share is driven by rising consumption among
the retirees, which is in turn caused by the increase in aggregate wealth held by
the retirees, and their rising share in the population, given that their marginal
propensities to consume are higher than the workers’.
The fluctuations in the simulated trade balance are caused by population
growth fluctuations during the period. In periods of relatively high popula-
tion growth in China, investments need to increase to maintain an equal rate of
return across countries, which temporarily weakens the trade balance. Overall,
the relatively rapid population ageing in China causes a slow and continuous
decline in the net foreign asset position of the US, which resembles the down-
ward trend observed in the data.
3.4.3.2 The effects of social security and fiscal policy
Between 1980 and 2015, the output shares of social security expenditures and
general government expenditures were higher in the US than in China over
nearly every period (see figure 3.7). In this section, we analyze the dynamics
of the trade balance, taking into account government expenditures and social
security spending, in addition to the demographic transition described in the
previous section. Public pension spending is assumed to grow slowly from
6 % to 7 % of GDP in the US, and to remain at 2.1 % of GDP in China over
the simulation period. The GDP share of general government expenditures
exactly matches the data, and we assume it to be 15.5 % in the US and 14.4 %
in China in the initial and final states. Government debt as a share of GDP is
endogenously determined by the fiscal rule (equation (3.23)), and we assume it
to be 20 % in the initial and final states in both countries, as no data on Chinese
government net debt is available.
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Figure 3.13: Effects of a permanent demographic changes with social security
and fiscal policy on the trade balance (left panel) and on the net foreign asset
position (right panel).
The results of the dynamic simulation are shown in figure 3.13. The effect
of public pension expenditures on the external imbalances is noticeable. Con-
sistent with the steady state results, high public pension expenditures in the
US have a negative effect on its initial net foreign asset position: whereas the
demographic factors would predict the US to hold a positive net foreign asset
position of approximately 60 % of GDP (see figure 3.12), when differences in
social security expenditures are accounted for, the initial net foreign asset po-
sition is negative (figure 3.13). Despite life expectancy being lower in China,
low pensions raise the aggregate level of non-human wealth in the economy,
resulting in a positive net foreign asset position in the initial state.
Relatively high government expenditures have a small negative effect on
the US’ net foreign asset position in the steady state. High government expen-
ditures increase the tax rate, lowering the labor income of employees, which
crowds out private consumption and savings. The impact on steady state trade
balance is positive because of the negative wealth effect on consumption, but
the net foreign asset position is weaker because of lower savings.
The dynamics of the trade balance and the net foreign assets are mainly
driven by the demographic changes, which cause a large increase in Chinese
savings and result in an increase in its net foreign asset position vis-a-vis the
US. When the differences in social security and government expenditures are
also accounted for, the model dynamics qualitatively match the data well.
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Figure 3.14: Effects of a permanent demographic changes, social security, gov-
ernment expenditures and TFP growth on the trade balance (left panel) and on
the net foreign asset position (right panel).
3.4.3.3 The effects of productivity growth fluctuations
During the period 1980-2015, the average annual TFP growth rate was 1.9 %
in China and 0.9 % in the US. In this section, we introduce temporary TFP
fluctuations, which match the data exactly (see figure 3.8), in addition to de-
mographic, social security and government expenditure shocks. In the initial
and final states, productivity growth rate is assumed to be constant at 1 %.
Figure 3.14 reports the resulting dynamics. As expected, TFP shocks have
a strong impact on the trade balance. Periods of relatively high productivity
growth in China raise investment and consumption, which weaken its trade
balance and the net foreign asset position. However, due to the underlying
demographic trends and differences in social security and government expen-
ditures between China and the US, the trend in the Chinese net foreign asset
position is increasing. Indeed, only during the period of high TFP growth in
China in the mid-2000s does the model counterfactually predict the net foreign
asset position to decline to zero. For most of the periods in the sample years,
the model predicts a positive trade balance for China.
Figure 3.15 shows the simulation decomposed into the effects of demo-
graphic transition and the marginal effects of pensions, fiscal policy and TFP.
Even though the negative impact of TFP shocks weakens the US trade balance,
especially in the early 2000s, the opposite effects of demographic factors, so-
cial security and fiscal policy predict a trade deficit for the US, especially at the
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Figure 3.15: Decomposition of the effects of demographic
factors and marginal effect of pensions and fiscal pol-
icy and TFP on the dynamics of the trade balance.
beginning of the simulation period. Social security is a key element in driving
the results: without it, the model would indeed predict a counterfactual trade
deficit and foreign debt for China for almost the entire simulation period.
3.4.4 Deterministic simulation with updates
The deterministic simulation used in the previous section assumes that the
paths of the exogenous variables are known to the agents at the beginning
of the simulation period. This section presents an alternative solution to the
model, in which a deterministic simulation is performed for every period of
the simulation, but the shocks and paths of exogenous variables are allowed
to change. In particular, for each period, the initial values of the exogenous
and endogenous variables are given by the simulation for the previous pe-
riod, and new transition paths are solved based on the updated information.
Innovations in exogenous variables are unanticipated, unlike in the previous
simulation. This approach allows the agents to update their knowledge on the
future paths of exogenous variablesas they become available in the data. The
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transition paths are constructed as a compilation of values of different rounds
of simulation.
The assumptions regarding the future paths of exogenous variables are as
follows. In each period, the agents are assumed to know the paths of life
expectancy and population growth as given in the respective vintage of the
UN population forecast (plotted for selected years in figures 3.5 and 3.6). TFP
growth rate and government expenditures are assumed to follow AR(1) pro-
cesses known by the agents, who estimate the autoregressive parameter given
past data in each period. The agents observe the current exogenous realiza-
tion of TFP and government expenditures, and forecast the future values given
the AR(1) process. The agents thus assume that, after the temporary shock
has occurred, these variables slowly converge to their steady state values. In
each period there is a shock to TFP and government expenditures so that the
compiled series of these variables match the data exactly (plotted in figures 3.7
and 3.8). Therefore, unlike in the deterministic simulation, the agents are not
assumed to know the entire path of e.g. productivity growth at the beginning
of the simulation. Pension expenditures are assumed to be constant over time.
With respect to the endogenous variables, we assume that the economies are
otherwise in a steady state implied by the exogenous variables apart from net
foreign assets and trade balance, which are assumed to be zero at the beginning
of the period.
The results of the simulation are presented in figure 3.16. The simulated
paths of the trade balance and the net foreign asset position match the data
better than those obtained with the deterministic simulation. The Chinese
trade balance is positive for almost the entire simulation period, apart from
a sharp deterioration caused by a sharp unexpected downward revision in life
expectancy in the 1982 population forecast. Periods such as the mid-2000s,
when the TFP grew at record rates reaching up to 6 %, cause the trade balance
to decline, but it remains positive for the entire simulation period. In contrast,
with the deterministic simulation Chinese trade balance is negative between
1990-1994 (-0.4 % of GDP on average) and 1998-2005 (-1.7 % of GDP on aver-
age). With the simulation with updates, China is predicted to have a positive
net foreign asset position which averages 23 % of its GDP during the simula-
tion period. For the US as well, the simulated trade balance and the negative
and deteriorating foreign asset position match the data well.
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Figure 3.16: Effects of a permanent demographic changes, social security, gov-
ernment expenditures and TFP growth on the trade balance, simulation with
updates (left panel) and on the net foreign asset position (right panel).
3.4.5 Life expectancy and the labor supply channel
The dynamics of the simulations in sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4, and especially the
persistent trade surplus in China, are driven by the demographic transition. A
demographic shock, which induces an increase in life expectancy, lowers ag-
gregate consumption and increases savings in the model. However, if labor
supply is assumed to be constant, the impact of the increase in life expectancy
can be unrealistically large in the sense that it could lead to counterfactual ex-
cessive savings by the young and a dynamically inefficient world interest rate.
In the US data, the share of wealth held by the elderly has in fact increased over
the past 30 years (see left panel in figure 3.17). The endogeneity of labor supply
helps to address this problem, as an increase in life expectancy then results in a
more modest increase in savings by the working-age population as the house-
holds also adjust their labor supply in response to a demographic shock. The
resulting labor supply dynamics match the data qualitatively well.
In this section, in order to illustrate the impact of the labor supply channel
in the model, we compare the dynamic effects of an increase in life expectancy
with variable labor supply and fixed labor supply (in the latter case, we assume
that v = 1, ξ = 0). In the initial state, life expectancy is assumed to be 74.3 years
in the US and 67.5 years in China, and to slowly converge to 79.5 years in the
US and 76.6 years in China, corresponding to estimates of life expectancies in
1985 and projected values in 2020 according to the data from United Nations
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Figure 3.17: Share of wealth held by population aged 65-. Source: Federal
Reserve, Survey of Consumer Finances (SFC) 1989-2016.
(2015).6
As previously discussed, an increase in life expectancy lowers the marginal
propensities to consume (equations (3.6) and (3.11)), which leads to a decline
in consumption (equations (3.5) and (3.12)), unless offset by an increase in the
present value of life-time wealth. With variable labor supply, the decline in
consumption and the increase in the marginal utility of consumption require
an increase in labor supply lr and lw for a given wage and tax rate for the in-
tratemporal labor supply optimality conditions (equations (3.4) and (3.9)) to
hold. However, an increase in labor supply in retirement raises the present
discounted value of workers’ human wealth H jwt . As workers anticipate higher
labor income during their retirement, the negative wealth effect on their con-
sumption is smaller.7 If the retirees’ labor supply increases sufficiently, the
workers react by reducing their labor supply and increasing consumption, and
thus the increase of life expectancy may result in a decline in the world aggre-
6The preference parameters are calibrated as in table 3.1. Social security expenditures, the level
of government expenditures and the steady state value of government debt are assumed to be at
the same level in both countries (4%, 15 % and 20 % of GDP, respectively). Growth rate of working
rate population is fixed (2.15%). The simulation abstracts from temporary TFP and government
expenditure shocks.
7See also discussion by Fujiwara and Teranishi (2008) on the non-monotonic effects of life ex-
pectancy in the Gertler (1999) framework.
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Figure 3.18: Impact of population aging with variable and fixed labor supply.
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gate financial wealth, and an increase in real interest rate.
In the current simulation (see figure 3.18), retirees’ labor supply is in the
initial state higher in the country with higher life expectancy (US) because of
the negative wealth effect discussed above. In the US, high labor supply in
retirement increases the present value of workers’ human wealth so that labor
supply during working life is also lower in the US than in China. An increase
in longevity increases retirees’ labor supply so much that after the initial im-
pact (which lasts for 2 to 4 periods), workers’ labor supply declines in both
countries. The increase in expected labor income dampens the negative wealth
effect, and savings by workers increase less than in the model with fixed labor
supply, and therefore the share of financial wealth held by the retirees does not
fall in either economy. Furthermore, in the model with variable labor supply,
population aging results in a smaller increase in the level of financial wealth
and a smaller decline in the world real interest rate, resulting in lower invest-
ment and higher consumption than the fixed labor supply model. The impact
on the external balance is similar, because the higher consumption in the vari-
able labor supply model is coupled with a low investment-to-output ratio.
The labor supply dynamics of the model match the data qualitatively. La-
bor force statistics display consistently higher hours worked per worker for
China than the United States (see left panel in figure 3.19).8 Second, there has
been a persistent decline in hours worked both in the US and China, which in
the model arises as a result of population aging. Third, according to the 2010
population census in China, labor income was a primary source of support for
28% of the rural population aged 65 and over, and for 4 % of the urban pop-
ulation in China9, and in the US, employment to population ratio among the
population over 65 has displayed an upward trend since the early 1980s (see
right panel in figure 3.19), suggesting that retirees’ role in income provision is
important.
8Also, on the extensive margin, the employment to population ratio, as well as the labor force
participation rate, has been historically higher in China than in the US both among population
aged 15-64 and population aged 65 and over (the right panel in figure 3.19).
9Original source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2012), cited by Jiang et al. (2016). In
2004, working was the primary source of income 8% of urban men and 4% of urban women, and
43% of rural men and 23% of rural women. Original source: National Bureau of Statistics of China
(2005), cited by Naughton (2007).
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Figure 3.19: Left panel: Annual hours worked per worker. Source: The Confer-
ence Board Total Economy Database 2015. Right panel: Employment to popu-
lation ratio on age groups 15-64 and 65 and over. Source: OECD Labor Force
Survey 2018.
3.5 Conclusions
This paper examines whether the relatively rapid demographic transition in
China combined with its low level of social security can help to explain why
China has accumulated a large positive net foreign asset position over the past
decades and why the country has persistently run a positive trade balance vis-
a-vis the US. The analysis is performed with a model which features a life-cycle
structure and a pay-as-you-go pension system along with endogenous labor
supply and distortionary taxation.
The results show that demographic transition, together with the low level
of social security expenditures, helps to explain the observed long-lasting trade
and current account surpluses of China vis-a-vis the US. The rapid increase in
life expectancy increases Chinese savings and generates current account and
trade surpluses. The model predicts a long-lasting improvement in China’s net
foreign asset position and a positive trade balance for most of the simulation
period. The role of low social security income in explaining the observed pat-
tern is crucial. Even though life expectancy grew more quickly in China, it still
remained lower than in the US for the entire simulation period, and therefore
without social security, the model would counterfactually predict a negative
trade balance and net foreign asset position for China.
Temporary TFP fluctuations remain important drivers of the trade balance,
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but even after controlling for the effects of productivity growth, the model pre-
dicts a positive trade balance and net foreign asset position for China for most
of the simulation period. TFP growth rate fluctuations cause more volatility
in the trade balance when the model is solved deterministically than when the
alternative method, in which the temporary shocks are not known in advance
and agents learn gradually, is used. Therefore the impact of the TFP fluctua-
tions is smaller with the latter method, and the results better aligned with data.
As the features in the model are not specific to China, the model could also
be used to analyze the relationship between other emerging and industrial-
ized economies. Given the similarities in demographic trends in other emerg-
ing economies and the relatively low level of social security commonly ob-
served, the model is likely to predict a similar pattern for several other emerg-
ing economies.
Finally, the analysis omits the effects of the Chinese central bank policies,
including foreign exchange policies, capital controls and trade policies, as well
as financial market imperfections. I leave this for future research.
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Appendix
3.A Trade balance
Figure 3.20: Left: External balance on goods and services 1980-2015 for China and
the US. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. Right: US bilateral trade
balance against China 1985-2015. Sources: US Census Bureau (goods) and Bureau of
Economic Analysis (goods and services since 1999).
3.B Data fit
Figure 3.21: Simulation results (simulation with updates) with bilateral trade balance
data (left) and multilateral trade balance data (right).
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3.C Life-cycle structure
Population in a country at time t consists of two groups of individuals: work-
ers, whose total number is Nwt , and retirees, whose number equals N
r
t . All
agents enter the economy as workers at the age of 20 and remain workers
with probability ωt,t+1 and retire with probability 1 − ωt,t+1. Every period
(1−ωt,t+1 + nt,t+1)Nwt new workers are born. Thus the number of workers
grows each period at rate nt,t+1 and the law of motion for aggregate labor force
is
Nwt+1 = (1−ωt,t+1 + nt,t+1)Nwt +ωt,t+1Nwt = (1+ nt,t+1)Nwt . (3.28)
At time t, probability of a retiree to survive to the next period is γt,t+1. The
law of motion for the number of retirees is
Nrt+1 = (1−ωt,t+1)Nwt + γt,t+1Nrt . (3.29)
The ratio of number of retirees to the number of workers, dependency ratio,
is given by ψt = Nrt /N
w
t and can be solved to evolve according to
(1+ nt,t+1)ψt+1 = (1−ωt,t+1) + γt,t+1ψt . (3.30)
3.D Pension systems
China In the early 1980s, the Chinese pension system covered mostly urban
workers in the public sector and state-owned enterprises, and until the early
1990s, all China’s pension liabilities were unfunded (Naughton, 2007). After
the beginning of the 1980s, the Chinese economy and demographic structure
underwent changes that necessitated several reforms in the pension system.
The targets of the reforms included increasing the pension coverage to urban
employees of private enterprises and, eventually, to rural residents, and tack-
ling the challenge posed by the aging population by setting up a partly funded
system.
The current two-tier pension system was introduced in 1998 and revised in
2006 (OECD, 2015). It consists of a public basic pension, which is funded on
a pay-as-you-go basis, and a mandatory employee contribution to a second-
tier plan. The coverage of the pension system remains mostly limited to urban
workers. The second-tier plan, which is a funded individual-account system,
was de facto functional in only 11 out of the 33 Chinese provinces. The pension
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scheme covers 27.7 % of the population aged 15-65 and 33.5 % of the labor
force. Depending on individual earnings, the gross replacement rate of the
basic pensions system, defined as the pension benefits as a share of individual
lifetime average earnings, varies between 30 and 50 % (OECD, 2015). With the
defined contribution pillar, the gross replacement rate is approximately 75%.
The US The public pension system in the United States is called Social Se-
curity and originates in the Social Security Act of 1935. It is a defined bene-
fit, earnings-based public pension scheme. A means-tested old-aged pension
benefit (Supplemental Security Income) provides additional income for low-
income pensioners. The social security covered 71.4 % of the population aged
15 to 65 and 92.2 % of the labor force in 2010 (OECD, 2015). The gross replace-
ment rate of the social security varies between 25 % and 45 %, which is low
in comparison to the OECD average (OECD, 2015). Private pension funds are
highly important in the United States. An approximation by the OECD (2015)
shows that if all workers are assumed to contribute annually at the rate of 9%
into a voluntary private pension fund throughout their life, the replacement
rate of an average earner is 82%.
The social security system is partly funded. Almost all wage income is sub-
ject to FICA taxes (FICA = Federal Insurance Contributions Act tax), which
are administered by the Social Security Trust Funds. The Federal Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance (OASI) fund holds the accumulated old-age pension fund
assets and pays the benefits (The Board of Trustees, Federal Old-Age and Sur-
vivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds, 2016). Any ex-
cess income is deposited into the fund and invested in special US government
bonds (Special Issue Securities; www.ssa.gov). The OASI funds reserves at the
end of 2015 were 2780 billion USD. Income in 2015 was 798 billion USD (of
which 679 billion USD consisted of payroll taxes) and costs 776 billion USD (of
which benefit payments amounted to 769 billion) (The Board of Trustees, Fed-
eral Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust
Funds, 2016).
Classification of the pension systems by Pallares-Miralles et al. (2012) The
classification is based on three principles: i) what the basic form of benefit
promise is, ii) how the benefits are financed and iii) whether the system is
privately or publicly managed. The classification is a simplified version of
the World Bank’s 5-pillar classification. The majority of pension systems un-
der pillars 0 and 1 are PAYG, which supports the classification of the Chinese
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and American systems as PAYG systems. The Chinese pension system con-
sists of pillars 0 (mandatory, publicly managed pension schemes aiming at ade-
quacy) and 1 (mandatory, publicly managed systems aiming at income replace-
ment), both consisting of defined benefits rather than defined contributions.
The American pension system, managed under “Social Security”, consists of
targeted programs under pillar 0 and defined benefit pension schemes under
pillar 1. Neither the Chinese nor the American system have elements of pil-
lar 2, which is a scheme that also aims at income replacement, but is privately
managed.
3.E Sensitivity to TFP growth assumptions
News shocks on TFP growth are known to cause aggregate fluctuations espe-
cially in low-frequency analysis (see Fujiwara (2010)). In order to capture the
impact of different assumptions about TFP growth on the aggregate fluctua-
tions the model has been simulated under three alternative TFP growth sce-
narios.
Choosing the assumptions about future long term TFP growth over the sim-
ulation period is not trivial. Even though TFP gains can still be expected due
to resource reallocation and policy reforms, as discussed by Adler et al. (2017),
China’s integration to the world trade has matured and the effects of structural
transformations may be fading. In all scenarios, I assume that current TFP
growth exactly matches the data (shown in figure 3.8), but future TFP growth
rate follows a linear trend, in which the Chinese TFP growth exceeds the US
growth rate for varying periods of time.
In the first scenario, I assume that the Chinese TFP growth rate is 2 % in
1980 and slows down at a constant rate over the next 35 years, so that in 2015,
the growth rates in China and the US are equalized. The second scenario is
similar but the TFP growth rates are equalized only in 2030, meaning that TFP
growth rate remains higher in China for 50 years. In the last scenario, China
experiences a 35-year period of relatively high TFP growth between 1980 and
2015, after which its TFP growth slows down to 0.75 % between 2016 and 2025,
and then grows again and becomes equal to the US growth rate of 1 % in 2030.
In all scenarios, TFP growth rates are equal in the steady state to gain station-
arity.
In these scenarios, the results are not qualitatively affected. However, the
larger and the more persistent the TFP growth differential, the smaller the trade
balance, especially early in the simulation period.
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3.F Parameter sensitivity
NXt/Yt NX∗t /Y∗t Ft/Yt F∗t /Y∗t Rt
Baseline simulation
mean -0.02 0.02 -0.39 0.23 1.02
min / max -0.05/0.01 -0.01/0.03 -0.83/-0.01 0.01/0.41 1.01/1.04
standard deviation 0.01 0.01 0.26 0.13 0.01
β discount factor
β = 0.990 mean -0.02 0.01 -0.38 0.23 1.03
min / max -0.05/0.01 -0.01/0.03 -0.81/-0.01 -0.01/0.40 1.01/1.04
standard deviation 0.01 0.01 0.25 0.13 0.01
β = 0.998 mean -0.03 0.02 -0.41 0.24 1.02
min / max -0.05/0.01 -0.01/0.04 -0.85/-0.01 0.01/0.42 1.00/1.03
standard deviation 0.01 0.01 0.26 0.13 0.01
σ elasticity of intertemporal substitution
σ = 0.45 mean -0.02 0.01 -0.29 0.17 1.03
min / max -0.04/0.02 -0.02/0.03 -0.68/0.02 -0.02/0.34 1.02/1.05
standard deviation 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.12 0.01
δ depreciation rate
δ = 0.15 mean -0.02 0.01 -0.28 0.16 1.04
min / max -0.04/0.02 -0.02/0.03 -0.67/0.01 -0.01/0.33 1.02/1.06
standard deviation 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.11 0.01
φ investment adjustment cost factor
φ = 0.2 mean -0.03 0.02 -0.35 0.20 1.02
min / max -0.07/0.03 -0.03/0.05 -0.81/0.08 -0.07/0.40 1.01/1.05
standard deviation 0.02 0.02 0.27 0.15 0.01
φ = 10 mean -0.02 0.02 -0.43 0.26 1.02
min / max -0.04/-0.00 0.00/0.04 -0.55/-0.02 0.02/0.43 1.01/1.04
standard deviation 0.01 0.01 0.25 0.12 0.01
ξ productivity of a unit of labor, retiree to worker
ξ = 0.6 mean -0.02 0.01 -0.33 0.20 1.03
min / max -0.04/0.01 -0.01/0.03 -0.73/-0.00 0.05/0.36 1.01/1.04
standard deviation 0.01 0.01 0.23 0.12 0.01
v elasticity of period utility with respect to consumption
v = 0.75 mean -0.02 0.01 -0.38 0.23 1.03
min / max -0.04/0.01 -0.01/0.03 -0.80/-0.01 0.01/0.40 1.01/1.04
standard deviation 0.01 0.01 0.25 0.13 0.01
Table 3.4: The table shows the sensitivity of the mean, minimum and maximum
values and standard deviation of the simulated variables to changes in single
parameter values during the sample period 1980-2015 in the simulation with
updates. The rest of the parameters are calibrated as in the baseline simulation
(table 3.1).
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3.G Technical appendix
Derivation of the model
The appendix presents derivation of retiree’s and worker’s problems, the ag-
gregation result, the problem of the firm, dynamic stationarized equations and
a characterization of the steady state of the stationarized model.
1.1 Households
Retirees
A retiree born in period j and retired in period i chooses consumption-saving
allocation and labor input to maximize
V jrt (i) = max
{[(
Cjrt (i)
)v
(1− lrt )1−v
]ρ
+ βγt,t+1
(
V jrt+1(i)
)ρ} 1ρ
(3.31)
subject to
Ajrt+1 (i) =
RtA
jr
t (i)
γt−1,t
+Wtξl
jr
t (1− τt) + Srt − Cjrt (i) . (3.32)
Rt is the world interest rate that clears the international capital market and
γt,t+1 (henceworth, γt,t+1 ≡ γt+1) is the retirees’ probability to survive from
one period to the next. Wξlrt (1− τt) is the net wage income and Srt is the pen-
sion income from the government. The proportional income tax τt is paid both
by the workers and the retirees.
The first order condition with respect to asset accumulation is
v(Cjrt (i))
vρ−1(1− l jrt )ρ(1−v) = βγt+1(V jrt+1(i))ρ−1
∂V jrt+1(i)
∂Ajrt+1(i)
. (3.33)
The envelope condition is
∂V jrt (i)
∂Ajrt (i)
= (V jrt )
1−ρv(Cjrt (i))
vρ−1(1− l jrt )(1−v)ρ
Rt
γt
. (3.34)
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The first order condition with respect to labor is
l jrt (i) = 1−
Cjrt (i)ς
Wtξ(1− τt) (3.35)
where ς = 1−vv .
Combining the first order conditions and the lagged envelope condition(
∂V jrt+1(i)
∂Ajrt+1(i)
)
, and noting that σ = 11−ρ gives the following Euler equation for
retirees:
Cjrt+1(i) = C
jr
t (i)
[(
Wt(1− τt)
Wt+1(1− τt+1)
)ρ(1−v)
βRt+1
]σ
. (3.36)
Guess that consumption is a fraction of total lifetime wealth:
Cjrt (i) = etpit
(
RtA
jr
t (i)
γt
+ H jrt (i) + P
r
t
)
(3.37)
where H jrt is the present discounted value of a retiree‘s lifetime human
wealth and Prt is the present discounted value of a retiree‘s lifetime pension
benefits. The present discounted value of a retiree’s human wealth can be writ-
ten as
H jrt (i) = Wt(1− τt)ξl jrt (i)+
Wt+1(1− τt+1)ξl jrt+1(i)
Rt+1/γt+1
+
Wt+2(1− τt+1)ξl jrt+1(j)
(Rt+1/γt+1)(Rt+2/γt+2)
+ ...
=
∞
∑
v=0
Wt+v(1− τt+v)ξl jrt+v(i)
∏vs=1(Rt+s/γt+s)
=Wt(1− τt)ξl jrt (i) +
H jrt+1(i)
Rt+1/γt+1
. (3.38)
Similarly, the present discounted value of a retiree’s pension benefits can be
written as
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Prt = S
r
t +
Prt+1
Rt+1/γt+1
. (3.39)
Combining the Euler equation (3.36) with the guess (3.37) as follows gives
a law of motion for the marginal propensity to consume as follows.
First, combine the budget constraint (3.32) with the guess (3.37) to have the
following expression for consumption:
Cjrt (i) = etpit
(
Rt
γt
∗ γt
Rt
(Ajrt+1(i)−Wtξl jrt (i) (1− τt)− Srt − Cjrt (i)) + H jrt (i) + Prt
)
.
(3.40)
Second, substitute this expression (3.40), a lagged expression of the guess
(3.37) and the expressions for present value of human (3.38) and social security
(3.39) wealth into the Euler equation (3.36) to obtain the following expression
et+1pit+1
(
Rt+1A
jr
t+1(i)
γt+1
+ H jrt+1(i) + P
r
t+1
)
={
etpit
(
Ajrt+1(i) +
H jrt+1(i) + P
r
t+1
Rt+1/γt+1
+ Cjrt (i)
)}
∗
[(
Wt(1− τt)
Wt+1(1− τt+1)
)ρ(1−v)
βRt+1
]σ
. (3.41)
Dividing both sides of the equation by the LHS (left-hand-side) of itself and
using the Euler equation and the conjecture again, retiree’s marginal propen-
sity to consume can be solved to evolve according to
etpit = 1− etpit
et+1pit+1
γt+1
(
Wt(1− τt)
Wt+1(1− τt+1)
)ρσ(1−v)
βσ(Rt+1)ρσ . (3.42)
To obtain a solution for the value function, first conjecture that it is linear in
consumption according to
V jrt (i) = 4rtCjrt (i)
(
ς
Wtξ(1− τt)
)
1−v, (3.43)
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substitute the conjecture into the value function and solve for 4rt to obtain
the following expression
(4rt)ρ = 1+
βγt+1(4rt+1)ρ
[
Cjrt+1(i)
(
ς
Wt+1ξ(1−τt+1)
)
1−v
]ρ(
Cjrt (i)(
ς
Wtξ(1−τt) )
1−v
)
ρ
.
Then, substitute Cjrt+1(i) from the Euler equation (3.36) and use the equation
(3.42) to verify that
4rt = (etpit)−
1
ρ . (3.44)
and thus
V jrt (i) = (etpit)
− 1ρCjrt (i)
(
ς
Wtξ(1− τt)
)
1−v. (3.45)
Workers
A worker born in period j chooses consumption-saving allocation and labor
input to solve
V jwt = max
{[(
Cjwt
)v (
1− l jwt
)1−v]ρ
+ β
[
ωt+1V
jw
t+1 + (1−ωt+1)V jrt+1
]ρ} 1ρ
(3.46)
where ωt,t+1 (henceworth, ωt,t+1 ≡ ωt+1) is the workers’ probability to
remain a worker, subject to
Ajwt+1 = RtA
jw
t +Wtl
jw
t (1− τt)− Cjwt − T jwt . (3.47)
The first order condition with respect to asset accumulation is
v(Cjwt )
vρ−1(1− l jwt )ρ(1−v) =
β
(
ωt+1V
jw
t+1 + (1−ωt+1)V jwt+1
)
ρ−1
[
ωt+1
∂Vwt+1
∂Awt+1
+ (1−ωt+1)
∂Vrjt+1
∂Awjt+1
]
.
(3.48)
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The envelope conditions are
∂V jwt
∂Ajwt
= (Vwt )
1−ρv(Cwt )vρ−1(1− lwt )(1−v)ρRt (3.49)
and
∂V jrt (i)
∂Ajwt
=
∂V jrt (i)
∂Ajrt
∂Ajrt
∂Ajwt
=
∂V jrt (i)
∂Ajrt
= (Vrt )
1−ρv(Crt )vρ−1(1− lrt )(1−v)ρRt.
(3.50)
The first order condition with respect to labor is
lwt (j) = 1−
Cwt (i)ς
Wt(1− τt) . (3.51)
Combining the first order conditions and the envelope conditions gives the
Euler equation for the workers. First, substitute into the first order condition
for asset accumulation (3.48) the envelope conditions taking into account the
assumption of no compensation for the risk of death :
v(Cjwt )
vρ−1(1− l jwt )ρ(1−v) =
β(ωt+1V
jw
t+1 + (1−ωt+1)V jwt+1)ρ−1∗
(ωt+1(Vwt+1)
1−ρv(Cwt+1)
vρ−1(1− lwt+1)(1−v)ρRt+1
+ (1−ωt+1)(Vrt+1)1−ρv(Crt+1)vρ−1(1− lrt+1)(1−v)ρRt+1).
Then substitute the labor FOC (3.51) to have
Cwt
(
Wt+1(1− τt+1)
Wt(1− τt)
) ρ(1−v)
ρ−1
(βRt+1)σ =
(ωt+1V
jw
t+1 + (1−ωt+1)V jwt+1)∗[
ωt+1(Vwt+1)
1−ρ(Cwt+1)
ρ−1 + (1−ωt+1)(Vrt+1)1−ρv(Crt+1)ρ−1ξ(v−1)ρ
]−σ
.
(3.52)
Conjecture that similarly as for retirees, the value function is linear in consump-
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tion:
V jwt = 4jwt Cjwt
(
ς
Wt(1− τt)
)1−v
. (3.53)
In addition, define the adjustment term to be
Ωt ≡ ωt−1,t + (1−ωt−1,t)e
1
1−σ
t χ (3.54)
and define χ = ξ−(1−v).
Substitute the conjectures for the value functions (3.43) and (3.53) into equa-
tion (3.52). The resulting Euler equation takes the form
Cjwt
[(
Wt(1− τt)
Wt+1(1− τt+1)
)ρ(1−v)
βR,t+1Ωt+1
]σ
=
ωt+1C
jw
t+1 + (1−ωt+1)
(
4rt+1
4wt+1
)
χCjrt+1 (3.55)
which equals
Cjwt
[(
Wt(1− τt)
Wt+1(1− τt+1)
)ρ(1−v)
βR,t+1Ωt+1
]σ
=
ωt+1C
jw
t+1 + (1−ωt+1)(et+1)
σ
1−σ χCjrt+1.
Guess the consumption to be a fraction of total lifetime wealth
Cjwt = pit(RW,tA
jw
t + H
jw
t + P
jw
t ) (3.56)
where H jwt is the present discounted value of a worker‘s human wealth
net of taxation and Pwt is the present discounted value of a worker‘s pension
benefits that (s)he can assume to get once retired.
Substitute the per period budget constraint (3.47) to get the following ex-
pression:
Cjwt = pit(A
jw
t+1 −Wtl jwt (1− τt) + Cjwt + Twt + H jwt + Pwt ).
For a retiree who just abandoned the labor force, the consumption is guessed
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to be proportional to the assets they had as workers which they carry to their
first period of retirement and human and social security as retirees:
Cr|wt = εtpit(RtA
jw
t + H
jr
t + P
jr
t ) (3.57)
with the budget constraint being
Ajr|wt+1 = RtA
jw
t +Wtl
jw
t (1− τt)− Cjwt − Twt . (3.58)
Substitute the budget constraint (3.58) into the conjecture (3.57) to have
Cr|wt = εtpit(A
jr|w
t+1 −Wtl jwt (1− τt) + Cjwt + Tw + H jrt + Pjrt )
Combining the Euler equation (3.55) with the guesses (3.56) and (3.57) and
the budget constraints (3.47) and (3.58) as follows gives a law of motion for the
marginal propensity to consume as follows. First, subsitute the guesses into
the Euler equation to have
pit(RW,tA
jw
t + H
jw
t + P
jw
t )
[(
Wt(1− τt)
Wt+1(1− τt+1)
)ρ(1−v)
βRt+1Ωt+1
]σ
=
ωt+1pit+1(Rt+1A
jw
t+1 + H
jw
t+1 + P
jw
t+1)
+ (1−ωt+1)
(
4rt+1
4wt+1
)
χεt+1pit+1(Rt+1A
jw
t+1 + H
jr
t+1 + P
jr
t+1) (3.59)
and substitute the per period budget constraints (3.47) and (3.58) to have
pit(RW,tA
jw
t + H
jw
t + P
jw
t )
[(
Wt(1− τt)
Wt+1(1− τt+1)
)ρ(1−v)
βRt+1Ωt+1
]σ
=
ωt+1pit+1(RW,t,t+1(RW,tA
jw
t +Wtl
jw
t (1− τt)− Cjwt − Twt ) + H jwt+1 + Pjwt+1)+
(1−ωt+1)
(
4rt+1
4wt+1
)
χεt+1pit+1(Rt+1(RW,tA
jw
t +Wtl
jw
t (1− τt)−Cjwt −Twt )+H jrt+1 + Pjrt+1).
(3.60)
Substituting again the guess for Cwjt , collecting terms and using the defini-
tion of the adjustment term, collecting terms with Awt on the LHS and dividing
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the equality by Ωt+1pit+1Rt+1, this expression becomes
RtAwt ∗
[
1− pit − pit
pit+1
(
Wt(1− τt)
Wt+1(1− τt+1)
)ρ(1−v)σ
βσ(Rt+1Ωt+1)σ−1
]
=[
pi +
pit
pit+1
(
Wt(1− τt)
Wt+1(1− τt+1)
)ρ(1−v)σ
βσ(Rt+1Ωt+1)σ−1
]
(Hwt + P
w
t )−Wtlwt (1− τt)+Tt
− ωt+1
Rt+1Ωt+1
(Hwt+1 + P
w
t+1)−
(1−ωt+1)
Rt+1Ωt+1
(
4rt+1
4wt+1
)
χεt+1(Hrt+1 + P
r
t+1).
Conjecturing that Hwjt =Wtl
jw
t (1− τt)−Twt +
ωt+1H
jw
t+1
Ωt+1Rt+1
+
(1−ωt+1)
(4rt+1
4wt+1
)
χεt+1Hrt+1
Ωt+1Rt+1
and
Pwjt =
ωt+1P
jw
t+1
Ωt+1Rt+1
+
(1−ωt+1)
(4rt+1
4wt+1
)
χεt+1Prt+1
Ωt+1Rt+1
, this can be written as
(RtAwt +H
wj
t + P
wj
t ) ∗
[
1− pit − pit
pit+1
(
Wt(1− τt)
Wt+1(1− τt+1)
)ρ(1−v)σ
βσ(Rt+1Ωt+1)σ−1
]
= 0
which implies that the workers´ marginal propensity to consume can be
solved to evolve according to
pit =
[
1− pit
pit+1
(
Wt(1− τt)
Wt+1(1− τt+1)
)ρσ(1−v)
βσ(Rt+1Ωt+1)σ−1
]
. (3.61)
To obtain a solution for the value function, subsitute the conjecture of the
value function (3.53) into the value function (3.46) and solve for 4rt to obtain
the following expression
(4wt )ρ = 1+
βσ
(
Wt(1−τt)
Wt+1(1−τt+1)
)(1−v)ρ
(4wt+1)ρ
[
ωt+1Cwt+1 + (1−ωt+1)
(
∆rt+1
∆wt+1
)
χCrt+1
]ρ
(Cwt )
ρ .
Then, substitute the Euler equation (3.55) into this expression and use the
equation (3.61) to verify that
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4wt = (pit)−
1
ρ . (3.62)
and thus
Vwt = (pit)
− 1ρCrt (
ς
Wt(1− τt) )
1−v . (3.63)
1.2 Aggregation
Total assets
Because of the perfect annuity market, RtArt−1 of the assets of retirees of period
t − 1 is carried to the next period t. Of workers who retire between periods
t− 1 and t, (1−ωt−1,t)(RW,t−1Awt−1 +Wt−1lwt−1 (1− τt−1)− Cwt−1 − Twt−1) adds
to the retirees assets in the beginning of period t. Thus retirees’ aggregate assets
evolve according to
Art+1 = RtA
r
t + (1−ωt+1)(Rt+1Awt +Wtlwt (1− τt)Nwt − Cwt − Twt ). (3.64)
Workers aggregate assets evolve according to
Awt+1 = ωt+1(Rt+1A
w
t +Wtl
w
t (1− τt)Nwt − Cwt − Twt ). (3.65)
Consumption
Retirees’ and workers’ marginal propensities to consume do not depend on
individual characteristics. The aggregate consumption in each group is thus
total wealth times the groups’ marginal propensities to consume.
Retirees’ aggregate consumption is
Crt = etpit(RtA
r
t + H
r
t + P
r
t ) (3.66)
and workers’ aggregate consumption is
Cwt = pit(RtA
w
t + H
w
t + P
w
t ). (3.67)
Total aggregate consumption is
Ct = Crt + C
w
t = etpit(RW,tA
r
t + H
r
t + P
r
t ) + pit(RW,tA
w
t + H
w
t + P
w
t ). (3.68)
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Denoting the share of assets held by retirees λt =
Art
At , total aggregate consump-
tion is given by
Ct = pitAtRW,t(etλt + 1− λt) + pit(Hwt + Pwt ) + etpit(Hrt + Prt ). (3.69)
Human wealth
The present discounted value of retirees’ aggregate human wealth is
Hrt =
(
1− L
w
t
Lt
)
αYt(1− τt) + γt+1 ψtψt+1
Hrt+1
(1+ nt,t+1)Rt+1
(3.70)
and the present discounted value of workers’ aggregate human wealth is
Hwt =
Lwt
Lt
αYt(1− τt)− twt Yt
+ωt+1
Hwt+1
(1+ nt,t+1)Rt+1Ωt+1
+ (1−ωt+1)
Hrt+1e
1
1−σ
t+1 χ
ψt+1(1+ nt,t+1)Rt+1Ωt+1
. (3.71)
Social security wealth
With St = S
jr
t N
r
t , the present discounted value of retirees´ aggregate pension
benefits at time t is
Prt = St + γt,t+1
Prt+1
(1+ nrt,t+1)Rt+1
. (3.72)
In the current period, workers receive no social security payments (St), but
expect to receive social security once retired. The total value of social security
payments for the working force at time t equals
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Pwt = ωt,t+1
Pwt+1
(1+ nwt,t+1)Rt+1Ωt+1
+ (1−ωt,t+1)
Prt+1e
1
1−σ
t+1 χ
ψt+1(1+ nt,t+1)Rt+1Ωt+1
. (3.73)
Labor supply
Because the individual labor supply for retirees (3.35) is linear in consumption
which is linear in wealth (3.37), the aggregate labor supply by retirees is:
Lrt = N
r
t −
ς
ξWt(1− τt)C
r
t . (3.74)
Similarly, aggregate labor supply by workers is
Lwt = N
w
t −
ς
Wt(1− τt)C
w
t . (3.75)
Distribution of wealth
Substituting expressions (3.65) and (3.67) into (3.64), the distribution of wealth
between workers and retirees can be shown to evolve as follows:
λt+1 = ωt,t+1(RW,tλt
At
At+1
(1− etpit)+ N
r
tWt(1− τt)lrt ξ
At+1
+
Srt − etpit(Hrt + Prt )
At+1
)
+ (1−ωt+1). (3.76)
1.2 Firms
Firms operate in a competitive market and employ labor, capital and invest-
ment to maximize present discounted value of profits which is given by
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V (It−1,Kt) = max
[
(Xt (Lwt + ξL
r
t))
α K1−αt −Wt (Lwt + ξLrt)− It +
V(It,Kt+1)
RW,t+1
]
(3.77)
subject to the law of motion of capital
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +
[
1− φ
2
(
It
It−1
− µt
)2]
It . (3.78)
The capital is owned by the firm and wage is paid to the effective labor
force. Production takes place according to a constant returns to scale Cobb-
Douglas production function
Yt = (Xt (Lwt + ξL
r
t))
α K1−αt (3.79)
where Xt is the level of exogenous labor augmenting productivity at time
t. Effective labor supplied by the retirees is given by ξLrt . Productivity grows
according to Xt+1 = (1+ xt,t+1)Xt. α is the labor share. The Lagrangian is
L = (Xt (Lwt + ξLrt))α K1−αt −Wt (Lwt + ξLrt)− It
+
V(It,Kt+1)
Rt+1
− qt
[
(1− δ)Kt +
[
1− φ
2
(
It
It−1
− µt
)2]
It − Kt+1
]
and the first order conditions with respect to labor force, capital and invest-
ment solve
Wt = α
Yt
Lwt + ξL
r
t
(3.80)
∂L
∂It
= −1+ ∂V(It,Kt+1)
∂It
− qt − qt
(
It
It−1
− µt
)2
+ qtφ
It
It−1
(
It
It−1
− µt
)
= 0
and
∂L
∂Kt+1
=
∂V(It,Kt+1)
∂Kt+1
− qt = 0.
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The envelope conditions are
∂V(It−1,Kt)
∂It−1
= qtφ
(
It
It−1
)2 ( It
It−1
− µt
)
and
∂V(It−1,Kt)
∂Kt
= (1− α)Yt
Kt t
+ (1− δ)qt.
Substituting the envelope conditions into the first order conditions gives
the following first order conditions for capital and investment:
qt =
1
Rt+1
[
(1− α)Yt+1
Kt+1
+ (1− δ)qt+1
]
(3.81)
and
qt
[
1− φ
2
(
It
It−1
− µt−1,t
)2
− φ
(
It
It−1
− µt−1,t
)
It
It+1
]
= 1− φqt+1
Rt+1
(
It+1
It
− µt,t+1
)(
It+1
It
)2
. (3.82)
1.3 Government
In addition to wasteful spending Gt, government pays the retirees social se-
curity benefits St, and finances these with tax revenues and by issuing debt.
Government spending and social security are assumed exogenous fraction of
output: GtYt = gt and
St
Yt = st. Government’s per period budget constraint is
Bt+1 = RtBt + Gt + St − Tt (3.83)
and iterating forward, the intertemporal budget constraint is
RtBt =
∞
∑
v=0
Tt+v
∏vz=1 Rt+z
−
∞
∑
v=0
Gt+v
∏vz=1 Rt+z
−
∞
∑
v=0
St+v
∏vz=1 Rt+z
. (3.84)
With elastic labor supply, total tax revenue is
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Tt = τtWt (ξlrtN
r
t + l
w
t N
w
t ) + T
w
t . (3.85)
The lump sum tax Twt = N
w
t T
jw
t is exogenous. labor tax τt endegenously
adjusts according to the following fiscal policy rule:
τt = τt−1 + θ
[
bt − b¯t
]
, (3.86)
where b¯t is an exogenous steady state debt/output share.
1.4 A competitive world equilibrium and the external sector
A competitive world equilibrium is a sequence of quantities and prices such
that in each country (i) households maximize utility subject to their budget
constraint, (ii) firms maximize profits subject to their technology constraints,
(iii) the government chooses a path for taxes and debt, compatible with in-
tertemporal solvency, to finance exogenous level of total spending, and (iv) all
markets clear.
In each economy, total assets are the sum of capital stock, government
bonds and net foreign assets Ft:
At = Kt + Bt + Ft. (3.87)
Net foreign asset position evolves according to
Ft+1 = Rt+1Ft + NXt (3.88)
where NXt is the trade balance
NXt = Yt − (Ct + It + Gt). (3.89)
Return RW,t is equalized across the two countries because of the clearing
of the international asset markets, which implies that internationally traded
assets are in zero net supply:
Ft + F∗t = 0. (3.90)
Denoting the relative size of the economies by
RSt =
XtNt
X∗t N∗t
, (3.91)
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the relative size of the economies evolves according to
X∗t+1N
∗
t+1
Xt+1Nt+1
=
X∗t N∗t (1+ x∗t,t+1 + n
∗
t,t+1)
XtNt(1+ xt,t+1 + nt,t+1)
. (3.92)
Given an initial relative size R¯S in period 1, the size in period T is
RST = R¯S(1+ x1 + n1)(1+ x2 + n2)...(1+ xT + nT) (3.93)
= R¯S
T−1
∏
s=1
(1+ x1+s + n1+s).
Exogenous policy variables, government spending to output ratio gt and
social security to output ratio st, follow first order autoregressive processes as
follows:
gt = (1− θt)gss + θtgt−1 + ugt
and
st = (1− θt)sss + θtst−1 + ust .
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4 China’s macroeconomic
policies and spillover effects
.
4.1 Introduction
China’s rapid economic growth and its rise to become the world’s largest mer-
chandise trader1 has created tensions between China and other large economies.
These tensions come from the fact that China’s trade has been persistently im-
balanced, and the imbalances have been interpreted as being, at least to some
extent, a result of government policies which distort both the country’s in-
tratemporal terms of trade, i.e. the price of foreign goods in the domestic mar-
ket, and the intertemporal terms of trade, i.e. the real interest rate, at the ex-
pense of China’s trading partners. Throughout the 2000s, China has run trade
and current account surpluses against the rest of the world and against its main
trading partner, the United States2.
The objective of this paper is to provide a quantitative analysis of the effects
of China’s macroeconomic policies on the dynamics of its trade balance and the
real interest rate in the 2000s, and the spillover effects of these policies on the
United States. The policies analyzed are i) capital controls, which allow the
government to set a domestic interest rate that differs from the world interest
rate, ii) undervaluation of the real exchange rate, and iii) fiscal policy, especially
the strong growth of the Chinese general government’s expenditures and the
large fiscal deficits observed during the 2000s.
1Source: WTO World Trade Statistical Review, 2017.
2Current account balance is shown in Appendix 4.D, figure 4.15.
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While earlier theoretical literature on capital controls and real exchange
rates provides qualitative indications on the effects of these policies on the ex-
ternal sector, the novelty of this paper lies in providing a theory-based, quan-
titative and dynamic assessment of the importance of government policies on
the observed external imbalances between China and the United States in the
2000s. In the analysis, I take into account differences in demographic struc-
tures as a factor which affects the transmission of government policies. I also
analyze the spillover effects that Chinese macroeconomic policies are likely to
have on its trading partners.
In order to quantify the impact of the above-mentioned policies, I build
a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model embedded with policy in-
struments describing the behavior of Chinese policymakers. I assume that a
consolidated Chinese government-central bank can impose capital controls,
which prevent the private Chinese agents from holding foreign assets, and
control directly an exogenously given real exchange rate. The model also fea-
tures a life-cycle structure in which the households live through two differ-
ent stages in life and the sizes of cohorts vary over time. In this framework,
fiscal policy is non-Ricardian, and its effects depend on the demographic pa-
rameters. The life-cycle feature is important for the quantitative analysis since
the demographic structures between the economies differ considerably. The
life-cycle structure also facilitates the analysis of life-cycle behavior on house-
holds’ consumption-saving choices, which is important given that the Chinese
current account surplus is driven by Chinese households’ high saving rate.
The reasons for considering the above-mentioned policies as a potential
cause for the trade imbalances are as follow.
First, despite maintaining an open trade stance, China’s restrictions on its
capital account have been relatively high by international standards (see the
left panel in figure 4.1), and free capital mobility, especially in portfolio invest-
ments, has been prevented.3,4 Even though liberalization of the capital account
has been set as an official target, and measures to allow higher capital mobil-
ity have taken place, the schedule of full capital account liberalization remains
unknown. Capital controls have given China the ability to exercise an indepen-
dent interest rate policy despite its exchange rate regime, in which the yuan has
3The historical development of the capital control index is shown in figure 4.13 in Appendix
4.D.
4Foreign direct investments (FDI) have been less stringently regulated, which is reflected in a
relatively large share of FDI in foreign liabilities (figure 4.14 in Appendix 4.D). For a review of
capital controls on different asset classes, see Fernández et al. (2016).
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Figure 4.1: Left panel: Capital controls index (overall restrictions index, including all
asset classes). Source: Fernández et al. (2016). Right panel: Real interest rates (lending
interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator). Source: World
Bank World Development Indicators 2018 and author’s calculations.
effectively been anchored to the U.S. dollar (IMF, 2014)5. According to World
Bank data (see right panel in figure 4.1), the United States’ real interest rate has
exceeded the Chinese real interest rate rate considerably from the 1980s until
the Asian financial crises in 1997; in the 2000s, the Chinese real interest rate
has been below the US real interest rate (5 basis points on average) as well.
By controlling the domestic real interest rate, the government has been able to
distort the intertemporal terms of trade faced by the private sector and thereby
the trade balance. As the private sector is largely prevented from accessing
the international financial market, persistent trade surpluses have led to the
accumulation of a sizeable foreign reserve position held by the People’s Bank
of China (PBOC), which constitutes the majority of China’s external assets (see
figure 4.14 in Appendix 4.D). To capture this, in the model, I assume that the
consolidated central bank is the only Chinese agent able to access the interna-
tional financial market. The domestic interest rate is assumed to be exogenous
and directly controlled by the central bank.
Second, the Chinese real exchange rate is estimated to have been underval-
ued for an extended period of time during the 2000s and 2010s. According to
Goldstein and Lardy (2009), the undervaluation was approximately 20 % from
2002 to 2008. Also according to the IMF Series of External Sector Reports (IMF,
5Since 2016, the yuan has been classified as de facto anchored to a composite basket instead of
the dollar.
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2014, 2015, 2016), the REER was slightly undervalued until as late as 2014 after
which it reached a level which the IMF describes as being in line with the fun-
damentals.67 Figure 4.2 presents estimates of the REER undervaluation based
on Goldstein and Lardy (2009) and by the IMF (the right panel). From the
figure it can also be seen that the REER has closely followed the bilateral real
exchange rate of the renmimbi vis-a-vis the dollar (the left panel). The period
of renmimbi undervaluation coincides with the substantial increase in the cur-
rent account surplus in 2006-2007.8 In the simulations, I assumed that the real
exchange rate is exogenous and matches the estimates by Goldstein and Lardy
(2009) and the IMF.
Figure 4.2: Left panel: Nominal China / US exchange rate (solid line),
real China / US exchange rate (dashed blue line), China’s real effective ex-
change rate (dotted black line). All data is quarterly. Data sources: Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of St. Louis (exchange rates), OECD (inflation).
Right panel: China REER misalignment based on IMF REER index gap and linear ex-
trapolation as in Goldstein and Lardy (2009).
Third, the size of the general government, measured by the government
consumption as a share of GDP, has grown markedly in the 2000s in China,
and government expenditures have been financed, to a growing extent, with
6For the methodology of the undervaluation assessment, see IMF, 2019.
7Alternative estimates on the size of the undervaluation are summarized by Goldstein (2008).
17 out of 18 studies from the years 2000-2007 find that the real effective exchange rate (henceforth,
REER) of the renmimbi was undervalued in the first part of the 2000s, by 17 % in years 2000-2004
and by 26 % between 2005-2007 on average.
8See figure 4.15 in Appendix 4.D.
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net borrowing (see figure 4.5). General government total expenditures grew
from approximately 17 % to over 30 % of GDP between 2000 and 2015, and
the growth in government revenues has not sufficed to close the fiscal deficit,
especially in the latter part of the 2010s. The observed fiscal deficits have the
potential to explain China’s high savings rate to the extent that they have led
to an increase in private savings in anticipation of high future tax rates. At the
same time, the United States has also been running a persistent government
budget deficit, which widened in the aftermath of the financial crisis and has
led to a substantial increase in public debt.
Finally, the demographic structures of China and the United States differ
significantly from each other, and demographic developments have changed
the population age structures both in China and the US in the past decades (see
the United Nations’ 2017 demographic projections, figure 4.3). Demographic
changes have been more evident in China than in the US, and this asymmetry
can potentially explain at least to some extent the observed imbalances in the
external sector. In addition, the demographic structure affects the transmission
of public policies in the economies by altering the share of different age groups
in the economy, whose marginal consumption and saving propensities differ
from each other, and by affecting the households’ discount rate. Therefore it
is important to analyze the impacts of the policies in a model that features a
life-cycle structure.
According to my analysis, the macroeconomic policies have had a positive
effect on the Chinese trade balance in the 2000s, driven by the real exchange
rate undervaluation, which has caused households to postpone consumption
into the future. Observed fiscal policy has also had a positive impact on the
Chinese trade balance. The impact of the interest rate policy on the trade bal-
ance has been negative, because the policy of low interest rates has encouraged
investment and discouraged savings. The removal of capital controls, which
would lead to an equalization of the domestic interest rate with the interna-
tional interest rate, would have a positive effect on the Chinese trade balance.
Furthermore, I find that the effect of the macroeconomic policies on the real
interest rate has been positive, as they have resulted in a reduction in world
aggregate savings. Demographic change has, on the contrary, put downward
pressure on the international interest rate, as it has strengthened the saving-for-
retirement motive in both economies. Demographic change has also resulted
in a long-term improvement in China’s trade surplus because of the relatively
large increase in life expectancy, even though the periods of high population
growth in the early 2000s have lowered the trade surplus temporarily. The im-
pact of the exchange rate policy is less clear as it is sensitive to the value of
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elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
4.2 Related literature
My paper is related mainly to the four following strands of literature: first, the-
oretical literature that applies the theory on capital controls and real exchange
rates to study the consequences of capital controls and exchange rate policy in
the Chinese context; second, a broader strand of literature on the optimality of
capital controls analyzed with two-country models; third, theoretical literature
on real exchange rate and terms of trade manipulation; and fourth, literature
linking demographics and the dynamics of the external sector.
The first strand of literature on the consequences of capital controls and ex-
change rate policy in the Chinese context includes papers by Song et al. (2014),
Bacchetta et al. (2013) and Chang et al. (2015). Song et al. (2014) analyze the
economic consequences of capital controls and domestic interest rate and ex-
change rate policies on measures of economic performance, including the trade
surplus, with a dynamic two-period OLG model that features the endogenous
economic transition mechanism by Song et al. (2011). Like Song et al. (2014),
Bacchetta et al. (2013) analyze the impact of capital controls and reserve ac-
cumulation in a model in which a consolidated government-central bank is by
assumption the only agent that can access the international financial market. In
Bacchetta et al. (2013) the economy is a simple endowment economy, where the
households are assumed to be borrowing-constrained, and exogenous output
growth and endowment fluctuations give rise to consumption smoothing mo-
tives. Bacchetta et al. (2013) show that in a fast-growing economy like China,
the central bank can subsidize or tax households’ borrowing and saving by
manipulating the interest rate, and influence the intertemporal allocation of re-
sources in a welfare-improving way. My paper is close to Song et al. (2014)
and Bacchetta et al. (2013) as it assumes that domestic (Chinese) households
cannot access the international financial market. In addition, like Song et al.
(2014), I assume that there is a consolidated government-central bank which
accumulates foreign reserves and exercises interest rate and exchange rate poli-
cies. However, in contrast to Song et al. (2014), I generalize the two-stage OLG
structure into a Gertler (1999) life-cycle model, in which the households are as-
sumed to spend realistic average lengths of time as workers and retirees. This
allows me to take into account the impact of the demographic transition and
rationalizes the observed high saving propensity through population ageing.
Unlike Song et al. (2014), my analysis is quantitative, and it is performed in a
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two-country framework, which allows me to analyze the interest rate dynam-
ics, the spillover effects on the foreign economy through the interest rate, and
the feedback effects on the domestic economy through endogenous foreign de-
mand.
Chang et al. (2015) study the impact of China’s macroeconomic policies on
its welfare and the external balance with a New-Keynesian DSGE model with
a focus on the monetary policy trade-off that sterilization of the PBOC inter-
ventions involves. In the model, sterilization is costly if the interest rate on
domestic government bonds is above the world interest rate, but unsterilized
foreign exchange interventions would result in an increase of money supply
and higher inflation. My work is related to the paper by Chang et al. (2015)
as I analyze the impact of government dissaving through bond issuance, but
unlike Chang et al. (2015), who focus on the case in which government reserve
accumulation can only be financed by bond issuance (or money creation), my
focus is on the case where the government can accumulate reserves with taxa-
tion, as the households in my model are heterogeneous and therefore tax policy
is non-neutral.
Second, my work is related to the following papers, which study the ef-
fects of capital controls in two country models. Costinot et al. (2014) analyze
the use of capital controls as a tool to manipulate the world real interest rate
and thereby the intertemporal terms of trade. De Paoli and Lipinska (2013),
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2015) and Heathcote and Perri (2016) focus on
the role of aggregate uncertainty and incomplete asset markets, Devereux and
Yetman (2014) analyze the possibility of capital controls to restore monetary
policy independence at the zero lower bound, and Coeurdacier et al. (2015)
analyze the impact of growth and credit constraints on external imbalances.
Jeanne and Korinek (2010), Bianchi (2011), Korinek (2017) and Benigno et al.
(2016) focus on the optimality of capital controls as a measure to correct pecu-
niary externalities related to foreign borrowing. The main difference between
my paper and this strand of literature is that the analysis in the latter is norma-
tive whereas mine is positive and aims at explaining the link between observed
capital controls and dynamics in the external sector. This strand also abstracts
from consideration of the demographic factors.
Third, the analysis of the effects of the real exchange rate on the external
sector is related to Harberger (1950), Laursen and Metzler (1950), Obstfeld and
Rogoff (1995),Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Cashin and McDermott (2003).
Harberger (1950) and Laursen and Metzler (1950) analyze the link between
currency valuation and the trade balance, and explore the negative income
effect of an adverse terms of trade shock on private savings. Obstfeld and
139
CHINA’S MACROECONOMIC POLICIES AND SPILLOVER EFFECTS
Rogoff (1995) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) analyze the transmission of mon-
etary and fiscal policy shocks in a two-country DSGE models, discussing also
the substitution effect related to terms of trade shocks. Cashin and McDer-
mott (2003) explore the role of intertemporal and intratemporal substitution in
influencing the responses to terms-of-trade shocks in a small open economy.
Uribe and Schmitt-Grohé (2017) discuss the empirical evidence on terms-of-
trade shock and the external sector.
Finally, the paper is related to literature on the impacts of demographic
change on the real interest rate and the trade balance, and on the distributional
effects of policy shocks, including papers by Kilponen et al. (2006), Fujiwara
and Teranishi (2008), Ferrero (2010), Carvalho et al. (2016) and Niemeläinen
(2017), which all build on the Gertler (1999) framework. Fujiwara and Teranishi
(2008) show that the impact of monetary policy shocks, in the context of the
model, depend on the demographic structure of the economy. Ferrero (2010)
and Carvalho et al. (2016) discuss the role of demographic change as a driver
behind the decline of the real interest rate. The main difference between my
model and the previous literature with the Gertler (1999) framework are the
embedded policy instruments. In addition, with the exception of Ferrero (2010)
and Niemeläinen (2017), the previous literature studies closed or small open
economies.
4.3 The model
The model economy consists of two countries populated by finitely lived agents
with the Gertler (1999) life-cycle structure. In country 1 (China), a consoli-
dated government-central bank imposes capital controls on outflows so that
the domestic private agents can invest in domestic firms or government bonds
but not in foreign government bonds or firms, and on inflows so that foreign
investors cannot hold private domestic assets. The government-central bank
issues domestically held debt to match the domestic asset demand given the
interest rate, which is exogenously set by the government-central bank. It also
collects taxes, consumes and intervenes in the foreign exchange markets by ac-
quiring the net income by exporters and using the proceeds to acquire foreign
reserves according to its fiscal policy rule. The foreign reserves are composed
solely of the government bonds of country 2.
In both economies, a representative firm produces an internationally traded
good with Cobb-Douglas production technology with labor-augmenting pro-
ductivity.
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4.3.1 Households
All households are assumed to be born as workers at the age of 20 years and
face the probability 1− ωt,t+1 to retire between periods t and t+ 1. In retire-
ment, households die with probability 1− γt,t+1. The growth rate of the num-
ber of workers is nwt,t+1 and the old age dependency ratio, ψt, evolves according
to
ψt+1(1+ nwt,t+1) = (1−ωt,t+1) + γt,t+1ψt (4.1)
where ψt is defined as ψt =
Ntt
Nwt
.
4.3.1.1 Retirees
A retiree born in period j and retired in period i chooses consumption-saving
allocation to maximize her/his expected continuation value given by
V jrt (i) = max
Cjr,1t (i),C
jr,2
t (i),A
jr,1
t+1(i)
{(
Cjrt (i)
)ρ
+ βγt,t+1
(
V jrt+1(i)
)ρ} 1ρ
. (4.2)
Households consume both domestic goods, Cjr,1t (i), and foreign goods, C
jr,2
t (i),
and the consumption index of a retiree is given by
Cjrt (i) =
((
Cjr,1t (i)
) ε−1
ε
+
(
Cjr,2t (i)
) ε−1
ε
) ε
ε−1
(4.3)
where ε is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods
(Armington elasticity). The budget constraint of the retiree is
Ajrt+1 (i) =
Rdt A
jr
t (i)
γt−1,t
− Cjr,1t (i)− etCjr,2t (i) (4.4)
where Rdt is the domestic interest rate set by the local authority, et is the price of
the foreign good in terms of a domestic good (the real exchange rate), etC
jr,2
t (i)
consumption expenditures of the foreign good in local consumption units and
Ajrt (i) the value of financial wealth.
The first order condition with respect to asset accumulation is
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((
Cjr,1t (i)
) ε−1
ε
+
(
Cjr,2t (i)
) ε−1
ε
)
ερ
ε−1−1
(
Cjr,1t (i)
) ε−1
ε −1
= βγt+1(V
jr
t+1(i))
ρ−1 ∂V
jr
t+1(i)
∂Ajrt+1(i)
(4.5)
and the first order condition with respect to foreign consumption is
Cjr,1t (i)e
−ε
t = C
jr,2
t (i). (4.6)
Retiree’s Euler equation is
Cjr,1t+1(i) = C
jr,1
t (i)
[
βRdt+1
]σ (1+ e1−εt
1+ e1−εt+1
) ε−σ
ε−1
, (4.7)
and their marginal propensity to consume evolves according to
etpit = 1− etpit
et+1pit+1
γt,t+1β
σ(Rdt+1)
ρσ
(
1+ e1−εt
1+ e1−εt+1
) 1−σ
ε−1
. (4.8)
4.3.1.2 Workers
A worker born in period j chooses consumption-saving allocation to maximize
her/his expected continuation value given by
V jwt = max
Cjw,1t ,C
jw,2
t ,A
jw
t+1
{(
Cjwt
)ρ
+ β
[
ωt+1V
jw
t+1 + (1−ωt+1)V
jr
t+1
]ρ} 1ρ
(4.9)
where Cjwt =
((
Cjw,1t
) ε−1
ε
+
(
Cjw,2t
) ε−1
ε
) ε
ε−1
is subject to the periodic budget
constraint
Ajwt+1 = R
d
t A
jw
t +Wt − Cjw,1t − etCjw,2t − T jwt . (4.10)
The first order condition with respect to asset accumulation is
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((
Cjw,1t
) ε−1
ε
+
(
Cjw,2t
) ε−1
ε
) ερ−ε+1
ε−1 (
Cjw,1t
)− 1ε
= β
(
ωt+1V
jw
t+1 + (1−ωt+1)V
jr
t+1
)
ρ−1
ωt+1 ∂Vwt+1∂Awt+1 + (1−ωt+1) ∂V
rj
t+1
∂Awjt+1
 (4.11)
and the first order condition with respect to consumption of foreign goods is
Cjw,1t e
−ε
t = C
jw,2
t . (4.12)
The Euler equation for the worker is
ωt+1C
jw
t+1 + (1−ωt+1)(et+1)
σ
1−σ Cjrt+1 = C
jw,1
t
[
βRd,t+1Ωt+1
]σ (1+ e1−εt
1+ e1−εt+1
) ε−σ
ε−1
(4.13)
and her/his marginal propensity to consume evolves according to
pit = 1− pit
pit+1
βσ(Rdt+1Ωt+1)
σ−1
(
1+ e1−εt
1+ e1−εt+1
) 1−σ
ε−1
. (4.14)
The workers’ human wealth equals
Hwjt =Wt − T jwt +
ωt+1H
jw
t+1
Ωt+1Rdt+1
(4.15)
whereΩt is a variable which augments the interest rate in worker’s marginal
propensity to consume (eq. 4.14), defined as
Ωt ≡ ωt−1,t + (1−ωt−1,t)e
1
1−σ
t . (4.16)
4.3.2 Aggregation
Because the marginal propensities to consume (equations (4.8) and (4.14)) do
not depend on individual characteristics, aggregate consumption expenditures
by the retirees can be solved to be a fraction of aggregate financial wealth held
by the retirees
Crt = etpit(R
d
t λtAt) (4.17)
143
CHINA’S MACROECONOMIC POLICIES AND SPILLOVER EFFECTS
where λt ≡ A
r
t
At is the share of non-human wealth held by retirees. Similarly,
aggregate consumption expenditures of workers is given by
Cwt = pit(R
d
t (1− λt) At + Hwt ). (4.18)
Retirees and workers consume domestic and foreign goods in the same pro-
portion, the consumption shares of domestic and foreign goods is determined
by
C1t e
−ε
t = C
2
t . (4.19)
Given that aggregate consumption expenditures in the domestic currency are
Ct = C1t + etC
2
t = C
1
t (1 + e
1−ε
t ) = pitAtR
d
t (etλt + 1− λt) + pit(Hwt ), aggregate
consumption expenditures of domestic good in country 1 are given by
C1t =
(
pitAtRdt (etλt + 1− λt) + pit(Hwt )
)
(1+ e1−εt )
(4.20)
and aggregate consumption expenditures of the foreign good in country 1 by
C2t =
e−εt
(
pitAtRdt (etλt + 1− λt) + pit(Hwt )
)
(1+ e1−εt )
. (4.21)
Households’ aggregate financial wealth is the sum of the domestic capital
stock and government bonds, given by
At = Kt + Bt. (4.22)
4.3.3 Consolidated government-central bank
The consolidated government-central bank issues real one-period bonds, con-
sumes, collects taxes and trades international assets. Because of capital con-
trols, it is the only agent that can hold foreign assets. The government’s flow
budget constraint is given by
Bt+1 − etB∗t+1 = Rdt Bt − Rw,tetB∗t + Gt − Tt (4.23)
where Bt stands for the outstanding amount of domestic government bonds,
and B∗t for the outstanding value of foreign assets. The left-hand-side of equa-
tion (4.23) is the net debt of the central-bank government.9 Rw,t stands for the
9I follow the convention by Bacchetta et al. (2013) and Chang et al. (2015) where a positive value
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interest rate on foreign assets, Rd,t the interest rate on domestic government
debt, Gt government expenditures, and Tt taxes.
In “normal times” the government-central bank follows a balanced budget
rule, given by
Tt = (Rdt − (1+ xt,t+1 + nt,t+1))Bt
− et(Rw,t − (1+ xt,t+1 + nt,t+1))B∗t + Gt, (4.24)
which keeps net government wealth constant. In the quantitative analysis I
allow the government-central bank to follow fiscal policy so that the tax-to-
output ratio, τt ≡ TtYt , matches an exogenously given value which is calibrated
to directly match the data. Government spending is an exogenously deter-
mined fraction of the output GtYt = g¯t also calibrated to match the data.
4.3.4 The external sector
The net foreign asset position in country 1 evolves according to
etB∗t+1 = etRt+1B
∗
t + NXt (4.25)
where NXt is the trade balance, defined as
NXt ≡ Yt − (Ct + It + Gt) (4.26)
where Ct are aggregate domestic consumption expenditures. The interest rate
on internationally traded assets,RW,t, pinned down by the financial market
clearing condition
B1,∗t + B
2,∗
t = 0 (4.27)
which states that the assets are in zero net supply. In country 2, by arbitrage,
the international interest rate equals the domestic interest rate. However, the
central bank-government in country 1 is assumed to be able to control the do-
mestic interest rate in country 1 directly so that it can differ temporarily from
the international interest rate (Rdt 6= Rw,t). This is possible because the capital
controls imposed by country 1 prevent free capital mobility.
The internationally traded foreign assets are denoted in country 2 consump-
tion units. Equations for country 2 are analogous, but they are denoted in local
of B∗t indicates a net creditor position.
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consumption units. The rate of exchange in country 2 is the inverse of country
1’s rate of exchange, e∗t = 1et .
Definition 1 (a competitive world equilibrium)
A competitive world equilibrium without policy interventions is a se-
quence of quantities and prices such that in each country (i) households
maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, (ii) firms maximize
profits subject to their technology constraints, (iii) the government chooses
a path for taxes and debt, compatible with intertemporal solvency, to fi-
nance exogenous level of total spending, and (iv) all markets clear.
4.3.5 Transmission channels of transitory macroeconomic
policies
In the quantitative analysis, I allow country 1 to practice transitory macroeco-
nomic policies which cause the economy to deviate temporarily from the equi-
librium conditions laid out in the previous section. In this section I describe the
equilibrium conditions under activist macroeconomic policies and describe the
policy transmission channels. In describing the transmission channels, I use
the following decomposition of central bank - government’s periodic budget
constraint (eq. (4.28)):
etB∗t+1 = Bt+1 + etRw,tB∗t − Rdt Bt + Tt − Gt (4.28)
= At+1 − Kt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
private saving gap
+ etRw,tB∗t − Rdt Bt + Tt − Gt︸ ︷︷ ︸
net government savings
.
The second equality follows from the fact that the government-central bank
issues domestic debt to meet the domestic asset demand at the given domestic
interest rate Rdt , and therefore domestic government debt equals the domestic
private saving gap (Bt+1 = At+1− Kt+1). Therefore, the value of foreign assets
equals the sum of the private saving gap and net government savings.
4.3.5.1 Exchange rate policy
The exchange rate, et, is exogenous, and the government of country 1 is as-
sumed to be able to control it directly. An exchange rate policy shock (a terms
of trade shock) is defined as a temporary under-/overvaluation of country 1’s
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currency (et > 1/ et < 1 ), and simultaneous over-/undervaluation of country
2’s exchange rate e∗t . I define the equilibrium under exchange rate policy as
follows:
Definition 2 (a competitive world equilibrium under active exchange
rate policy)
A competitive world equilibrium under active exchange rate policy is
a sequence of quantities and prices such that given the exogenous level
of exchange rate et for t ∈ [n,m], n,m ∈ N, in each country (i) house-
holds maximize utility subject to their budget constraints, (ii) firms max-
imize profits subject to their technology constraints, (iii) the government
chooses a path for taxes and debt, compatible with intertemporal sol-
vency, to finance exogenous level of total spending, and (iv) all markets
clear.
The impact of a terms of trade shock on private savings, At+1, is ambigu-
ous. On one hand, the depreciation of the foreign exchange rate of country
1 (et > 1) lowers households’ income, which impacts negatively consumption
and savings (i.e. the Harberger-Laursen-Metzler (HLM) effect).10 However, the
negative terms of trade shock also induces a positive substitution effect on cur-
rent savings, because it increases the relative price of current consumption in
comparison to future consumption. With low elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution, σ, the HLM effect dominates, and the impact of real exchange rate
appreciation on savings is negative.
In addition to intertemporal substitution, the households respond to the
terms of trade shock by intratemporal substitution. The depreciation of the
domestic exchange rate makes foreign goods more expensive in comparison to
domestic goods, increasing the optimal consumption share of domestic goods
and decreasing the share of foreign goods in the consumption basket, which
can be seen from the optimality condition of period t ratio of foreign to domes-
tic goods
e−εt =
Cjz,2t (i)
Cjz,1t (i)
10The Harberger-Laursen-Metzler (HLM) effect, after Harberger (1950) and Laursen and Metzler
(1950), is also known as the consumption-smoothing effect, as discussed by Cashin and McDermott
(2003). Uribe and Schmitt-Grohé (2017) discuss empirical evidence on the HLM effect.
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where z = {w, r}. With high elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign goods ε, an adverse exchange rate shock shifts the consumption in the
current period from the expensive foreign good to the domestic good.
The relative size of σ and ε determines whether the substitution towards
domestic goods or the substitution of consumption into future periods has a
larger impact on the consumption of the domestic goods. The retirees’ and
workers’ consumption expenditures of domestic goods are decreasing in et as
long as σ > ε, as then the substitution towards future periods is larger than
the increase in the consumption of domestic goods.
To develop intuition for the dynamics of the real interest rate, the workers’
savings can be shown in the limiting 2-period version of the model to be a con-
cave function of the real exchange rate (see Appendix section 4.A). Therefore
a symmetric terms of trade shock has a larger impact on the savings behav-
ior of the country with an overvalued real exchange rate. If σ > 1, as in the
simulations in section 4, the substitution effect dominates, and the currency
undervaluation leads to an increase in domestic savings, and a decline in sav-
ings abroad. Because the decline in savings abroad exceeds the increase in
domestic savings, the impact on world aggregate financial wealth is negative,
and therefore the policy leads to an increase in the world real interest rate.
The terms of trade shock also has a direct impact on the external wealth
held by the central bank-government. If country 1 is a net creditor, the under-
valuation worsens its foreign asset position in terms of domestic consumption
units. If the country follows the balanced budget rule (equation 4.24), fiscal
policy must be adjusted to take the valuation effect into account. A worsening
of the net external wealth calls for an increase in taxes, to keep the value of
government net wealth in domestic consumption units constant.
4.3.5.2 Interest rate policy
The domestic interest is exogenous and the central bank-government in coun-
try 1 is assumed to be able to control it directly. When the domestic central
bank-government is not practising active interest rate policy, the domestic in-
terest rate equals the international interest rate determined by the asset market
clearing condition (Rdt = Rt). Interest rate policy is defined as a transitory devi-
ation of the domestic interest rate from the international interest rate (Rdt 6= Rt).
I define the competitive world equilibrium under interest rate policy as fol-
lows:
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Definition 3 (a competitive world equilibrium under active interest
rate policy)
A competitive world equilibrium under active interest rate policy is a
sequence of quantities and prices such that, given the exogenous level
of the country 1 interest rate Rdt for t ∈ [n,m], n,m ∈ N, in each coun-
try, (i) households maximize utility subject to their budget constraint,
(ii) firms maximize profits subject to their technology constraints, (iii)
the government chooses a path for taxes and debt, compatible with in-
tertemporal solvency, to finance exogenous level of total spending, and
(iv) all markets clear.
The impact of the interest rate policy on private savings is ambiguous. An
increase in the domestic interest rate (Rdt > Rt) has a positive impact on house-
holds’ savings, At+1, because the price of present day consumption in terms
of future consumption increases (substitution effect), and because the present
value of lifetime wealth falls.11 On the other hand, the policy has a positive
income effect, which increases households’ consumption and lowers savings.
With high elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the substitution effect domi-
nates, and the savings are increasing in interest rate. The impact of the increase
in the interest rate on investments and the capital stock, Kt+1, is negative. The
policy increases the marginal cost of capital and therefore drags down invest-
ment and output. With high elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the pol-
icy’s impact on the private saving gap is unambiguously positive, as it has a
positive impact on households’ savings and a negative impact on investment.
To illustrate the impact of the interest rate policy on net government saving,
eq. (4.28) can be further decomposed as follows:
etB∗t+1 = At+1 − Kt+1 − Rdt Bt + etRw,tB∗t + Rw,tBt − Rw,tBt + Tt − Gt (4.29)
= At+1 − Kt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
private saving gap
+ Rw,t (etB∗t − Bt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
interest income
− (Rdt − Rw,t)Bt︸ ︷︷ ︸
policy cost/bene f it
+ Tt − Gt.
Because the interest payments on domestic bonds differs from the interest in-
come on foreign assets, the interest rate policy induces a cost or benefit to the
11In the workers’ case, the negative wealth effect is reinforced by the presence of the additional
discount factor Ωt, which captures the expected finiteness of life, and the survival probability at
work, ωt,t+1, which captures the fact that the worker has a positive probability to lose their future
work stream. This can be seen in the workers’ decision rule for consumption and the marginal
propensity to consume (see eq. (4.18)). In retirees’ case, the expected finiteness of life is mitigated
by the perfect annuity market and no such reinforcement mechanism exists.
149
CHINA’S MACROECONOMIC POLICIES AND SPILLOVER EFFECTS
government, depending on the sign of the interest rate spread and whether
the government is a net debtor or lender. Net government savings consist of
interest income/expenses on net government assets less the cost of running
the interest rate policy, and tax income net of government consumption ex-
penditures. An increase in the domestic interest rate lowers net government
savings as it induces a positive policy cost, but as the government follows the
balanced budget rule, which keeps net government wealth constant, taxes de-
pend positively on the domestic interest rate (see eq. (4.24)). The net effect on
government savings is therefore ambiguous.
The policy increases demand for the foreign (internationally traded) bond,
if the net effect on the external asset position is positive. The increasing asset
demand lowers the interest rate in the international asset market, and therefore
the domestic interest rate in country 2, increasing its capital stock and output.
4.3.5.3 Government expenditures and fiscal deficit
In “normal times”, the government is assumed to follow the balanced budget
rule (eq. (4.24)), which keeps the government’s net wealth constant. In ana-
lyzing the quantitative impacts of fiscal policy, the government is allowed to
deviate temporarily from the balanced budget rule and directly choose an ex-
ogenous tax rate τt. I also allow for transitory government expenditure shocks.
I focus on the case characterized by the tax policy where τt < Tt , since both
China and the United States have run budget deficits for the most years in the
period of interest (2000s). I define the competitive world equilibrium under
active fiscal policy as follows:
Definition 4 (a competitive world equilibrium under active fiscal pol-
icy)
A competitive world equilibrium under active fiscal policy is a sequence
of quantities and prices such that, given an exogenous level of tax-to-
GDP ratio τt for t ∈ [n,m], n,m ∈ N, in each country (i) households max-
imize utility subject to their budget constraint, (ii) firms maximize prof-
its subject to their technology constraints, (iii) the government chooses a
path for taxes and debt for t /∈ [n,m], compatible with intertemporal sol-
vency, to finance exogenous level of total spending, and (iv) all markets
clear.
An increase in government expenditures, when financed with a balanced
budget, has a negative impact on households’ consumption because of a rise
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in tax liabilities. However, because of the expected finitude of working time
and life, the households have a higher discount rate than the government,
and therefore they do not fully capitalize the future tax stream associated with
higher government expenditures. Therefore the decline in private consump-
tion does not offset the rise in public consumption, and the net effect on na-
tional savings is negative.
Running a fiscal deficit has a direct negative impact on external asset hold-
ings (see eq. (4.29)) through a decline in government savings, and an indirect
effect through private savings. Lower taxes raise working age households’ dis-
posable income with a positive effect on current consumption. On the other
hand, the agents anticipate higher taxes in the future, which has a positive ef-
fect on private savings. Because the agents do not fully capitalize future tax
liabilities, which are postponed further into the future because of the budget
deficits, the increase in private savings does not compensate for the public dis-
saving, and the net effect on the national savings is negative.
The households’ discount rate varies with life expectancy and population
growth rate, so that the extent to which the government debt increases the
households’ wealth depends on individuals’ retirement age and life expectancy,
and the demographic structure of the economy. An economy with lower life ex-
pectancy and higher population growth rate has a higher discount factor, and
so the impact of government expenditures and debt on private consumption is
stronger.
4.4 Quantitative analysis
In this section I evaluate the dynamic effects of the demographic transition
and macroeconomic policies (exchange rate policy, interest rate policy and fis-
cal policy) on the external sector and the real interest rate in the 2000s. The
quantification of the exchange rate policy is based on the estimates on the per-
centage deviation of the renmimbi real exchange rate from its equilibrium level
by Goldstein and Lardy (2009) and by the IMF External Sector Reports 2013-
2018, shown in figure 4.2. The quantification of the interest rate policy is based
on the observed real interest rates in the World Bank data (see figure 4.1), and
the quantification of the government deficits on the observations on govern-
ment expenditures and fiscal deficits as in the IMF World Economic Outlook
database (figure 4.5). Subsection 4.4.1 presents the calibration of the model and
assumed paths of exogenous variables. In subsection 4.4.2, I analyze the effects
of demographic change on the world real interest rate and the trade balance,
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and the resulting dynamics are used as a benchmark for the analysis of the
impacts of the macroeconomic policies in section 4.4.3.
4.4.1 Calibration and exogenous variables
Table 4.1 reports the values of the calibrated parameters in the simulation. The
calibration follows the literature so that the labor share of income, α, the dis-
count factor, β, and the capital depreciation rate, δ, equal the values in the
Gertler (1999) model.12 The parameter for the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution is set at σ = 1.5, which is a compromise between the two strands of
literature, namely models with the Gertler framework (such as Gertler (1999),
Fujiwara and Teranishi (2008), Ferrero (2010), and Kilponen et al. (2006)) in
which the elasticity of intertemporal substitution takes values below unity, and
the model by Song et al. (2014), a general equilibrium model with similar pol-
icy features as the one in this paper, in which the value of the parameter of
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is 2. Because the results are sensitive to
the value of σ, I report the main results for σ = 0.5 in section 4.C of the Ap-
pendix. In setting the value of elasticity of substitution between domestic and
foreign goods, ε, I follow Song et al. (2014).
The values of the exogenous variables are shown in table 4.2. The frequency
of the data is annual. The simulation entails a permanent demographic change
which takes place over 39 periods as follows. In the initial period, life expectan-
cies in both countries match the values in the data in 2001, and in the final
period, the values in 2040. In the initial state, population growth rates equal
the average population growth rate (the rate of growth of population between
ages 20-64) between the two countries in 2001, and in the final state, an approx-
imation of the value in 204013. The probability of staying in the labor force is
constant and calibrated to match an average retirement age of 65 years as in
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), Gertler (1999) and Ferrero (2010). Technologi-
cal growth rate is assumed to be constant and equal between the countries and
12Because the analysis focuses on the effects of macroeconomic policies of the government, and
demographic factors which affect the households, the calibration of the supply side parameters,
α and δ, follows the convention in the literature. In addition, the discount factor β is calibrated
as in Gertler (1999) as I am mainly interested in the workers’ effective discounted factor, which
is augmented by the adjustment term Ωt and varies over time due to the demographic factors. I
abstract from any differences in the values of these parameters across the countries. The analysis
of cross-country or time variation of the parameters is left for future research.
13The average growth rate in 2040 is negative. I assume that there is no population growth in
the final steady state.
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matches the average in the data between 2001-2014. Government consump-
tion is assumed to be a constant multiple of the GDP, matching the average in
the data between 2001-2017 in each country. The government-central bank in
both countries is assumed to have negative net wealth. The net government
debt-to-GDP ratio of country 2 (US) is 31.5 % corresponding to the observed
net debt in 2001 in the data. China’s net debt is assumed to be 50 % smaller in
efficiency units, corresponding to 17.5 % of GDP in the initial state (China).14 In
the simulation with fiscal policy, the increase in government net debt is taken
into account endogenously. In other simulations, the government is assumed
to follow a balanced budget rule.
The deterministic simulations are performed with the extended path algo-
rithm, which allows the introduction ofunanticipated changes to exogenous
policy variables.
Parameter Value Source
α labor share of income 2/3 Gertler (1999)
β discount factor 0.96 Gertler (1999)
δ depreciation rate 0.1 Gertler (1999)
σ elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1.5 Ferrero (2010)
ε elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods 2 Song et al. (2014)
Table 4.1: Calibration
Exogenous variable Initial state
(2001)
Final state
(2040)
Data source / reference
γ1 probability to survive, China 0.9062 0.9374 UN Population Prospects 2017
γ2 probability to survive, US 0.9227 0.9465 UN Population Prospects 2017
ω1 = ω2 probability to stay in labor force 0.9778 0.9778 Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), Gertler
(1999), Ferrero (2010)
n1 = n2 population growth rate 1.35 % 0.00 % UN Population Prospects 2017
x1 = x2 technology growth rate 1.00 % 1.00 % Penn World Table 9.0
g1 government spending to ouput 16.2 % 16.2 %/30.2 %* IMF World Economic Outlook 2018
g2 government spending to ouput 30.2 % 30.2 % IMF World Economic Outlook 2018
B1t+1−etB1,∗t+1
Y1t
government net debt to ouput 17.5 % (endogenous) Estimate base on gross debt data from
IMF World Economic Outlook 2018
B2t+1−e∗t B2,∗t+1
Y2t
government net debt to ouput 35.1 % (endogenous) World Bank, WEO
Table 4.2: Exogenous variables. *Final value in the simulation with fiscal policy.
14Data on China’s general government net debt is not available.
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4.4.2 Demographic change
Over the first decades of the 21st century, increase in longevity and decline
in population growth rates have led to societal ageing, i.e. an increase in the
old-age dependency ratio, both in China and the US (see figure 4.3). Because
longevity has increased more in China, and the population growth rate has
declined substantially more quickly, societal ageing has been faster in China.
The old age dependency ratio rose by 37 % in China (from 10.5 to 14.5), and by
14 % in the US (from 21.7 to 24.7), between 2000 and 2015.
Figure 4.3: Historical estimates and long term projections of demographic trends in
China and the US. “Year” on the x-axis corresponds to a five-year period in the data;
e.g. “1980” corresponds to an estimated value in 1980-1985. Source: United Natios
World Population Prospects 2017.
Societal ageing is projected to continue throughout the century and severely
affect the demographic structure of the Chinese population in particular, due
to a projected decline in the size of the working-age population.
Figure 4.4 shows the dynamic effects of the demographic changes, which
follow the trends in the data closely, on the trade balance and the real inter-
est rate. The increase of life expectancy raises saving in both economies and
results in a fall in the real interest rate, because increasing longevity calls for
higher savings to sustain the optimal income level in the lengthening retire-
ment period. Because life expectancy increases more in China, the effect on
savings of Chinese households is more pronounced, and therefore population
ageing has a positive long-term effect on its trade balance. Also, the strong fall
in the population growth rate has a positive impact on the trade balance in the
long run. Temporary population growth surges, including the sharp increase
in working-age population growth rate in China in early 2000s, result in tem-
porary deteriorations of the Chinese trade balance, and a temporary halt in the
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fall of the real interest rate.
Here, the government-central bank is assumed to be passive and to not
practice active macroeconomic policies: the domestic interest is equal to the
international interest rate (Rdt = Rw,t), the law of one price holds (et = 1) and
the government-central bank follows the balanced budget rule (equation (4.24))
which keeps its net wealth constant, i.e. acts as an intermediator between the
domestic private sector and the international financial market.
Figure 4.4: Impact of demographic change on the net real interest rate and the trade
balance.
4.4.3 Policy interventions
Despite the transition of the Chinese economy over the past decades, the gov-
ernment still plays a central role in economic activity as a feature of a socialist
market economy. In this section I analyze to what extent the Chinese central
government has affected the observed trade imbalances and the dynamics of
the intertemporal terms of trade, i.e. the real interest rate, via three policies:
capital controls and interest rate policy, exchange rate policy, and fiscal policy.
In order to analyze the impacts of the macroeconomic policies on the exter-
nal balance and the real interest rate, I construct a series of policy variables for
the real exchange rate et, real interest rate Rdt , tax τt and government expendi-
tures gt. The quantification of the policies is based on the following facts.
First, as discussed in the introduction, the capital controls prevent private
international capital flows to a large extent, and therefore the government has
been able to control the Chinese real interest rate, which has, despite its con-
vergence, stayed below the US real rate in the 2000s. Accordingly, in the quan-
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titative analysis, the domestic interest rate Rdt is assumed to be 50 basis points
below the world interest rate in 2002, and the spread is assumed to diminish
gradually so that the interest rates are equalized after 2015 (Rdt = .995× Rw,t
for t = 1 and follows and AR(1) process). The initial spread of 50 basis points is
based on the average interest rate spread between China and the US between
2002-2015, and the decline of the spread is based on the assumption that the
capital controls are gradually removed, which leads to equalization of the in-
terest rates across the countries (figure 4.1).
Second, for an extended period of time, between 2001 and 2014, the Chi-
nese real exchange rate was estimated to be undervalued. In the simulation,
the central bank-government manipulates the price of the foreign goods in
terms of domestic goods so that the real exchange rate is undervalued for 14
periods, which corresponds to the period of renmimbi undervaluation during
2001-2014 according to Goldstein and Lardy (2009) and the IMF (et < 1 for
t = 1 : 14). The renmimbi undervaluation begins in 2002, reaches its peak in
2006-2007, and the equilibrium level is restored in 2015. Both the estimates and
the policy variable, which is constructed based on the estimates, are shown in
figure 4.2.
Third, the quantitative analysis of fiscal policy is based on the observed
changes in government expenditures between 2001 and 2015, and the fiscal
deficits in the 2000s. China has experienced a large growth in both total gov-
ernment expenditures and revenues between 2001 and 2015 (left panel in figure
4.5). However, for the majority of the period, the general government has run
a budget deficit. After the early 2000s, the government deficit was reduced,
but has grown sharply again since 2012 with the government trying to boost
economic growth with expansionary fiscal policy. In the United States, gen-
eral government expenditures and revenues have remained stable at approx-
imately 30 % of GDP in the 2000s. The general government has run a budget
deficit since 2002, and due to a sharp rise in government expenditures and a
decline in revenues during and after the financial crises, the deficit increased
to almost 12 % of the GDP and led to a substantial increase in the govern-
ment’s net debt. In the simulation, I use total government revenues as a share
of GDP to estimate the total tax revenue of the government, and total govern-
ment expenditures (which include net interest payments) to obtain an estimate
of total government expenditures. In order to capture the effects of the budget
deficits, I run as a counterfactual a simulation in which the government expen-
ditures follow the dynamics in the data and the government is assumed to run
a balanced budget, and compare the dynamics to the case in which the govern-
ment’s tax revenues follow the government revenues in the data, which results
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in budget deficits in both countries, and an increase in the total government
net debt.
Figure 4.5: General government total expenditures and revenues, deficit and debt in
2001-2015. Data source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database October 2018.
The quantitative results of the simulation with active exchange rate, interest
rate and fiscal policies are shown in figure 4.6, together with the results of the
benchmark simulation of section 4.4.2. Overall, the policies raise the world real
interest rate (black solid line) by approximately 0 to 30 basis points relative
to the benchmark (black dashed line) in the short run (while the policies are
active), and after a brief initial deterioration in the trade balance caused by
a surge in investments, improve the trade balance of country 1 (China). In
the long run, they increase the interest rate by approximately 10 basis points
relative to the benchmark, and worsen the trade balance of country 1 (after
its return to the laissez-faire economy). The results are mainly driven by the
undervaluation of the exchange rate. Sections 4.4.3.1-4.4.3.3 analyze the impact
of individual policies in more detail.
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Figure 4.6: Impact of macroeconomic policies and demographics on the real interest
rate and trade balance. The “baseline” variables refer to the interest rate and trade
balances simulated in section 4.4.2 with demographic change under passive policy
(where Rdt = Rw,t). The “policy” variables refer to the simulated interest rates and
trade balances with demographic change and government policy interventions (where
Rdt 6= Rw,t).
4.4.3.1 Real exchange rate undervaluation
Figure 4.7 shows the results of exchange rate undervaluation on the model dy-
namics, plotted together with the benchmark policy in which the real exchange
rate is at its equilibrium level.
The undervaluation of the real exchange rate in country 1, et, has a positive
impact on the trade balance of country 1 (China) in the short run and results
in a large increase in the trade balance around 2006-2007 as observed in the
data, which is mainly caused by a fall in aggregate consumption expenditures.
Because households expect the real exchange rate to appreciate, they substi-
tute consumption into the future and save more, and the private savings gap
(Bt = At − Kt) increases. The government, which acts as an intermediator be-
tween the domestic and foreign asset markets, issues domestic debt to meet the
asset demand, and invests the proceeds in international asset markets. After
the equilibrium level of the real exchange rate is restored, consumption expen-
ditures in country 1 increase, reflecting the higher level of financial wealth held
by the households, with a negative impact on the trade balance. Because of the
symmetry of the countries, an opposite effect takes place in country 2 as its real
exchange rate, e∗t , appreciates.
The impact of the exchange rate policy on the world interest rate is positive
due to the nonlinearity of the savings function with respect to the exchange rate
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(discussed in section 4.3.5). The reduction of savings in country 2 exceeds the
increase in savings in country 1, and the decline in the world financial wealth
leads to a positive effect on the world real interest rate.
Figure 4.7: Impact of exchange rate policy and demographics on the economy.
4.4.3.2 Capital controls and interest rate policy
Figure 4.8 shows the results of interest rate policy on the model dynamics, to-
gether with the benchmark where the domestic and the world interest rate are
equal. The interest rate policy affects the trade balance in country 1 negatively
in the short run, relative to the benchmark. The negative trade account effect
is driven by a fall in investment, caused by the decline in the marginal cost
of capital, and by an increase in the consumption of the working age pop-
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ulation, which is driven by the rise in wages and the present value of hu-
man wealth. The impact on the consumption of the old is negative, because
marginal propensities to consume out of lifetime wealth fall, as well as the
level of financial wealth. In other words, the substitution effect dominates in
the workers’ case, and the income effect in the retirees’ case. However, because
of the large proportion of the working age population, the net effect on con-
sumption is positive. As there are no adjustment costs in the model, there is a
large shift in investments in the periods in which the policy begins and ends,
as the capital stock is instantly adjusted to the optimal level.
In the long run, the interest rate policy leads to a lower level of financial
wealth. After the domestic interest rate returns to the world equilibrium level,
the net effect of the interest rate policy on aggregate consumption becomes
negative.
As a result of the interest rate policy, the world real interest rate increases
relative to benchmark. As the policy lowers the private savings gap, Bt =
At − Kt, in country 1, and therefore its government-central bank’s domestic
debt, it also has a negative impact on the government-central bank’s net for-
eign asset holdings. In the international financial market, lower asset demand
pushes up the interest rate, which increases investment and output and lowers
consumption in country 2.
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Figure 4.8: Impact of interest rate policy and demographics on the economy.
4.4.3.3 Government spending and budget deficits
Figure 4.9 shows the effects of government expenditure shocks, both assuming
that the government runs a balanced budget and taking into account the ob-
served fiscal deficits, together with the benchmark simulation of section 4.4.2,
where government expenditures are constant and both governments run a bal-
anced budget.
The observed government expenditure fluctuations, had the government
budgets been balanced (the dashed lines in figure 4.9), would have led to an
improvement in China’s, and a deterioration in the US’, trade balance. The
increase in public consumption raises taxes and crowds out private consump-
tion. However, the workers’ discount rate exceeds the government’s discount
161
CHINA’S MACROECONOMIC POLICIES AND SPILLOVER EFFECTS
rate, the riskless interest rate Rwt+1, (see eq. 4.15) because of the anticipated fini-
tude of working life and overall lifetime. Therefore the workers do not fully
capitalize the increase in future tax liabilities, and the fall in private consump-
tion does not fully offset the rise in government expenditures (i.e. increase in
private saving does not fully compensate for the decline in public saving), re-
sulting in a reduction in domestic savings, a decline in the capital stock and
an increase in the world real interest rate. The increase in government expen-
ditures, as it results in an increase in the world interest rate, implies an inter-
generational transfer to the old, who live out of savings and interest income
only. Because the discount rate of Chinese workers is lower due to lower life
expectancy, the reduction in private consumption expenditures is more prou-
nounced than in the United States, resulting in a smaller decline in aggregate
savings, and therefore the net effect on its trade balance is positive.
The observed fiscal deficits (solid lines in figure 4.9) lead to an improve-
ment of the Chinese trade balance, and rise in the world interest rate, rela-
tive to the counterfactual where government expenditures are financed with
a balanced budget. As the households’ discount rate is higher than the gov-
ernment’s, postponing tax payments further into the future raises the present
value of human wealth relative to taxes timed according to a balanced budget
rule. Therefore, when financed with debt, government expenditures crowd out
less private consumption than with a balanced budget, and the increase of pri-
vate savings is smaller. As national savings are lower, the world interest rate
is higher, resulting in lower investments and capital stock. The increase in life
expectancy raises the households’ discount rate and the crowding-out effect of
government deficit on private consumption becomes muted, and the current
account effect stronger. To the contrary, an anticipated decline in the popu-
lation growth rate raises the present discounted value of tax liabilities, which
means that the external sector becomes less sensitive to fiscal policy (govern-
ment budget deficits). The quantitative effect of observed government expen-
ditures and deficits on the trade surplus is small, approximately 0.1-0.5 % of
GDP, and on the interest rate, less than 10 basis points at the most.
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Figure 4.9: Impact of fiscal policy and demographics on the economy.
4.5 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the impact of China’s macroeconomic policies, including
capital controls and interest rate policy, exchange rate policy and fiscal policy,
on China’s trade balance vis-a-vis the United States and the world real inter-
est rate in the 2000s. In the analysis, I take into account the direct effects of
demographic factors on the external imbalances as well as the indirect effects
through the impact that demographics have on the transmission of the macroe-
conomic policies. The paper is motivated by the observed persistence of the ex-
ternal imbalances in China and the United States, the central role of the public
sector in the Chinese economy, and the claims that China has been able to af-
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fect both the interest rate dynamics and the trade balance by practising policies
that affect both intratemporal and intertemporal terms of trade.
In order to quantify the importance of these factors in explaining the ob-
served trade balance and interest rate dynamics, I construct a dynamic general
equilibrium model embedded with features that describe the behavior of the
Chinese policy makers. The policies I focus on are capital controls and interest
rate policy, exchange rate policy and fiscal policy. I construct a series of policy
variables based on the observations that i) the Chinese real exchange rate was
undervalued between 2001 and 2014; ii) the US real interest rate has exceeded
the Chinese real rate in the 2000s despite their convergence; and, iii) Chinese
government expenditures and budget deficits have grown in the 2000s, and
simulate with the model to analyze the dynamics of the trade balances and the
real interest rate in the 2000s.
According to my analysis, the macroeconomic policies overall have had a
strong positive impact on the trade balance, and also a positive impact on the
interest rate in the 2000s. The effects are driven by the real exchange rate pol-
icy. The demographic developments have contributed to the fall of the interest
rate by approximately 50 basis points since 2001. The impact of demographic
change on the trade balance has been negative in the first decade, and posi-
tive in the second decade of the century. However, the impact of the exchange
rate policy is qualitatively sensitive to the assumptions on the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution. The impact of the demographic change and the other
policies are qualitatively robust to this assumption.
164
REFERENCES
References
Auerbach, A. and L. Kotlikoff (1987). Dynamic fiscal policy. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge.
Bacchetta, P., K. Benhima, and Y. Kalantzis (2013). Capital controls with in-
ternational reserve accumulation: Can this be optimal? American Economic
Journal. Macroeconomics 5(3), 229.
Benigno, G., H. Chen, C. Otrok, A. Rebucci, and E. Young (2016). Optimal
capital controls and real exchange rate policies: A pecuniary externality per-
spective. Journal of Monetary Economics 84, 147–165.
Bianchi, J. (2011). Overborrowing and systemic externalities in the business
cycle. American Economic Review 101(7), 3400–3426.
Brunnermeier, M. and Y. Sannikov (2015). International credit flows and pecu-
niary externalities. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 7(1), 297–338.
Carvalho, C., A. Ferrero, and F. Nechio (2016). Demographics and real interest
rates: Inspecting the mechanism. European Economic Review 98(1), 358–393.
Cashin, P. and C. McDermott (2003). Intertemporal substitution and terms-of-
trade shocks. Review of International Economics 11(4), 604–618.
Chang, C., Z. Liu, and M. Spiegel (2015). Capital controls and optimal Chinese
monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 74, 1–15.
Coeurdacier, N., S. Guibaud, and K. Jin (2015). Credit constraints and growth
in a global economy. American Economic Review 105(9), 2838–81.
Corsetti, G. and P. Pesenti (2001). Welfare and macroeconomic interdepen-
dence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(2), 421–445.
Costinot, A., G. Lorenzoni, and I. Werning (2014). A theory of capital controls
as dynamic terms-of-trade manipulation. Journal of Political Economy 122(1),
77–128.
De Paoli, B. and A. Lipinska (2013). Capital controls: a normative analysis.
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports No. 600.
Devereux, M. and J. Yetman (2014). Capital controls, global liquidity traps,
and the international policy trilemma. The Scandinavian Journal of Eco-
nomics 116(1), 158–189.
165
CHINA’S MACROECONOMIC POLICIES AND SPILLOVER EFFECTS
Fernández, A., M. Klein, A. Rebucci, M. Schindler, M. Uribe, et al. (2016). Cap-
ital control measures: A new dataset. IMF Economic Review 64(3), 548–574.
Ferrero, A. (2010). A structural decomposition of the U.S. trade balance:
Productivity, demographics and fiscal policy. Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 57(4), 478–490.
Fujiwara, I. and Y. Teranishi (2008). A dynamic new Keynesian life-cycle
model: Societal aging, demographics, and monetary policy. Journal of Eco-
nomic Dynamics and Control 32(8), 2398–2427.
Gertler, M. (1999). Government debt and social security in a life-cycle economy.
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 50(1), 61–110.
Goldstein, M. (2008). Debating China’s exchange rate policy. Peterson Institute.
Goldstein, M. and N. Lardy (2009). The Future of China’s Exchange Rate Policy.
Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Harberger, A. (1950). Currency depreciation, income, and the balance of trade.
Journal of political Economy 58(1), 47–60.
Heathcote, J. and F. Perri (2016). On the desirability of capital controls. IMF
Economic Review 64(1), 75–102.
IMF (2014). Annual Report on Excange Arrangements and Exchange Restric-
tions 2014.
IMF (2015). 2015 External Sector Report - Individual Economy Assessments.
IMF (2016). Annual Report on Excange Arrangements and Exchange Restric-
tions 2016.
IMF (2019). The External Balance Assessment Methodology: 2018 Update. IMF
Working Paper 19/65.
Jeanne, O. and A. Korinek (2010). Excessive volatility in capital flows: A pigou-
vian taxation approach. American Economic Review 100(2), 403–07.
Kilponen, J., H. Kinnunen, and A. Ripatti (2006, December). Population ageing
in a small open economy - some policy experiments with a tractable general
equilibrium model. Research Discussion Papers 28/2006, Bank of Finland.
166
REFERENCES
Korinek, A. (2017). Regulating capital flows to emerging markets: An external-
ity view. Journal of International Economics.
Laursen, S. and L. Metzler (1950). Flexible exchange rates and the theory of
employment. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 281–299.
Niemeläinen, J. (2017). External imbalances between China and the US: a dy-
namic analysis with a life-cycle model. Discussion Papers 417, HECER.
Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogoff (1995). Exchange rate dynamics redux. Journal of
political economy 103(3), 624–660.
Song, Z., K. Storesletten, and F. Zilibotti (2011). Growing like China. The Amer-
ican Economic Review 101(1), 196–233.
Song, Z., K. Storesletten, and F. Zilibotti (2014). Growing (with capital controls)
like China. IMF Economic Review 62(3), 327–370.
Uribe, M. and S. Schmitt-Grohé (2017). Open economy macroeconomics. Princeton
University Press.
167
CHINA’S MACROECONOMIC POLICIES AND SPILLOVER EFFECTS
Appendix
4.A Exchange rate and savings
The life-cycle model of this paper nests a two-period OLG model in the special
case when ωt,t+1 = 0 and γt,t+1 = 0 ∀ t . In this case, retirees consume all
of their wealth, and the aggregate savings in the economy consist of workers’
savings only. Then, as also shown by Song et al. (2014), workers’ savings are
given by
Awt+1 = (Wt − Twt )
1−
1+ βσRσ−1t+1
(
1+ e1−εt+1
1+ e1−εt
) σ−1
ε−1
−1
 (4.30)
which is an increasing/decreasing function of the exchange rate et if σ >
1/σ < 1 (see figure 4.10). The first derivative of the savings with respect to the
exchange rate is
∂Awt+1
∂et
=
βσRt+1σ−1(σ− 1)
(
1+e1−εt+1
1+e1−εt
) σ−ε
ε−1 (1+e1−εt+1)e
−ε
t
(1+e1−εt )2(
1+ βσRσ−1t+1
(
1+e1−εt+1
1+e1−εt
) σ−1
ε−1
)2 (Wt − Twt )
and it is positive if σ > 1. Furthermore, because the savings increase/decrease
at a diminishing rate, overvaluation of the exchange rate (et < 1) has a larger
effect on savings than undervaluation of the exchange rate (et > 1).
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Figure 4.10: Workers’ savings as function of the exchange rate et in the two-period
OLG version of the model (with different elasticities of intertemporal substitution, σ =
0.5, σ = 1 and σ = 1.5).
4.B Capital controls and Ricardian equivalence
To develop the intuition for how the domestic interest rate policy breaks down
Ricardian equivalence, consider a two-period small open endowment econ-
omy consisting of two agents: a representative household and government,
which takes the international interest rate R as given, but can set a domestic
interest rate Rd different from the international interest rate. Assume that the
government and household have no initial wealth in period 1, and in period
2, all wealth is consumed. Assume that the household can not access external
financial markets so that its only savings vehicle is the domestic government
bond so that At+1 = Bt+1 where At+1 = household’s financial wealth and Bt+1
= domestic government bond.
In this economy, the household maximises utility, given by
U = C1 + βC2 (4.31)
subject to the budget constraint Y1 − T1 = C1 + A2 in period 1 and Y2 −
T2 + R2A2 = C2 in period 2. Solving the household’s constrained optimiza-
tion problem gives the standard Euler equation, C2 = βRC1, which, when
combined with the budget constraints, gives the optimal consumption expen-
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ditures in periods 1 and 2, given by C1 = 11+βR
[
Y1 − T1 + Y2−T2R
]
and C2 =
βR
1+βR
[
Y1 − T1 + Y2−T2R
]
.
The government’s flow budget constraint is given by Bt+1− B∗t+1 = RdBt−
RB∗t +Gt − Tt, where Bt+1 is the government’s domestic debt and B∗t+1 foreign
assets. The government’s budget constraint is given by B2 − B∗2 = G1 − T1
period 1 and by 0 = RdB2 − RB∗2 + G2 − T2 = Rd(B2 − B∗2 ) + (Rd − R)B∗2 +
G2 − T2 in period 2. The government’s interemporal budget constraint then
solves as T1 +
T2
Rd
− B∗2
(
1− RRd
)
= G1 +
G2
Rd
.
If the government is a net external creditor, B∗2 > 0, and if the domestic in-
terest rate is below the international interest rate, Rd < R, the government can
save at a higher rate than the households, and for a given domestic interest rate
Rd, external saving by the government relaxes the budget constraint. Then, as
the households internalize the government’s intertemporal budget constraint,
consumption in both periods depends positively on government’s net external
asset holdings, given by
C1 =
1
1+ βRd
[
Y1 +
Y2
Rd
− G1 − G2Rd − B
∗
2
(
1− R
Rd
)]
in period 1 and by
C2 =
βRd
1+ βRd
[
Y1 +
Y2
Rd
− G1 − G2Rd − B
∗
2
(
1− R
Rd
)]
in period 2. The Ricardian equivalence in this case does not hold.
The current account is defined as CAt = Yt − Ct − Gt + (Rw,t − 1)B∗t =
B∗t+1− B∗t . Given the assumption of a two-period economy, the current account
is given by CA1 = Y1 − C1 − G1 = B∗2 in period 1 and by CA2 = Y2 − C2 −
G2 + (R− 1)B∗2 = −B∗2 in period 2. By substituting C1 into period 1’s current
account condition, one can solve for the period 1 current account, which is
given by
B∗2 =
βRd
1+ βRd−
(
1− RRd
) (Y1 − G1)− 1
1+ βR−
(
1− RRd
) [Y2
Rd
− G2
Rd
]
.
If Rd 6= R, the current account differs from that under Ricardian equivalence.
Specifically, a low domestic interest rate, Rd < R, is associated with a smaller
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external asset position than if Rd = R. This is because (even though low inter-
est rate lowers saving) the positive wealth effect associated with public external
debt results has a positive effect on consumption, which at the optimum in pe-
riod 1 equals C1 =
[
1
1+βRd
− βRd
(
1− RRd
)
1+βRd−
(
1− RRd
)
] [
Y1 − G1 + Y2−G2Rd
]
. Therefore, in
addition to the normal interest rate channel, the capital control breaks down
the Ricardian equivalence and induces a positive wealth effect on domestic
households.
4.C Robustness of the quantitative results to EIS
There is a discrepancy in the literature about the value of the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution parameter σ. Papers which study the impact of de-
mographic change with life-cycle models, such as Gertler (1999), Fujiwara and
Teranishi (2008), Ferrero (2010), and Kilponen et al. (2006), typically set the pa-
rameter value below one. Models that study the effect of terms of trade shocks
on consumption-saving decisions, including Song et al. (2014), typically have
higher elasticities of intertemporal substitution.
Figure 4.11 shows the effect of demographic change with σ = 1.5 and σ =
0.5. With a low value of σ, demographic change leads to a larger decline (appr.
150 basis points) of the real interest rate. However, qualitatively the result is
not sensitive to this assumption, as the demographic change produces a fall in
the interest rate (appr. 50 basis points) even with σ = 1.5. The simulation with
low sigma, which leads to a lower real interest rate, is associated with smaller
gross trade balance / GDP ratios.
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Figure 4.11: Impact of demographics on the real interest rate and trade balance with
different elasticities of intertemporal substitution (σ = 1.5 and σ = 0.5).
Figure 4.12 shows the effect of macroeconomic policies with σ = 1.5 and
σ = 0.5. The impact of the macroeconomic policies on the world interest rate is
qualitatively robust to the assumption for σ in the short run, but not in the long
run. In the long run, the simulation with policies and with σ = 1.5 results in
an interest rate which is appr. 0-10 basis points above the benchmark interest
rate, but if σ = 0.5, the long run interest rate is appr. 30 basis points below
the benchmark interest rate. This, as well as the sensitivity of the trade balance
dynamics to the value of σ, is mainly due to the fact that the exchange rate
policy has opposite effects with different values of σ. As discussed in section
4.3.5, exchange rate policy is dominated by the HLM effect when σ < 1, and
by the substitution effect when σ > 1. The impact of fiscal policy on the trade
balance is also sensitive to the value of σ, as fiscal policy has a stronger impact
with σ < 1. Then the increase of taxes does not have quite as large a negative
effect on private savings, and the net effect on government savings is larger.
Because of the sensitivity of the results to parameter values, and because of
the illustrative nature of the policy shocks, the results must be interpreted with
caution.
172
4.C ROBUSTNESS OF THE QUANTITATIVE RESULTS TO EIS
σ = 1.5
σ = 0.5
Figure 4.12: Impact of macroeconomic policies and demographics on the real interest
rate and trade balance with different elasticities of intertemporal substitution (σ = 1.5
and σ = 0.5).
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4.D Figures
Figure 4.13: Capital controls in China 1995-2015, overall restrictions index. Source:
Fernández et al. (2016).
Figure 4.14: China’s external assets and liabilities. Source: IMF 2017.
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Figure 4.15: Current account balance of China and the United States. Source: IMF
2018.
4.E Technical appendix
This appendix presents the derivation of the retirees’ and workers’ problems
and the aggregation result.
1.1 Households
Retirees
A retiree born in period j and retired in period i chooses consumption-saving
allocation and labor input to maximize
V jrt (i) = max
{[
Cjrt (i)
]ρ
+ βγt,t+1
(
V jrt+1(i)
)ρ} 1ρ
. (4.32)
Households consume domestic goods Cjr,1t (i) and foreign goods C
jr,2
t (i) so that
the aggregate consumption index is given by
Cjrt (i) =
((
Cjr,1t (i)
) ε−1
ε
+
(
Cjr,2t (i)
) ε−1
ε
) ε
ε−1
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where ε is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. Rdt
is the domestic interest rate set by the local authority and γt,t+1 is the retirees’
probability to survive from one period to the next. Then the value function can
be written as
V jrt (i) = max
Cjr,1t (i),C
jr,2
t (i),A
jr,1
t+1(i)
(4.33)

[((
Cjr,1t (i)
) ε−1
ε
+
(
Cjr,2t (i)
) ε−1
ε
) ε
ε−1
]ρ
+ βγt,t+1
(
V jrt+1(i)
)ρ
1
ρ
.
The periodic budget constraint is
Ajrt+1 (i) =
Rdt A
jr
t (i)
γt−1,t
− Cjr,1t (i)− etCjr,2t (i) (4.34)
where Ajrt+1(i) is financial wealth and et is the price of the foreign good in
terms of a domestic good i.e. the real exchange rate. By solving the periodic
budget constraint for domestic consumption and substituting into the value
function, one obtains
V jrt (i) = max
Cjr,1t (i),C
jr,2
t (i),A
jr,1
t+1(i)
(4.35)

(Rdt Ajrt (i)
γt−1,t
− Ajrt+1 (i)− etCjr,2t (i)
) ε−1
ε
+
(
Cjr,2t (i)
) ε−1
ε

ρε
ε−1
+ βγt,t+1
(
V jrt+1(i)
)ρ
1
ρ
.
The first order condition with respect to asset accumulation is
((
Cjr,1t (i)
) ε−1
ε
+
(
Cjr,2t (i)
) ε−1
ε
)
ερ
ε−1−1
(
Cjr,1t (i)
) ε−1
ε −1
= βγt+1(V
jr
t+1(i))
ρ−1 ∂V
jr
t+1(i)
∂Ajrt+1(i)
(4.36)
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and the first order condition with respect to foreign consumption is
Cjr,1t (i)e
−ε
t = C
jr,2
t (i). (4.37)
Substituting the latter into the former, one obtains
(
Cjr,1t (i)
)ρ−1 (
1+ e1−εt
) ε(ρ−1)+1
ε−1
= βγt+1(V
jr
t+1(i))
ρ−1 ∂V
jr
t+1(i)
∂Ajrt+1(i)
. (4.38)
The envelope condition is
∂V jrt (i)
∂Ajrt (i)
= (V jrt )
1−ρ(Cjr,1t (i))
ρ−1
(
1+ e1−εt
) ε(ρ−1)+1
ε−1 Rdt
γt−1,t
. (4.39)
Combining the first order conditions and the lagged envelope condition(
∂V jrt+1(i)
∂Ajrt+1(i)
)
, and noting that σ = 11−ρ gives the following Euler equation for
retirees:
Cjr,1t+1(i) = C
jr,1
t (i)
[
βRdt+1
]σ (1+ e1−εt
1+ e1−εt+1
) ε−σ
ε−1
. (4.40)
Guess that aggregate consumption is a fraction of total lifetime wealth:
Cjr,1t (i) + etC
jr,2
t (i) = etpit
(
Rdt A
jr
t (i)
γt
)
=
(
1+ e1−εt
)
Cjr,1t (i) (4.41)
where the last equality follows from eq. (4.37). Then, combining the Euler
equation (4.40) with the guess (4.41) gives a law of motion for the marginal
propensity to consume as follows. First, combine the budget constraint (4.34)
with the guess (4.41) to have the following expression for consumption:
Cjr,1t (i) + etC
jr,2
t (i) = etpit
(
Ajrt+1(i) + C
jr
t (i)
)
=
(
1+ e1−εt
)
Cjr,1t (i). (4.42)
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Second, substitute this expression (4.42) and lagged expression of the guess
(4.41) into the Euler equation (4.40) to obtain the following expression
et+1pit+1
(1+ e1−εt+1)
(
Rdt+1A
jr
t+1(i)
γt,t+1
)
=
{
etpit
(1+ e1−εt )
(
Ajrt+1(i) + C
jr
t (i)
)}
∗
[
βRdt+1
]σ (1+ e1−εt
1+ e1−εt+1
) ε−σ
ε−1
.
Dividing both sides of the equation by the LHS (left-hand-side) of itself
gives
1 =
{
etpit
(1+e1−εt )
(
Ajrt+1(i) +
(
1+ e1−εt
)
Cjr,1t (i)
)}
∗
[
βRdt+1
]σ ( 1+e1−εt
1+e1−εt+1
) ε−σ
ε−1
et+1pit+1
(1+e1−εt+1)
(
Rdt+1A
jr
t+1(i)
γt,t+1
)
=
etpit
(1+e1−εt )
Ajrt+1(i)
[
βRdt+1
]σ ( 1+e1−εt
1+e1−εt+1
) ε−σ
ε−1
et+1pit+1
(1+e1−εt+1)
(
Rdt+1A
jr
t+1(i)
γt,t+1
)
+
etpit
(1+e1−εt )
(
1+ e1−εt
)
Cjr,1t (i)
[
βRdt+1
]σ ( 1+e1−εt
1+e1−εt+1
) ε−σ
ε−1
et+1pit+1
(1+e1−εt+1)
(
Rdt+1A
jr
t+1(i)
γt,t+1
)
=
etpit
et+1pit+1
βσ
(
Rdt+1
)σ−1
γt,t+1
(
1+ e1−εt
1+ e1−εt+1
) 1−σ
ε−1
+
etpitC
jr,1
t (i)
[
βRdt+1
]σ ( 1+e1−εt
1+e1−εt+1
) ε−σ
ε−1
et+1pit+1
(1+e1−εt+1)
(
Rdt+1A
jr
t+1(i)
γt,t+1
)
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By the conjecture (eq. (4.41)), the denominator of the last term equals
et+1pit+1(
1+ e1−εt+1
) (Rdt+1Ajrt+1(i)
γt+1
)
= Cjr,1t+1(i) = C
jr,1
t (i)
[
βRdt+1
]σ (1+ e1−εt
1+ e1−εt+1
) ε−σ
ε−1
where the last equality follows from the Euler equation (eq. (4.40). Then the
retiree’s marginal propensity to consume can be solved to evolve according to
etpit = 1− etpit
et+1pit+1
γt,t+1β
σ(Rdt+1)
ρσ
(
1+ e1−εt
1+ e1−εt+1
) 1−σ
ε−1
. (4.43)
To obtain a solution for the value function, first conjecture that it is linear on
consumption (non-linear on exchange rate) according to
V jrt (i) = 4rtCjrt (i)
(
1+ e1−εt
) 1
ε−1 (4.44)
= 4rtCjr,1t (i)
(
1+ e1−εt
) ε
ε−1 .
Substitute the conjecture into the value function and solve for4rt to obtain
the following expression
(4rt)ρ = 1+
βγt,t+1(4rt+1)ρ
[
Cjr,1t+1(i)
(
1+ e1−εt+1
) ε
ε−1
]ρ
(
Cjr,1t (i)
(
1+ e1−εt
) ε
ε−1
)
ρ
.
Then, substitute Cjrt+1(i) from the Euler equation (4.40) and use the equation
(4.43) to verify that
4rt = (etpit)−
1
ρ (4.45)
and thus
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V jrt (i) = (etpit)
− 1ρCjr,1t (i)
(
1+ e1−εt
) ε
ε−1 (4.46)
= (etpit)
− 1ρCjrt (i)
(
1+ e1−εt
) 1
ε−1 .
Workers
As retirees, workers consume domestic and foreign goods. A worker born in
period j chooses consumption-saving allocation to solve
V jwt = max
Cjw,1t ,C
jw,2
t ,A
jw
t+1
[((
Cjw,1t
) ε−1
ε
+
(
Cjw,2t
) ε−1
ε
) ε
ε−1
]ρ
+ β
[
ωt+1V
jw
t+1 + (1−ωt+1)V jrt+1
]ρ
1
ρ
(4.47)
subject to
Ajwt+1 = R
d
t A
jw
t +Wt − Cjw,1t − etCjw,2t − T jwt . (4.48)
Solving for consumption of the domestic good, Cjw,1t , from the budget con-
straint and substituting it into the value function gives
V jwt = max
Cjw,2t ,A
jw
t+1
(
[((
Rdt A
jw
t +Wt − etCjw,2t − T jwt − Ajwt+1
) ε−1
ε
+
(
Cjw,2t
) ε−1
ε
) ε
ε−1
]ρ
+ β
[
ωt+1V
jw
t+1 + (1−ωt+1)V jrt+1
]ρ
)
1
ρ . (4.49)
The first order condition with respect to asset accumulation is
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((
Cjw,1t
) ε−1
ε
+
(
Cjw,2t
) ε−1
ε
) ερ−ε+1
ε−1 (
Cjw,1t
)− 1ε
= β
(
ωt+1V
jw
t+1 + (1−ωt+1)V jrt+1
)
ρ−1
[
ωt+1
∂Vwt+1
∂Awt+1
+ (1−ωt+1)
∂Vrjt+1
∂Awjt+1
]
(4.50)
and the first order condition with respect to consumption of foreign goods
gives
Cjw,1t e
−ε
t = C
jw,2
t . (4.51)
Substituting eq. (4.51) into the first order condition eq. (4.52) gives
(
Cjw,1t
)ρ−1
(1+ e1−εt )
ερ−ε+1
ε−1
= β
(
ωt+1V
jw
t+1 + (1−ωt+1)V jrt+1
)
ρ−1
[
ωt+1
∂Vwt+1
∂Awt+1
+ (1−ωt+1)
∂Vrjt+1
∂Awjt+1
]
(4.52)
The envelope conditions are
∂V jwt
∂Ajwt
= (Vwt )
1−ρ(Cjw,1t )
ρ−1Rdt
(
1+ e1−εt
) ε(ρ−1)+1
ε−1 (4.53)
and
∂V jrt
∂Ajwt
=
∂V jrt
∂Ajrt
∂Ajrt
∂Ajwt
=
∂V jrt
∂Ajrt
= (V jrt )
1−ρ(Cjr,1t )
ρ−1
(
1+ e1−εt
) ε(ρ−1)+1
ε−1 Rdt (4.54)
where it has been taken into account that the agent that has been a worker
in period t, and becomes a retiree in period t + 1, does not take part in the
mutual fund.
Combining the first order conditions and the envelope conditions gives the
Euler equation for the workers. First, substitute into the first order condition
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for asset accumulation (4.52) the envelope conditions taking into account the
assumption of no compensation for the risk of death :
(Cjw,1t )
ρ−1(1+ e1−εt )
ερ−ε+1
ε−1 = β(ωt+1V
jw
t+1 + (1−ωt+1)V jrt+1)ρ−1∗
(ωt,t+1(V
jw
t+1)
1−ρ(Cjw,1t+1 )
ρ−1Rdt+1
(
1+ e1−εt+1
) ε(ρ−1)+1
ε−1
+ (1−ωt+1)(V jrt+1)1−ρ(Cjr,1t+1)ρ−1Rdt+1
(
1+ e1−εt+1
) ε(ρ−1)+1
ε−1
). (4.55)
Conjecture that, as for retirees, the value function depends on consumption
as follows:
V jwt = 4jwt Cjw,1t (1+ e1−εt )
ε
ε−1 . (4.56)
In addition, define the adjustment term to be
Ωt ≡ ωt−1,t + (1−ωt−1,t)e
1
1−σ
t . (4.57)
Substitute the conjectures for the value functions (4.44) and (4.56) into equa-
tion (4.55). This gives
(Cjw,1t )
ρ−1(1+ e1−εt )
ερ−ε+1
ε−1 (βRt+1)
−1 =
(ωt+14jwt+1Cjw,1t+1 (1+ e1−εt+1)
ε
ε−1 + (1−ωt+1)4rt+1Cjr,1t+1(i)
(
1+ e1−εt+1
) ε
ε−1
)ρ−1∗[
ωt,t+1(4jwt+1)1−ρ
(
1+ e1−εt+1
) 1
ε−1
+ (1−ωt+1)(4rt+1)1−ρ
(
1+ e1−εt+1
) 1
ε−1
]
.
(4.58)
After some algebra, obtain the following expression for the Euler equation:
Cjw,1t
[
βRd,t+1Ωt+1
]σ (1+ e1−εt
1+ e1−εt+1
) ε−σ
ε−1
= ωt+1C
jw,1
t+1 + (1−ωt+1)
(
4rt+1
4wt+1
)
Cjr,1t+1.
(4.59)
Guess the consumption to be a fraction of total lifetime wealth
Cjwt = pit(R
d
t A
jw
t + H
jw
t ) = C
jw,1
t (1+ e
1−ε
t ) (4.60)
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where H jwt is the present discounted value of a worker‘s human wealth net
of taxation. Then substitute the per period budget constraint (4.48) to get the
following expression
Cjwt = pit(A
jw
t+1 −Wt + Cjwt + T jwt − H jwt )
= pit(A
jw
t+1 −Wt + Cjw,1t + etCjw,2t + T jwt − H jwt ).
Note that for a retiree who has just abandoned the labor force, the consump-
tion is guessed to be proportional to the assets they had as workers which they
carry to their first period of retirement
Cr|wt = εtpit(R
d
t A
jw
t ) (4.61)
with the budget constraint being
Ajr|wt+1 = R
d
t A
jw
t +Wt − Cjwt − T jwt (4.62)
= Rdt A
jw
t +Wt − Cjw,1t − etCjw,2t − T jwt
= Rdt A
jw
t +Wt − Cjw,1t (1+ e1−εt )− T jwt .
Combining the Euler equation (4.59) with the guesses (4.60) and (4.61) and
the budget constraints (4.48) and (4.62) as follows gives a law of motion for the
marginal propensity to consume:
First, subsitute the guesses into the Euler equation to have
pit(Rdt A
jw
t + H
jw
t )
(1+ e1−εt )
(
1+ e1−εt
1+ e1−εt+1
) ε−σ
ε−1 [
βRdt+1Ωt+1
]σ
=
ωt+1
pit+1(Rdt+1A
jw
t+1 + H
jw
t+1)
(1+ e1−εt+1)
+ (1−ωt+1)
(
4rt+1
4wt+1
)
εt+1pit+1(Rdt+1A
jw
t+1)
(1+ e1−εt+1)
(4.63)
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and substitute the per period budget constraints (4.48) and (4.62) to have
pit(Rdt A
jw
t + H
jw
t )
(1+ e1−εt )
(
1+ e1−εt
1+ e1−εt+1
) ε−σ
ε−1 [
βRdt+1Ωt+1
]σ
=
ωt+1
pit+1(Rdt,t+1(R
d
t A
jw
t +Wt − Cjw,1t (1+ e1−εt )− T jwt ) + H jwt+1)
(1+ e1−εt+1)
+
(1−ωt+1)
(
4rt+1
4wt+1
)
εt+1pit+1(Rdt+1(R
d
t A
jw
t +Wt − Cjw,1t (1+ e1−εt )− T jwt ))
(1+ e1−εt+1)
.
(4.64)
Substituting again the guess for Cwjt , collecting terms and using the defini-
tion of the adjustment term, this equals
Ωt+1pit+1Rdt+1
[
Rdt A
w
t (1− pit) +Wt − pit(Hwt )− Twt
]
+ωt+1pit+1Hwt+1 =
pit(Rdt A
jw
t )
[
βRdt+1Ωt+1
]σ (1+ e1−εt
1+ e1−εt+1
) 1−σ
ε−1
+pit(H
jw
t )
[
βRdt+1Ωt+1
]σ (1+ e1−εt
1+ e1−εt+1
) 1−σ
ε−1
.
By collecting terms with Ajwt on the LHS, dividing the equality byΩt+1pit+1R
d
t+1
and conjecturing that Hwjt =Wt− T jwt +
ωt+1H
jw
t+1
Ωt+1Rdt+1
this expression can be written
as
(Rdt A
jw
t + H
wj
t ) ∗
1− pit − pit
pit+1
βσ(Rdt+1Ωt+1)
σ−1
(
1+ e1−εt
1+ e1−εt+1
) 1−σ
ε−1
 = 0 .
This implies that1− pit − pit
pit+1
βσ(Rdt+1Ωt+1)
σ−1
(
1+ e1−εt
1+ e1−εt+1
) 1−σ
ε−1
 = 0
from where workers´ marginal propensity to consume can be solved to
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evolve according to
pit = 1− pit
pit+1
βσ(Rdt+1Ωt+1)
σ−1
(
1+ e1−εt
1+ e1−εt+1
) 1−σ
ε−1
. (4.65)
1.2 Aggregation
Total assets
Because of the perfect annuity market, Rdt A
r
t−1 of periods’ t− 1 retirees is car-
ried to the next period. Of workers who retire between these periods, (1 −
ωt−1,t)(Rdt,t−1A
w
t−1 +Wt−1 − Cwt−1 − Twt−1) adds to the retirees assets in the be-
ginning of period t, where Twt = N
w
t T
jw
t . Thus retirees’ aggregate assets evolve
according to
Art+1 = R
d
t A
r
t − Crt + (1−ωt+1)(Rdt Awt +WtNwt − Cwt − Twt ). (4.66)
Workers’ aggregate assets evolve according to
Awt+1 = ωt+1(R
d
t A
w
t +WtN
w
t − Cwt − Twt ). (4.67)
Aggregate resource constraint is given by
At+1 = Awt+1 + A
r
t+1
= Rdt At +WtNt − Ct − Twt . (4.68)
Consumption
Marginal propensities to consume, both for retirees and workers, do not de-
pend on individual characteristics. The aggregate consumption in each group
is thus total wealth times the groups’ marginal propensities to consume.
Aggregate consumption for retirees is
Crt = etpit(R
d
t A
r
t) . (4.69)
Retirees aggregate consumption is divided between home and foreign goods
to satisfy the first order condition with respect to foreign consumption, Cr,1t e
−ε
t =
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Cr,2t , so that retirees’ consumption of domestic goods is
Cr,1t =
etpit(Rdt A
r
t)
(1+ e1−εt )
(4.70)
and retirees’ consumption of foreign goods
Cr,2t =
e−εt etpit(Rdt Art)
(1+ e1−εt )
. (4.71)
Similarly for workers, the aggregate consumption is
Cwt = pit(R
d
t A
w
t + H
w
t ). (4.72)
Workers’ consumption of domestic goods is
Cw,1t =
pit(Rdt A
w
t + H
w
t )
(1+ e1−εt )
(4.73)
and workers’ consumption of foreign goods is
Cw,2t =
e−εt pit(Rdt Awt + Hwt )
(1+ e1−εt )
. (4.74)
Total aggregate consumption is
Ct = Crt + C
w
t = etpit(R
d
t A
r
t) + pit(R
d
t A
w
t + H
w
t ). (4.75)
Denoting the share of assets held by retirees λt =
Art
At , total aggregate consump-
tion can be written as
Ct = pitAtRdt (etλt + 1− λt) + pit(Hwt ). (4.76)
Consumption for retirees can be written as
Crt = etpit(R
d
t λtAt) (4.77)
and consumption for workers
Cwt = pit(R
d
t (1− λt) At + Hwt ). (4.78)
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On the aggregate level, consumption of home and foreign goods is divided
as follows:
C1t e
−ε
t = C
2
t (4.79)
and given that aggregate consumption is Ct = C1t + etC
2
t = C
1
t (1+ e
1−ε
t ) =
pitAtRdt (etλt + 1− λt) + pit(Hwt ), aggregate consumption of domestic good in
country 1 is
C1t =
(
pitAtRdt (etλt + 1− λt) + pit(Hwt )
)
(1+ e1−εt )
(4.80)
and aggregate consumption of foreign goods in country 1 is
C2t =
e−εt
(
pitAtRdt (etλt + 1− λt) + pit(Hwt )
)
(1+ e1−εt )
. (4.81)
Human wealth
The present discounted value of workers’ aggregate human wealth is
Hwt = N
w
t Wt − Twt +ωt,t+1Nwt
Hwt+1
Nwt+1
Rdt+1Ωt+1
= Nwt Wt − Twt +ωt,t+1Nwt
Hwt+1
Nwt (1+nt)
Rdt+1Ωt+1
= Nwt Wt − Twt +ωt,t+1
Hwt+1
(1+ nt)Rdt+1Ωt+1
. (4.82)
Distribution of wealth
Substituting expressions (4.67) and (4.78) into (4.66), the distribution of wealth
between workers and retirees can be shown to evolve as follows:
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Art+1 = R
d
t A
r
t − Crt + (1−ωt+1)(Rdt+1Awt +WtNwt − Cwt − Twt )
= Rdt A
r
t(1− etpit) + (1−ωt+1)
Awt+1
ωt+1
(4.83)
Substituting the definition if λt =
Art
At , this can be rewritten as
At+1λt+1 = Rdt λtAt(1− etpit) + (1−ωt+1)
λt+1At+1
ωt+1
λt+1 = ωt,t+1(Rdt λt
At
At+1
(1− etpit)) + (1−ωt,t+1). (4.84)
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